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This study examines the public debt, public debt service and economic growth nexus 
in Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa using time-series data from 1970 to 2017. This 
research provides empirical evidence to contribute, firstly, to the ongoing public policy 
debate regarding the dynamic relationship between public debt, public debt service 
and economic growth, and their causal relationship; and secondly, to the relative 
impact of domestic and foreign public debt on economic growth in the selected study 
countries. For this purpose, four empirical models were utilised and estimated using 
the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds to cointegration and the error 
correction ARDL-based causality test. Model 1 explored the impact of aggregate public 
debt on economic growth, while Model 2 investigated the relative impact of domestic 
and foreign public debt on economic growth. Model 3 examined the impact of public 
debt service on economic growth, whereas the causality between aggregate public 
debt and economic growth, and between public debt service and economic growth is 
tested in Model 4a and Model 4b, respectively. Results show that in Model 1, 
aggregate public debt has a positive impact on economic growth in Zambia but is 
negative in Zimbabwe and South Africa. In Model 2, domestic public debt negatively 
impacts economic growth in Zambia and Zimbabwe and positive impact in South 
Africa. In addition, foreign public debt has a positive impact on economic growth in 
Zambia and negative impact in Zimbabwe and South Africa. The results from Model 3 
largely support a negative relationship between public debt service and economic 
growth in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and an insignificant relationship in South Africa. The 
causality results for Model 4a indicate that it is economic growth that drives public debt 
in all the study countries. Finally, no causal relationship between public debt service 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Background to the study 
The debate concerning the linkage between public debt and economic growth, and 
between public debt service and economic growth among policymakers has been 
acknowledged for many years, but after 1998, the contest became increasingly fierce 
and subject to misrepresentation. The resurgence of successive financial, economic 
and public debt crises that adversely affected most world economies beginning 1998 
intensified the debate (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2014a). From these recent 
empirical discussions, it became apparent that the relationship between sovereign 
debt and economic growth is not clear but that it is heterogeneous across countries 
and periods. The IMF (2012a: 9) concluded that “…there is no simple relationship 
between debt and growth ... There are many factors that matter for a country’s growth 
and debt performance”.  
Although a large body of existing literature on the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth supports a negative relationship through future policy uncertainty, 
crowding out effect and fiscal illusion (Mhlaba & Phiri, 2019; Huang et al., 2018; Sachs, 
1989), two alternative views still exist. The first argument purports the impact of public 
debt on economic growth to be positive (Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2018; Spilioti 
& Vamvoukas, 2015). The second argument is on the neutrality of public debt on 
economic growth (Kourtellos et al., 2013; Tchereni et al., 2013). 
There are also other divergent views where some studies support a nonlinear 
relationship between public debt and economic growth (Mupunga & Le Roux, 2015; 
Eberhardt & Presbitero, 2015). This view, however, is outside the scope of this study. 
Previous empirical studies on the subject have focused mostly on the relationship 
between aggregate public debt and economic growth, affording the relative impact of 
domestic and foreign public debt on economic growth very little coverage (Huang et 
al., 2018; Panizza & Presbitero, 2014; Reinhart et al., 2012). More so, the findings of 
the limited studies undertaken on the relative impact of domestic and foreign public 
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debt on economic growth are inconclusive (Akram, 2016; 2015; Akhter & Hassan, 
2012; Adams & Bevan, 2005). Although some found evidence consistent with a 
positive relationship between domestic public debt and economic growth, others 
established a negative relationship between the two variables. Furthermore, other 
studies maintain that domestic public debt has more crowding out effects on economic 
growth compared to its foreign counterpart (Akram, 2016; 2015). 
Apart from differing views in both theoretical and empirical literature on the general 
relationship between public debt (domestic and foreign) and economic growth, there 
is the debate on the impact of public debt service on economic growth. Two opposing 
theoretical views exist. First, is the view that public debt service negatively affects 
economic growth through: (1) liquidity constraint hypothesis (Moss & Chiang, 2003); 
(2) crowding out effect (Chowdhury, 2004; Elbadawi et al., 1997; Sachs, 1989); (3) 
fiscal policy space constraints; and (iv) future public policy uncertainties (IMF, 2018; 
2014a; Cecchetti, et al., 2012; Cochrane, 2011a; 2011b). Second, is the body of 
literature asserting that the link between public debt service and economic growth is 
non-existent (Barro, 1989). 
Similar to the overall impact of public debt on economic growth, and public debt service 
on economic growth is the lack of consensus on the direction of causality between 
public debt and economic growth, and between public debt service and economic 
growth. Unlike in the former scenario, the empirical literature on the direction of 
causality between public debt service and economic growth is still insufficient, and the 
results are mixed.  
Against this background, previous studies on the impact of public debt on economic 
growth, and public debt service and economic growth have not been consistent 
(Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2018; Akram, 2016; 2015; Baum et al., 2013). The 
current study aims to take the public debt, public debt service and economic growth 
nexus debate a step closer to its conclusion in three Southern African countries, as 
well as proffer policy recommendations to the relevant policymakers – thus helping the 
economies studied here to move to optimal growth paths and achieve the newly 
defined Sustainable Development Goals. 
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In order to examine and provide new country-focused evidence on the impact of public 
debt (domestic and foreign) and public debt service on economic growth; and establish 
the direction of causality between aggregate public debt and economic growth and 
between public debt service and economic growth, there are three Southern African 
economies incorporated in this study. These are Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
The selected countries constitute a general cross-section of the overall economic, 
financial and public debt structures in many Southern African economies. For instance, 
the selected countries are at different levels of economic development, enabling cross-
country comparisons. According to the 2018 World Bank’s world economies income 
classification, South Africa is in the upper-middle-income category, while Zambia and 
Zimbabwe are in the lower-middle-income and low-income categories, respectively 
(World Bank, 2018a).  
Furthermore, South Africa has a high proportion of its public debt denominated in local 
currency (Rands). In other words, South Africa relatively depends more on domestic 
debt than foreign debt, which is contrary to the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe (South 
African Reserve Bank, 2018; Bank of Zambia, 2018a; 2018b; Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, 2018a).  
Also, the chosen three countries are among the few Southern African countries with 
consistently available and reliable time-series data on the public debt (domestic and 
foreign), public debt service and economic growth. Lastly, the countries are among the 
economies in Southern African Development Community (SADC) where scarce 
empirical evidence exists concerning the relative impact of domestic and foreign public 
debt on economic growth.  
1.2 Statement of the problem  
The resurgence of the financial and public debt crises that affected several countries 
across the globe since 1998 again emphasised the need to re-examine this issue with 
the risks of high and increasing public sector indebtedness – including its composition 
and structure – and its impact on economic growth. A blend of low economic growth 
rates and ever-increasing budget deficits has forced most world governments, 
including SADC governments, to either borrow from both domestic and international 
sources or revert to money printing to suppress the effects of recession (Reinhart et 
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al., 2012). These high public debts (domestic and foreign) and the associated high 
repayment costs have not only reduced the fiscal space of both low-income and 
middle-income countries but also crippled governments’ effort to reduce poverty and 
soaring unemployment rates (IMF, 2018; Kobayashi, 2015; Claessens & Kose, 2013). 
Thus, the debate surrounding the impact of public debt (domestic and foreign) and 
public debt service on economic growth resurfaced at a time when most world 
countries are battling to transform their economies to attain sustainable economic 
growths and boost the welfare standards of its citizen (Claessens et al., 2012). 
Among the empirical work carried out, the results are mixed. Numerous studies found 
the accumulation of public debt and repayment costs as growth-inhibiting (Huang et 
al., 2018; Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2018). Others found that debt-financed 
expansionary fiscal policies positively affect economic growth (Kobayashi, 2015; 
Spilioti & Vamvoukas, 2015; DeLong & Summers, 2012). To date, few studies 
established evidence consistent with the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis, which 
asserts that public debt or public debt service do not affect economic growth (Akram, 
2016; 2015; Tchereni et al., 2013; Barro, 1989). 
Moreover, there is also unresolved debate on the debt-growth causal relationship 
despite the growing need for governments in the developing world to find lasting 
solutions to sustainable economic growth paths. Causality test results differ from one 
study to the other (Donayre & Taivan, 2017; Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2015). It 
is against this background that the study empirically tests the dynamic impact of 
aggregate public debt, the relative impact of domestic and foreign public debt, and the 
impact of public debt service on economic growth in the selected Southern African 
economies. Therefore, this research contributes to the ongoing debt-growth debate 
and also assisting with the formulation of government debt and economic growth 
policies.  
The study uses one of the most modern and advanced econometric techniques – the 
ARDL bounds testing approach to carry out all analysis and to guide policy in these 
study economies meaningfully. The study also examines the causal relationship 
between public debt and economic growth, and between public debt service and 
economic growth within a multivariate Granger-causality framework. The inconsistent 
5 
 
results from the currently available causality studies on the topic point to the necessity 
for an updated study on the debt-growth nexus in the study countries. 
1.3 Objectives and hypotheses of the study 
1.3.1 Objectives of the study 
The primary objective of this study is to empirically investigate the public debt, public 
debt service and economic growth nexus in Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa for 
the sample period 1970-2017.  
The specific objectives of this study are to examine: 
(i) the impact of aggregated public debt on economic growth in three Southern 
African countries, namely; Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
(ii) the relative impact of disaggregated public debt (domestic and foreign) on 
economic growth in the selected Southern African countries. 
(iii) the impact of public debt service on economic growth in the selected Southern 
African countries. 
(iv) the causality between aggregate public debt and economic growth in the 
selected Southern African countries. 
(v) the causality between public debt service and economic growth in the selected 
Southern African countries. 
1.3.2 Research hypotheses 
This study tests the following hypotheses: 
(i) aggregate public debt negatively impacts economic growth in the selected three 
Southern African countries. 
(ii) domestic and foreign public debt negatively impacts economic growth in the 
selected three Southern African countries. 
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(iii) public debt service negatively impacts economic growth in the selected three 
Southern African countries. 
(iv) there is a unidirectional causal flow from aggregate public debt to economic 
growth in these countries. 
(v)  there is a unidirectional causal flow from public debt service to economic growth 
in these countries. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
This study differentiates itself from the bulk of the related research on the subject in 
numerous ways. First, previous studies on the subject have tested either the impact 
of aggregate public debt or public debt service on economic growth only, while this 
study makes some critical distinctions in its analyses, thereby making it a more specific 
and comprehensive analysis (Spilioti & Vamvoukas, 2015; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010a; 
2010b). The study jointly analyses the impact of aggregate public debt and public debt 
service on economic growth. It then further splits public debt into domestic and foreign 
components and simultaneously, investigates the relative impact of each component 
on economic growth.  
Second, unlike some of the previous studies which could have suffered from omission-
of-variable bias by utilising bivariate causality tests, this study re-examines the causal 
flow between aggregate public debt and economic growth, and between public debt 
service and economic growth in a multivariate setting (Donayre & Taivan, 2017; 
Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2015; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010a). The incorporation of 
intermittent variables into the causality framework, which has not been widely used in 
most previous studies, increases the overall predictive strength of the causation test 
(Loizides & Vamvoukas, 2005; Lutkepohl, 1982).  
Third, the use of the bounds testing approach to cointegration, developed within an 
ARDL model, is not widely used to carry out both the impact analysis and causality 
tests. The chosen ARDL approach has the strength of yielding unbiased estimates 
even in small or finite data sample sizes, even when some of the regressors are 
endogenous (Narayan, 2004; Pesaran et al., 2001). 
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Fourth, the majority of the previous studies that have examined the relationship 
between public debt and economic growth have been conducted predominantly based 
on cross-sectional data analysis (Chudik et al., 2017; Savvides,1992). Cross-sectional 
grouping of countries that have adopted different economic management systems may 
fail to satisfactorily account for the important country-specific features (Khan & Kumar, 
1997). However, this research uses annual time-series data and one of the recently 
developed econometric estimation techniques and softwares. Thus, the chosen time-
series approach makes it possible to incorporate diverse factors across countries and 
periods, and thus provide country-specific results and policy recommendations. 
Finally, this study focuses on countries at varying stages of economic development, 
and with different public debt compositions. Hence, this approach makes it possible to 
provide country-specific policy recommendations as well as cross-comparisons of 
results for the countries under study.  
The researcher believes that the body of economic knowledge stands to gain from this 
study by extending the public debt-economic growth nexus debate to the Southern 
African countries (Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa) and providing new information 
on this association through the application of contemporary econometric techniques. 
Thus, the study findings could provide valuable policy guidance on debt-growth 
matters in these countries. 
1.5 Organisation of the study 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows:  
 
▪ Chapter 2 reviews country-based literature on public debt and economic 
growth, and public debt service and economic growth in Zambia.  
▪ Chapter 3 discusses country-based literature on public debt and economic 
growth, and public debt service and economic growth in Zimbabwe.  
▪ Chapter 4 considers country-based literature on public debt and economic 
growth, and public debt service and economic growth in South Africa.  
 
Thus, the economic, financial and public debt developments and experiences of these 
countries presented in Chapters 2 to 4 serve as a basis for the empirical examination 
8 
 
of public debt, public debt service and economic growth nexus presented in Chapters 
6 and 7.  
 
▪ In Chapter 5, the study reviews existing theoretical and empirical literature on 
the impact of public debt on economic growth, and of public debt service on 
economic growth, as well as literature on the causality between public debt and 
economic growth, and between public debt service and economic growth.  
▪ Chapter 6 discusses the study methodology and estimation techniques. 
▪ Chapter 7 presents and discusses the econometric analysis and empirical 
findings.  
▪ Chapter 8 concludes the study and provides some policy recommendations 
based on the empirical outcomes presented in Chapter 7. The chapter also 


















PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN ZAMBIA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the dynamics of public debt, public debt service and economic 
growth in Zambia. The chapter is structured into four major sections. Section 2.2 
discusses public debt and economic growth dynamics in Zambia and has four sub-
sections that examine the following issues: an overview of the evolution of public debt 
in Zambia, public debt reform, trends and challenges facing public debt management 
in Zambia. Section 2.3 discusses public debt service and economic growth dynamics 
in Zambia and is further divided into four sub-sections, namely: an overview of the 
evolution of public debt service in Zambia; public debt service reforms; trends in public 
debt service and economic growth in Zambia and challenges affecting public debt 
service management in Zambia. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 The dynamics of public debt in Zambia 
2.2.1 The evolution of public debt in Zambia  
The public debt of Zambia composes of domestic and foreign debt. As such, the 
evolution of Zambia’s public indebtedness stems from growing domestic borrowing 
and foreign loans, both concessional and non-concessional. Similar to many 
developing countries, Zambia’s profound public indebtedness was a result of the 
government’s need to bridge the fiscal gap, which was a product of copious factors 
ranging from periodic droughts, massive infrastructural developments, public sector 
financial indiscipline, growing social demands and economic misfortunes, locally and 
globally (World Bank, 2018a; Fraser & Larmer, 2010; McCulloch et al., 2000a). Hence, 
domestic and foreign borrowing by the Government of Zambia (GRZ) remained an 
essential part of resource mobilisation for the sake of financing rising fiscal imbalances 
(Bank of Zambia (BOZ), 2015a).  
Faced with a multiplicity of economic, political, financial and social problems, the 
Zambian government had several available financing options for its ever-increasing 
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public expenditure demands. According to the Development Finance International 
(DFID) (2015), between 1973 and 2000, the government resorted to excessive money 
printing, domestic and foreign borrowing – mostly on a non-concessional basis – and 
a rundown of export earnings at the central bank. However, each option had its 
challenges for the Zambian economy. Accordingly, the dynamics of the Zambian 
public indebtedness are centred mostly on the fiscal operations of the government, 
which also evolved due to changes in political administration, as well as global 
economic developments.  
Prior to 1970, Zambia’s economy was mainly stable, and the government’s overall 
fiscal balance and BOP were both in surplus (World Bank, 2018a). As a result, the 
fiscal policy of Zambia was mostly an administrative tool to guide government 
expenditures and raise revenues (Chakaodza, 1993). This period was also associated 
with positive economic growth rates, averaging 6.9% per annum, with gross national 
savings and investment in excess of 30% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2006). The state had high foreign 
exchange reserves from exports of raw copper, fetching extremely high prices on the 
global markets (Saasa, 2010; Hill & McPherson, 2004). These foreign exchange 
reserves amounted to approximately 12 months of import cover, and as a result, 
government borrowing, both domestic and foreign, was considered undesirable 
(Saasa, 2010; GRZ, 2006a). Total domestic and foreign public debts were US$177.3 
million and US$132.2 million, respectively, in 1970 (Andersson et al., 2000).  
However, the cumulative effect of the nationalisation program, which the government 
of Zambia termed the “Africanisation program”, and the global economic recession of 
the mid-1970s, exacerbated the macroeconomic instability in this country (Langmead 
et al., 2006). Consequently, Zambia plunged into severe budget and balance of 
payment problems, forcing the authorities to rely on debt financing (GRZ, 1979; 1972; 
1966).  
The public debt burden of Zambia was further worsened by the perceived country risk 
owing to domestic politics, which adversely affected domestic and foreign investments, 
as well as the inflow of foreign aid (Hill & McPherson, 2004). Ultimately, by the mid-
1980s, Zambia was in a critical public debt crisis, becoming one of the most highly 
indebted nations in the world (Andersson et al., 2000). The high public debt started to 
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impede the country’s economic and social progress, resulting in its consideration for 
debt relief by its major creditors, that is, the World Bank, the IMF and the Paris Club 
(Andersson et al., 2000). Subsequently, Zambia benefitted from huge debt relief 
mostly from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the Paris Club members 
from the early 1990s until 2006 (IMF, 2008a; IMF and the International Development 
Agency (IDA), 2000).  
Following the debt relief programmes, Zambia’s foreign public debt stock reduced to 
nearly US$1.2 billion in 2005 (IMF, 2005a). However, Zambia tapped from the local 
and foreign capital markets, and as a result, the public debt stocks have been on an 
upward trajectory since 2006. By October 2017, the World Bank and IMF (IMF, 2017a) 
considered Zambia to be at high risk of debt distress. Hence, a new approach to public 
debt management is essential to save the country from plunging into another public 
debt crisis in the future. 
2.2.2 Public debt reforms in Zambia 
A variety of issues over the years resulted in Zambia’s public sector indebtedness, 
including natural factors (such as periodic and devastating droughts), deteriorating 
terms of trade for commodity exports, poor gross investment levels, massive 
infrastructural developments, public sector financial indiscipline, and increasing social 
demands (World Bank, 2017a; Andersson et al., 2000). These domestic and global 
economic and financial crises between 1973 and 2000 caused severe state revenue 
constraints and persistent budget imbalances (Andersson et al., 2000; GRZ, 1989; 
1979). The government had to rely on seigniorage, domestic and foreign borrowing, 
mainly non-concessional, and an excessive rundown on export earnings at the 
country’s central bank to increase fiscal space (Andersson et al., 2000: 30). 
Furthermore, the inability by the country to timeously service foreign public debt 
induced the accumulation of interest on unserviced government debt in the 1980s 
(World Bank, 1993). The outcome was a perpetual increase in public debt stock in the 
1980s and 1990s, even after new foreign borrowings ceased (World Bank, 1993: 15). 
For instance, the public debt/GDP ratio was below 44% in 1970, but in 2001, the ratio 
exceeded 235% (World Bank, 2018a). 
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By mid-1980s, Zambia was in serious public debt crisis compelling the country to 
undertake a series of economic and financial reforms. Some of the policy reforms to 
the economic and public debt crises were well designed, while some were not. On the 
whole, public debt reforms in Zambia between 1964 and 2017 centred on improving 
the legal, institutional, and public financial management frameworks of the country; 
supported by structural economic adjustments. The primary purpose of these policy 
responses was to stimulate economic growth through increased investment levels and 
reduced public sector indebtedness and poverty (UNDP, 2016; IMF, 2008b). 
Nonetheless, economic growth rates remained subdued between 1973 and 2000 due 
to poor investment response, essentially due to the high investment risks associated 
with most African States, Zambia included (Chirwa & Odhiambo, 2016; Andersson et 
al., 2000). 
The high levels of government debt in Zambia between 1973 and 2000 encouraged 
the desirability of massive fiscal amendments to lessen the impact of anaemic 
economic growth rates and soaring levels of poverty in the country, as well to keep 
public debt within sustainable limits (World Bank, 2003; McCulloch et al., 2000b). Also, 
the need for public debt reforms in Zambia during the 1980s and 1990s was 
inescapable as it had a direct political connotation, especially to the ruling party (IMF, 
2008b).   
The public debt reforms in Zambia during the period under review consists of two 
distinct periods – 1964 to 2005 and 2006 to 2017. The first phase, 1964-2005, focused 
on reforms intended at developing the government securities market, and later on, 
lessening the government’s debt burden, while the second phase, 2006-2017, 
associated with reforms to promote responsible borrowing and maintenance of public 
debt stocks within sustainable levels (BOZ, 2015b; GRZ, 2011, 2006b; 2006c; 1989; 
1972; 1966).  
The major domestic public debt management reforms undertaken by the government 
of Zambia in the 1990s intended to grow the country’s financial and capital markets 
and promote private sector development. The reforms also targeted restricting rising 
fiscal deficits by boosting the revenue capacity of the government (World Bank, 2006). 
These economic and financial reforms included:  
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(1) the liberalisation of the economy and financial sector, which translated into the 
liberalisation of interest rates and government securities yield rates;  
(2) the introduction of new government securities trading arrangements – that is, 
the introduction of government bonds and treasury bill auctions, which 
substituted the old system of trading state securities by tap basis; and the 
selling of government securities using the electronic book-entry system, which 
replaced the issuance of certificates;  
(3) the implementation of a cash budgeting system in 1993;  
(4) the undertaking of tax reforms, for example, the introduction of value-added tax 
in 1995; and  
(5) the revision of the country’s foreign exchange laws (World Bank, 2017a; 2006; 
1993; 2001a; BOZ, 2007; GRZ, 2006b; Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), 2006; Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; 
McCulloch et al., 2000a; Kapumpa, 1995). 
 
The government securities market in Zambia existed since the time of the colonial 
government. During this period, the government used debt markets to raise funds by 
issuing bonds (Kamanga, 2007). After independence in 1964, the new government 
continued to raise budgetary funds from the government securities markets and 
introduced treasury bills, in addition to government bonds (Kamanga, 2007; Kapumpa, 
1995).  
In 1992, the government of Zambia undertook massive economic and financial 
liberalisation removing controls on both domestic interest rates on deposits and loans 
and foreign exchange (Kapumpa, 1995). The government also adopted new financial 
regulatory frameworks, including the inception of the Banking and Financial Services 
Act (Chapter 387) of the laws of Zambia (Kamanga, 2007). The new act observed new 
players entering the financial markets, bringing increased competition to the financial 
sector (Kamanga, 2007). Regarding the auctioning of government securities, treasury 
bills were first auctioned in January 1993, and bonds in February 1995 (World Bank, 
2006). Before the introduction of government securities auction system, both treasury 
bills and government bonds traded on an ad hoc and tap basis (World Bank, 2006). 
In 1994, the government securities market was further strengthened by means of the 
formation of the Lusaka Stock Exchange with technical assistance from the 
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International Finance Corporation and World Bank (World Bank, 2006). Before the 
inception of the Lusaka Stock Exchange, government securities and other long-term 
private issued instruments traded on an over-the-counter basis (World Bank, 2006). 
The creation of the Lusaka Stock Exchange was part of the government’s adherence 
to the World Bank economic and financial reforms (World Bank, 2006). 
On the expenditure side, to contain rising domestic public debt, the government 
introduced the cash budgeting system in 1993. Each line ministry’s expenditure was 
limited to disbursed government funds only utilising this method (GRZ, 2007). On the 
government securities side, the government controlled the growth of domestic public 
debt by managing the introduction of its securities. In 1993, the government of Zambia 
introduced a new treasury bill tender system called the auction system. This new 
development in the securities market aimed to increase domestic capital, money and 
foreign exchange markets, in addition to mopping up excess liquidity (BOZ, 2015b: 10; 
Kapumpa, 1995). This exercise caused a swift upsurge in nominal interest rates from 
approximately 60% in September 1992 to over 200% by the end of 1993 (World Bank, 
2001a). The liberalisation in the trading of government securities, that is, treasury bills 
and government bonds, meant that the market forces determined the prices of these 
securities.  
On the legal front, the government in 1995 enacted the Foreign Exchange Control Act 
leading to the cessation of foreign exchange repressions and strengthening the 
liberalisation of domestic interest rates (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000). Inevitably, the 
soaring real interest rates between 1991 and 2000, averaging 15.5%, attracted many 
private investors to the government-issued debt (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000). 
Apart from financial market liberalisation, the government also reformed its taxation 
systems, resulting in the replacement of sales tax with value-added tax in July of 1995 
(Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000). The government’s motive in introducing value-added tax 
in 1995 was to reduce inflationary pressures in the economy and enhance the revenue 
performances of the state by minimising tax evasion (OECD, 2006). In the area of 
structural and institutional reform, there was particular attention to public expenditure 
management and control. The focus of the government was to improve expenditure 
control and enhance the overall efficiency of the public sector. In line with these 
expenditure restructuring reforms, the government implemented the Integrated 
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Financial Management Information System (IFMS) in 2000 (IMF & IDA, 2000). Prior 
to this, the government launched the National Capacity Building Program to improve 
the capacity of the legislature and judiciary in the proper management of public 
resources and implementation of economic reforms, deregulation, and privatisation 
(IMF & IDA, 2000). Regarding the privatisation of state-owned businesses, in the 
1990s, the government formed the Zambia Privatisation Agency . The main focus of 
privatisation by Zambian authorities was to minimise government borrowing destined 
to subsidise loss-making state entities (IMF & IDA, 2000). 
In the post-Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) period, 2006-2017, domestic public 
debt reforms focused principally on minimising central government budget 
imbalances, managing the issuance of government securities and improving public 
sector financial management. The reforms included: the integration of planning and 
budgeting processes; introduction of new public expenditures controlling frameworks; 
adoption of new mechanisms of selling government securities; and amendment of the 
country’s constitution, especially on public finance management and accountability 
(World Bank, 2017a; GRZ, 2012; Dinh et al., 2002; Copestake & Weston, 2000). For 
example, in 2006, the government reduced the frequency of auctions for treasury bills 
from weekly to fortnightly and increased that of government bonds from quarterly to 
every two months (BOZ, 2006). This new policy directive intended to enhance liquidity 
management by progressively moving away from issuing shorter-term government 
securities to issuing longer-term government securities.  
As part of the fiscal consolidation exercise, the government in 2014 reintroduced the 
cash budgeting system to substantially reduce domestic public debt arrears 
accumulated in recent years (GRZ, 2015a; 2015b). The adopted cash budgeting 
system intends to continuously lower the government’s deficit financing syndrome, 
with the fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio targeted to reach 3% by 2020 (GRZ, 2015b). 
Furthermore, to promote more efficient and sustainable domestic public debt levels, 
the government in 2015 implemented the Treasury Single Account (TSA) system 
(GRZ, 2015a). The TSA system is an integrated structure of bank accounts that 
indicates the current cash resources of the government. The purpose of instituting the 
TSA system was to boost the government’s capability to efficiently and effectively 
administer public financial resources through refining existing payments processes 
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and eliminating unwarranted public finance management procedures (GRZ, 2015a; 
2015b).  
The other domestic public debt reforms in Zambia after 2006 were mostly embedded 
in the country’s constitution – Constitution Number 2 of 2016 (amended) – and other 
supplementary statutory instruments and acts. In the 2016 national constitution, each 
stage of the budgeting process, along with the modalities surrounding the issuance of 
domestic public debt, is guided by specific articles. For instance, the Bank of Zambia 
had the sole responsibility of issuing government securities and giving financial 
guidance to the government of Zambia (Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and 
Research (ZIPAR), 2015). These new arrangements were to foster public financial 
discipline and eliminate duplication of roles between the central bank and the Ministry 
of Finance. Other pieces of legislature included the Public Finance Act of 2004. The 
Public Finance Act of Zambia prescribes how budget deficits should be financed and 
provides annual limits of how much the responsible finance minister should contract 
on behalf of the government (GRZ, 2004).  
Apart from domestic public debt reforms, the government of Zambia also instituted 
numerous foreign public debt restructurings during the review period. Central to the 
financial and economic reforms before 2006 was the objective of reducing the foreign 
public debt and stimulating economic growth. For instance, in the period between 1991 
and 2006, the government of Zambia concentrated on engaging its major creditors, 
seeking both public debt relief and rescheduling. The country received considerable 
foreign public debt relief from the IMF, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, 
the Paris Club, and other creditors in following this policy direction (Ndikumana & 
Boyce, 2015; IMF, 2005a; 2000). 
Zambia also carried out extensive financial and economic reforms in its exchange rate 
regime and trade beginning in the 1970s until the 1990s. The reforms included the 
rapid devaluation of the exchange rate and decontrol of interest rates (Siakalenge, 
1994; Seshamani, 1990; Liebenthal, 1978). By the mid-1990s, Zambia had moved to 
a market-determined exchange rate policy supported by a liberal exchange control 
regime (Chiwele, 1996). The thrust of the government was to mobilise both domestic 
and foreign resources to repay the mounting foreign debt arrears. However, some of 
the instituted policies had secondary adverse effects on the government's budgetary 
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position, such as inflationary pressures into the economy, thus prompting further 
foreign borrowing (Seshamani, 1990).  
After 2006, the government focused mostly on promoting responsible foreign public 
borrowing, maintaining sustainable public debt levels, and enhancing efficient public 
finance management. Therefore, the reforms included the introduction of new foreign 
public debt management systems, including the introduction of computerised financial 
management information systems and new institutional frameworks responsible for 
public debt management (IMF, 2015a; GRZ, 2008; 2007).  
In order to qualify for the debt relief initiatives, the government of Zambia began to 
undertake joint public expenditure reviews with the World Bank in the late 1990s 
(World Bank, 2001a; Andersson et al., 2000). Complementing these expenditure 
reviews was the implementation of the Integrated Financial Management Information 
System (IFMIS) and the Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) (World Bank, 
2003). The objective of these initiatives was to improve public sector service delivery 
performance through the monitoring and tracking of foreign public debt commitments 
and domestic expenditures, thus helping to contain foreign public debt within 
sustainable levels. 
From 2006, the government started to carry out public Debt Sustainability Analyses 
(DSAs) consistently. The foreign public DSAs were in partnership with the World Bank 
and the IMF. The principal goal was to monitor the sustainability of foreign public debt 
levels closely and so help the government to assess its external borrowing needs, and 
also to evaluate all prospective debt sources (Ministry of Finance (MOF), 2014a). In 
line with the DSA initiative, the government also implemented the Medium-Term Debt 
Management Strategy (MTDS) to strengthen fiscal discipline and minimise future 
liquidity challenges in the post debt relief period (MOF, 2014a; GRZ, 2011). The MTDS 
is a policy guide that provides a framework for debt contraction, redemption, and 
refinancing to promote fiscal sustainability and stimulate economic growth (GRZ, 
2011). 
Similar to domestic public debt management, several pieces of legislation currently 
guide foreign public debt approval and contraction in the post-HIPC era in Zambia . 
These include the constitution of Zambia Number 2 of 2016 (amended); the Loans and 
Guarantees (Authorisation) Act, Chapter 366 of the laws of Zambia; the Bank of 
18 
 
Zambia (Amendment) Act, 2013, in conjunction with the Bank of Zambia Act of 1996, 
Chapter 360 of the laws of Zambia; the Local Loans Act, Chapter 353 of the laws of 
Zambia; and the Public Finance Act No. 15 of 2004 of the laws of Zambia (GRZ, 2016; 
2012; 2004; African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), 
2005). For example, according to Part VI, Article 63 sub-section two (d) of the 
Constitution of Zambia No. 2 of 2016, the National Assembly approves foreign public 
debt before it is contracted (GRZ, 2016). Further, Article 207, sub-section two(a) of the 
constitution states that the National Assembly specifies and approves the terms and 
conditions of a loan, grant, or guarantee (GRZ, 2016). The afore-described statutory 
instruments were enacted and enforced with the prime objective of cautioning the 
country against external shocks arising from unsustainable foreign borrowings.  
The public debt reforms discussed in this section have significantly influenced the 
structure and composition of Zambia’s public debt during the study period. The 
domestic and foreign debt reforms also contributed to the substantial decrease in the 
country’s debt stocks between 1992 and 2006. Furthermore, the public debt 
management reforms have also enhanced the study country’s economic growth 
prospects during this time. Presently, the country is among the Southern African 
countries whose overall public sector debt level is still within acceptable ranges under 
the World Bank and IMF baseline scenarios (IMF, 2020a; 2017a) (see diagram in 
Appendix). Besides sound macroeconomic policies and a strong public debt 
management framework, the country should continue to diversify its economy to 
expand its export base and strengthen its export structures (IMF, 2017a: 19). 
Furthermore, it needs to improve on overall public sector project appraisals and 
continue investing all borrowed funds in high returning investments, especially in the 
face of a projected rise in non-concessional borrowing and potential external financial 
and economic shocks (IMF, 2017a). 
2.2.3 Public debt and economic growth trends in Zambia 
The evolution of public debt in Zambia since the 1960s is a result of the combination 
of domestic and foreign factors. The domestic factors include public sector policy 
failures and domestic political developments, while the external factors include the 
debt relief initiatives as well as the global economic shocks. From one point of view, 
the internal component of Zambia’s public debt arises mostly from treasury bills and 
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government bonds, infrastructure loans, parastatals debts, and accumulation of 
arrears on statutory liabilities such as pensions (BOZ; 2013a; 2013b; IMF, 2012b; 
2005b; ZIPAR, 2015). Another view is that the foreign public debt component resulted 
mostly from excessive foreign borrowing on both concessional and non-concessional 
basis, mainly from multilateral and bilateral financial institutions, private banks, and 
export credit agencies (World Bank, 2015a; IMF, 2012c; BOZ, 2010). The non-
attractiveness of government securities in the 1990s and early 2000, due to high 
inflation and increased government debt payment defaults, also motivated the 
government to depend mostly on foreign borrowing (BOZ, 2015b: 10). 
In 1964, after attaining political independence, the Zambian government sought to 
attain economic sovereignty by setting as priority goals industrialisation and economic 
diversification (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2016). In 
line with these objectives, the country embarked on a series of political, financial, 
social, and economic reforms to stimulate economic growth through increased 
investment flows, efficient utilisation of domestic resources, increased export volumes, 
and finding sustainable ways of reducing domestic and foreign public debts (Fraser & 
Larmer, 2010). The focus was on massive infrastructure development through 
extensive expansionary government policies. Despite the enormous public sector 
investment in the early 1970s, exogenous factors such as the fall in world market 
prices of unrefined copper, and the global oil shocks of 1973 and 1978, increased the 
cost of imports and exacerbated macroeconomic instability (Langmead et al., 2006). 
Also, the massive nationalisation programme of the late 1960s significantly increased 
government expenditures, thereby worsening the financial position of the state 
(Andersson et al., 2000).  
Consequentially, weakening terms of trade, especially of raw copper and soaring 
international oil prices, caused extensive BOP problems and unsustainable budget 
deficits in Zambia, resulting in debt financing (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), 2012a; 2012b). In 1973, for instance, Zambia went into 
a loan contract with the World Bank to caution itself from the oil price shock (UNDP, 
2006: 11-12). However, the government erroneously perceived the adverse 
developments in the domestic and global economy, particularly copper export prices, 
as temporary. It, therefore, continued to maintain high levels of consumptive and 
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capital expenditures, opting to finance the resultant budget disparities through local 
and foreign borrowing (Fraser & Larmer, 2010). Moreover, the various infrastructural 
development projects undertaken by the government in the mid-1970s, such as the 
opening up of the Tanzania-Zambia corridor, helped accelerate the depletion of the 
state’s foreign reserves, forcing the government to opt for debt financing instead of 
scaling down capital costs (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Furthermore, the Zambian government’s commitment to supporting liberation 
struggles in the SADC region between 1960 and 1980 contributed to the negative 
compounding effect on state revenues, leading to incessant reliance on deficit 
financing (McCulloch et al., 2000a). The public debt burden of Zambia was further 
exacerbated by the perceived country risk owing to domestic politics, a condition which 
further adversely affected domestic private investment as well as the inflow of aid and 
foreign direct investment (Bates & Collier, 1998).  
2.2.3.1 Domestic public debt trend in Zambia 
In pre- and post-independent Zambia, the mining sector (mainly copper) was the 
mainspring of employment, foreign exchange earnings and government revenue 
(Rakner, 2003; Andersson et al., 1989). For this reason, the twin impact of sagging 
terms of trade and massive de-industrialisation experienced by Zambia from the late 
1970s until the late 1990s constrained the central government’s revenues from mineral 
taxation and exports, which declined by 82.6% from ZMK339 million in 1974 to ZMK59 
million in 1975, and further to ZMK12 million in 1976 (Organisation for Social Science 
Research for Southern and Eastern Africa (OSSREA), 2004). During this period, the 
aggregate contribution of raw copper to export revenues exceeded 90%, while the 
general manufacturing sector accounted for only 6.9% (World Bank, 2015b).  
With reduced government tax revenue and export receipts, especially mineral 
revenue, the government had to revert to domestic borrowing – resulting in a radical 
rise of domestic public debt stock in nominal terms, reaching over ZMK566 billion in 
2000 (Fagernäs & Roberts, 2004; McCulloch et al., 2000a). The Bank of Zambia 
started to issue credit on the domestic market to finance recurrent government 
expenditures, such as the payment of civil service and importation of fuel, as well as 
funding of work-in-progress capital projects (Fagernäs & Roberts, 2004).  
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The government’s economic reform program of the 1990s brought about massive 
privatisation of parastatals, liberalisation of the economy and financial markets, 
removal of price controls, removal of most restrictive labour controls, abolishment of 
most sectoral subsidies and establishment of numerous deficit financing instruments 
(Fraser & Larmer, 2010; World Bank, 2006; Hill & McPherson, 2004; Kaunga, 1993). 
As a result of these new economic structural arrangements, the government was 
compelled to be liable to the debt burden of the privatised parastatals and 
compensation of retrenched workers, thus worsening the domestic public debt position 
of the country (World Bank, 2006; Hill & McPherson, 2004). By the end of 1994, 
Zambia was in a severe domestic public debt trap, where government expenditures 
were rising fast, domestic public debt was increasing exponentially, and domestic 
interest rates were soaring (African Development Bank (AfDB), 2015). 
Overall, between 1990 and 2000, Zambia’s stock of domestic public debt was rising 
exponentially due to numerous factors but mainly rooted in the adopted liberalisation 
policies and the continuous fall in gross government revenues. These factors include, 
among others:  
(1) the rolling-over policy, which dealt with capitalisation of the principal and 
interest on domestic public debt;  
(2) the high-interest rates on government securities, determined by the forces of 
demand and supply;  
(3) the continued unsustainable government budget deficits; and  
(4) the high liquidity in the banking sector (MOF, 2004). 
 
However, the persistently high inflation levels experienced in the Zambian economy 
during this period had the effect of reducing the real value of domestic public debt, 
since there was no coordination with equal adjustments in domestic nominal interest 
rates (Central Statistical Office of Zambia, 2014). The repercussion was a continuous 
fall in the domestic public debt/real GDP ratio between 1983 and 1999. Figure 2.1 





Figure 2.1: Domestic public debt trend in Zambia (1980-2017) 
  
Source: Author’s computation from Bank of Zambia (2018a; 2018b) 
 
As revealed in Figure 2.1, the trend of domestic public debt as a proportion of GDP 
has two phases; 1980 to 1998 and 1999 to 2017. In the first phase, there is a general 
downward trend in the proportion of domestic public debt-to-GDP, while a rising trend 
is visible in the second phase. Although Figure 2.1 portrays a declining domestic public 
debt ratio in the first phase, the nominal value of domestic public debt was on the rise 
(BOZ, 2010). Persistent government borrowings from the domestic market since 1983 
crowded out private sector investment as well as caused high inflation rates in the 
economy, thus reducing the real value of domestic public debt (IMF, 2008a). According 
to Atique and Malik (2012), when issuing domestic public debt, the government uses 
domestic private savings that would otherwise be accessible to the private investors, 
resulting in increased domestic interest rates which negatively affect private 
investment. More so, when interest rates are controlled, domestic borrowing causes 
credit rationing, which consequentially leads to crowding out of private sector 
investment (Fischer & Easterly, 1990). According to Fischer and Easterly (1990), the 
situation was worse in Zambia owing to the absence of well-developed non-bank 
financial institutions such as pension funds and retirement funds to which the 












































































































In the second phase, 1999-2017, an upward trajectory of the domestic public debt-to-
GDP ratio is visible in Figure 2.1. This upward trend resulted from an increased new 
issuance of treasury bills and special government bonds following an extensive 
restructuring of both the central bank and the Zambia National Commercial Bank 
(BOZ, 2013b; Kamanga, 2007; World Bank, 2006). In 2003, the Bank of Zambia and 
the Ministry of Finance started to implement numerous financial and economic 
structural reforms which helped to reduce the percentage of domestic public debt on 
GDP from 21% in 2003 to 14% in 2008 – hence the gradual increase in the domestic 
public debt/GDP ratio between 2003 and 2007 (Kamanga, 2007). On the whole, 
although the growth in nominal domestic public debt of Zambia in the 1980s was due 
to accumulated domestic public debt arrears, pension arrears and other forms of 
compensation payment obligations, the growth in domestic public debt stocks after 
2006 was a result of the government’s new strategy to finance domestically both 
recurrent public spending and infrastructure development expenditure (IMF, 2015a).  
In Zambia, the highest proportion of domestic public debt was in the banking sector, 
mainly the Zambia National Commercial Bank (BOZ, 2013b). The domestic public debt 
composed of marketable securities, that is, treasury bills and government bonds, non-
marketable securities, such as the ten-year bond, and other special bonds (like the 
Kwacha bridge loan), pension arrears, as well as other public liabilities (BOZ, 2013b). 











Table 2.1: Structure of domestic public debt in Zambia (by holder) (1990-2017) 
 Debt holder 
 Banking sector (%) Non-banking sector (%) 
1990 87 13 
1995 81 19 
2000 76 24 
2005 64 36 
2010 66 34 
2011 69 31 
2012 72 28 
2013 68 32 
2014 62 38 
2015 59 41 
2016 57 43 
2017 53 47 
Source: Author’s computation from Bank of Zambia (2018a; 2018b) 
 
Table 2.1 shows that the government of Zambia borrowed excessively from the 
banking system to fund its budget imbalances. The major players in government 
securities in Zambia were institutional investors like commercial banks, pension funds, 
and insurance companies (GRZ, 2006a). This was mainly on account of the high 
returns on government securities due to high yield rates on treasury bills and the 
regulatory requirement for commercial banks to maintain liquid assets as a percentage 
of liabilities (World Bank, 2006). Similarly, commercial banks dominated in the holding 
of government bonds (BOZ, 2018a). 
During the period 1990-2000, domestic public debt was largely short-term, and 
treasury bills were the main borrowing instruments of the government (GRZ, 2006a). 
Treasury bills had four maturity profiles – 28 days, 91 days, 182 days and 273 days 
(World Bank, 2006; GRZ, 2006a). However, the introduction of long-term government 
securities in 2001, in the form of one-year, one-and-half years, two-years, three-years 
and five-years government bonds, saw the emergence of the non-banking private 
sector, including foreign investors, increasingly becoming a significant source of 
demand to the government securities in Zambia (IMF, 2015a; GRZ, 2006a). The 
increase in the issuance of government securities was due to the need to cover rising 
government deficits (World Bank, 2018a). Although foreign investors were permitted 
to buy government securities, the law only required them to do that through authorised 
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Zambian commercial banks (AFRODAD, 2011). Figure 2.2 provides a general 
structure of the domestic public debt of Zambia from 1990 to 2017. 
Figure 2.2: Domestic public debt structure in Zambia (by instrument) (1990-2017) 
Source: Author’s computation from BOZ (2018a; 2018b) 
Figure 2.2 shows a generally increasing trend in the issuance of long-term government 
securities, notably from 2001 to 2017. This issuance of long-term government bonds 
contributed to the expansion and development of the domestic debt market in Zambia, 
especially after 2001. With increased issuance of government bonds, the Zambian 
government progressively minimised the roll-over risk associated with short-term debt 
(IMF, 2017a). However, the active participation of the government on the domestic 
financial market constrained gross domestic savings accumulation, in addition to 
pushing up the yield rates of securities (IMF, 2007). For instance, the yield rates for 
365 days treasury bills were 36%, 48%, 51.6% and 58.9% in 1996, 2001, 2007 and 
2010, respectively (BOZ, 2016).  
2.2.3.2 Foreign public debt trend in Zambia 
Although domestic public debt increased over the years to supplement the dwindling 
export receipts, this could not match the import needs and fiscal activities of the 
country. This forced the government to augment domestic revenues with foreign 
borrowings in addition to the desire to fulfil pre-independence promises to roll out 
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international multilateral and bilateral creditors (Simson, 1985). As a result, foreign 
public borrowing grew from the moderately lower levels of US$3.8 million between 
1975 and 1984 to over US$7.2 billion in 2004, representing a 187% increase (IMF, 
2005a). The period 1970 to 2000 was “foreign debt led” in the sense that Zambia ran 
a persistent current account deficit and borrowed hugely from the global financial 
institutions and capital markets to finance the escalating fiscal gap (World Bank, 
2018a; Andersson et al., 2000). Table 2.2 highlights the changes in some of the 
selected foreign public debt variables for Zambia between the periods 1975 to 1991. 
Table 2.2: Selected foreign public debt variables in Zambia (1975-1991) 
Variable   1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Foreign public debt  
(US$ millions) 
1137 3266 4576 5745 6626 6840 6709 7237 7271 
Foreign public debt-
to-GDP (%) 
49 84 203 345 319 188 154 172 190 
Foreign public debt-
to-exports (%) 
129 201 527 775 735 547 470 539 324 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
As depicted in Table 2.2, in the five years from 1975 to 1980, the foreign public debt 
of Zambia increased by nearly three times from US$1137 million to US$3366 million, 
respectively (World Bank, 2018a). By 1991, total foreign public debt further increased 
to US$7271 million, with most debt measurement variables deteriorating to 
unsustainable levels (IMF, 2003a). Therefore, from 1980 to 1991, Zambia was in 
severe foreign public debt distress, since the foreign public debt-to-GDP and export 
ratios were above the recommended IMF and World Bank thresholds of 40% and 
200%, respectively (IMF, 2012c). In other words, the economy of Zambia could not 
generate sufficient financial resources to meet foreign public debt obligations, both 
principal and accumulated interest. Also evident in Table 2.2 is the fact that a large 
proportion of export proceeds went towards foreign public debt servicing instead of 
developmental activities (IMF, 2003a). 
By 1992, the foreign public debt of Zambia had reached alarming levels which 
prompted some creditors, like the Paris Club to cancel part of the debt owed to them 
by Zambia and reschedule the remaining balance. However, notwithstanding this 
gesture by the Paris Club, Zambia’s foreign public debt crisis remained in place. In 
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1996, the IMF and World Bank launched the HIPC initiative targeting developing 
countries in serious debt challenges (IMF & IDA, 2000). To be accorded foreign public 
debt relief, recipient countries must accept and adhere to the prescribed HIPC 
economic structural reforms and conditions. These reforms included privatisation, 
market-oriented investment policies and trade liberalisation (IMF & IDA, 2000).   
Also, the HIPC initiative had baseline measurements of foreign debt sustainability in 
the form of the public debt-to-exports ratio, public debt-to-reserve ratio, public debt-to-
GDP ratio, and public debt-service-to-exports and central government revenue ratios. 
The IMF and the World Bank’s suggestive measure of the impending foreign public 
debt crisis for the ratios above were, 150%, 250%, 40%, 20% and 30%, respectively 
(IMF, 2019; IMF & World Bank, 2004; Johnson, 2001). According to these baseline 
indicative thresholds, a country would qualify for HIPC debt relief initiative only if its 
net present value of foreign public debt-to-exports ratio exceeded 150%, with a per 
capita income of less than US$785, and Zambia qualified (IMF, 2005a). 
In December 2000, the Bretton Woods institutions agreed that Zambia had met the 
prescribed conditions in the HIPC initiative and thus reached the Decision Point (IMF 
& IDA, 2000). In 2000, Zambia’s foreign public debt was at least double its GDP (World 
Bank, 2018a). During the interim period, between decision and completion points, 
Zambia received foreign public debt cancellation of US$452 million from the IMF, and 
US$98 million from IDA, AfDB, Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), European Union (EU), and Paris Club creditors (IMF, 2005a).  
With the accomplishment of the HIPC Completion Point in April 2005, Zambia received 
remarkable foreign public debt relief from the Group of Eight (G8) countries, Paris Club 
and other major creditors (GRZ, 2006c). The debt relief was in the form of foreign 
public debt stock cancellation and rescheduling. A total of US$2.8 billion foreign public 
debt was cancelled, reducing accumulated foreign public debt from US$7.2 billion in 
2004 to US$4.4 billion by December 2005 (GRZ, 2006c).  
The foreign public debt burden of Zambia further reduced when the Bretton Woods 
institutions and AfDB agreed to cancel a significant proportion of the debts owed to 
them under the Enhanced HIPC initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI) of 2006 (GRZ, 2006b; MOF, 2006a). The MDRI was a redefined and 
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developed edition of the HIPC. In January 2006, the IMF wrote off US$581.6 million, 
representing 97% of the debt owed by Zambia (GRZ, 2008). In the same year, both 
IDA and AfDB wrote off debts owed to them by Zambia (World Bank, 2014a). As a 
consequence, the MDRI reduced Zambia’s debt by an extra US$3 billion to US$1.3 
billion by the end of 2006 (World Bank, 2014a). Furthermore, the World Bank’s 
financial and technical support to Zambia since 2005 helped to ease the country’s 
quest to borrow externally (World Bank, 2014a).  
As from 2005, the World Bank has extended to Zambia two budget support credits 
worth US$50 million (World Bank, 2014a). These forms of non-debt support initiatives 
are helping the country to reduce the growth in foreign public debt stocks since 2005. 
The technical support from the World Bank led to the crafting of the Financial Sector 
Development Plan (FSDP) in 2009 (BOZ, 2017). Figure 2.3 shows the foreign public 
debt dynamics in Zambia from 1990 to 2017. 
Figure 2.3: Foreign public debt trend in Zambia (1990-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
 
Figure 2.3 portrays two episodes of foreign public debt development in Zambia; 
episode one is the debt relief period, 1990 to 2006, and episode two the post debt 
relief period, 2007 to 2017. Episode one is characterised by high levels of foreign 
public debt averaging US$6.6 billion (World Bank, 2018a). In 1992, the new 
government embarked on fresh borrowings to sustain its programmes and activities, 
and also support the structural economic and financial reforms instituted in the country 















































































radical rise in interest charges on foreign debt as a proportion of the national income 
worsened the fiscal and public debt position of this country (IMF & IDA, 2000).  
The high levels of foreign public debt in the 1990s, both principal and protracted 
arrears, impeded economic growth prospects through massive capital flight, 
depressed public and private sector investments, increased foreign exchange outflows 
– in the form of foreign public debt repayments – and restricted access to international 
finance (GRZ, 2006b). The downward spike in foreign public debt between 1992 and 
1993 in Figure 2.3 is a result of a US$1.5 billion debt cancellation by the Paris Club, 
with the remaining government debt balance being rescheduled (IMF, 2005b).  
From 1996, Zambia’s outstanding foreign debt stock was reduced by successive debt 
forgiveness from its major creditors, resulting in the portrayed downward trajectory 
visible in Figure 2.3 between 1996 and 2000. In 2000, Zambia reached the Decision 
Point resulting in marginal debt cancellation from the World Bank and the IMF (World 
Bank, 2014a). Despite these minor debt reliefs in 2000 by the Britton Woods 
institutions, the foreign public debt stock continued to rise, averaging US$6.2 billion, 
owing to accrued interest arrears and also maturing principal debts (ZIPAR, 2015; 
BOZ, 2001). Upon reaching the Completion Point in 2005, Zambia received massive 
public debt cancellation from its major creditors, further reducing the foreign public 
debt stock to less than US$1.3 billion in 2006 (GRZ, 2006b). 
In the second episode, 2006-2017, there is a noticeable exponential rise in foreign 
public debt stock in Zambia. This swift accumulation in foreign indebtedness during 
this period is likely to have been the result of a mixture of factors, such as new non-
concessional borrowing from international capital markets, the issuance of Eurobonds 
and syndicated loans on international debt markets, and significant real exchange rate 
depreciation (World Bank, 2017b). Zambia, like many other African countries, has in 
recent years been actively borrowing on a non-concessional basis from various 
international creditors, such as China and other emerging market economies, to 
reduce its fiscal imbalances and fund public sector developmental projects (IMF, 
2017a).  
Regarding Eurobonds, Zambia issued the bonds three times since 2012, that is, in 
2012, 2014 and 2015 – with the cumulative value amounting to US$3 billion in 2016 
30 
 
(World Bank, 2017b). The country also amassed US$450 million in 2016 through a 
syndicated loan (World Bank, 2017b). Subsequently, foreign public debt grew from 
US$2.5 billion (or 8.4% of GDP) in 2011 to US$7.3 billion in 2017 (or 38.5 % of GDP) 
(GRZ, 2018). The last segment of Figure 2.3 shows that foreign public debt stocks 
surpassed the levels prior to receiving public debt relief, meaning that from 2015, 
Zambia was classified as being in public debt distress (IMF, 2017a). Table 2.3 




Table 2.3: Summary of the IMF and the World Bank loans to Zambia (1970-2005) 
Year Loan Description 
1973 The World Bank disbursed the requested by the Zambian government 
following the global oil price shock. 
1978 The World Bank, through the International Development Association, 
extended new loans to Zambia. 
1981 The IMF made some loan disbursements to Zambia under the Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF). 
1982 The IMF cancelled the EFF. 
1983 The World Bank stopped making new loan and aid disbursements to Zambia. 
1984 The World Bank agreed to give Zambia a new loan towards the resuscitation 
and development of the Copper Sector. 
1985 The Bretton Woods institutions made some Structural Adjustment 
Programme loans disbursements to Zambia. 
1987 The Zambian government cancelled all Bretton Woods sponsored reform 
programmes. The IMF and the World Bank suspends financial aid and loans 
to Zambia. 
1992 The Zambian government clears loan arrears to the World Bank. The IMF 
started to make some new loan disbursements. 
1995 The IMF and Zambian government signed a new loan of US$1.3 billion under 
the 3-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and 1-year 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF).  Also, in 1995, the World Bank issued 
new loans to Zambia under the Economic Recovery and Investment Project. 
1999 The IMF disburses part of the $350 million loan under the extended ESAF. 
2000 Zambia reached the IMF and the World Bank HIPC Decision Point. As a 
result, Zambia received partial foreign public debt relief. 
2004 Through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the IMF made new loans 
to Zambia, to the tune of US$320 million. 
2005 Zambia reached the IMF/World Bank HIPC Completion Point and received 
enormous debt relief from the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Source: Author’s computation from GRZ (2006a; 2006b); IMF (2005a; 2001) 
On the economic growth front, Zambia’s economic growth dynamics were determined 
first by command-driven policies from 1964 to 1990 and second by market-oriented 
policies, from 1991 to 2017. The period 1964 to 1990 was associated with central 
planning, nationalisation of economic sectors, mainly mines, construction, energy, 
clothing and textiles, chemicals and manufacturing (Andersson et al., 2000; Saasa, 
1987; GRZ, 1966; 1964). According to Chirwa and Odhiambo (2016), the performance 
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of the Zambian economy during the first phase, 1964 to 1990, can be split into two 
phases, the golden phase which spans from 1964 to 1974, and the economic hardship 
phase which stretches from 1975 to 1990.  
During the golden period, the Zambian economy grew by an average annual rate of 
5.1%, mainly driven by copper exports which fetched high prices on the global market 
and accounted for more than 80% of the Zambian government’s revenue (Chirwa & 
Odhiambo, 2016; Andersson & Mugerwa, 1989; GRZ; 1966). The average annual 
GDP per capita during this period was $1589, reaching a record high of $1724 in 1965 
(World Bank, 2018a). In contrast to the golden phase, the economic hardship period, 
1975-1990 is characterised by (1) severe deterioration in international commodity 
prices, mainly copper and agricultural output prices; and (2) stern global oil price 
shocks (World Bank, 2006). A combination of these adverse developments in the 
global economy negatively impacted economic growth trends in Zambia, and also 
caused numerous government policy reforms and public policy reversals (GRZ, 
2006b). The economic growth rates during the period 1975-1990, were thus moderate, 
spiking at around 0.1% of GDP – with swings reaching a period low of a negative 8.4% 
in 1975 and a period high of about 4.1% in 1981 (World Bank, 2018a).  
The economic hardship phase was immediately followed by the market-oriented 
economic growth period, 1991-2017. Beginning in 1991, Zambia embarked on 
extensive economic structural adjustment reforms which resulted in most state-owned 
enterprises either privatised or commercialised (IMF & IDA, 2000; Bigsten & Mugerwa, 
2000). Despite the economic and financial reforms, the economy grew by an average 
rate of 0.6% between 1991 and 2000, with per capita income declining from a peak of 
US$892 in 1994 to US$554 in 2000 (World Bank, 2018a). Figure 2.4 summarises the 
economic growth trends and economic reforms in Zambia from 1964 to 2017. 







Figure 2.4: Economic reforms and economic growth trends in Zambia (1964-
2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a); GRZ (2017b; 2011; 2006b; 1989; 1966) 
 
EP  = Emergency Program;                  TNDP  = Transitional National Development Plan;  
NDP  = National Development Plan;     SAP  = Structural Adjustment Programme 
NERP = New Economic Recovery Programme   PRSP = Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
 
The trends portrayed in Figure 2.4 indicate that Zambia’s economic growth was 
unstable between 1964 and 1998. The negative economic growth variations between 
1964 and 1981 coincided with the fall in global copper prices and growing inefficiencies 
that characterised most state-owned enterprises (World Bank, 2006; Mudenda, 1984). 
During this period, 1964-1998, the Zambian government borrowed excessively from 
both the domestic and foreign capital markets to meet the fiscal gap following the 
decrease in copper export revenues and increased financial losses of state-owned 
entities (Andersson et al., 2000).  
The economic growth rates, however, recovered gradually from the -4.4% recorded in 
1982 to a peak of 4.8% in 1988 before falling to a negative 2.4% in 1989 (World Bank, 
2018a). The rise and fall pattern of economic growth rates seem to be related to the 
market reforms adopted for a while and later abandoned for a state-led economic 
growth model at the end of the 1980s – a model which was also short-lived (Bigsten 






 NERP2; 4NDP 
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& Mugerwa, 2000). In the early 1990s, economic growth rates were erratic, and the 
economy reached a period low of negative 9.8% in 1994 (World Bank, 2018a).  
However, there was an economic rebound from 2001 until 2014 in which average 
annual economic growth was 5.6% (World Bank, 2018a). For the first time since 1965 
when it reached 15.7%, Zambia's economic growth reached 7.6% mark in 2010 owing 
to increased copper production, high copper prices and a boost in agricultural exports 
(World Bank, 2018a). The economic growth rates recorded between 2001 and 2014 
were higher and more sustainable than those recorded between 1980 and 2000 
(World Bank, 2018a). However, the economic growth rate eased in 2015, 2016 and 
2017, recording 1.4%, 0.9% and 1.0%, respectively, following poor achievements in 
the services, extractive and construction industries beginning the end of 2015 (World 
Bank, 2018a; 2016a). In 2017, the government of Zambia approved its Seventh 
National Development Plan (2017-2021), with the theme, "Accelerating Development 
Efforts Towards Vision 2030 Without Leaving Anyone Behind” (GRZ, 2017a). The 
prime objective of this government policy is to transform the country into an upper-
middle-income country by 2030 (MOF, 2006b).   
In Figure 2.5, the study presents the trends in public debt and economic growth in 
Zambia between 1980 and 2017. Public Debt (PD) is expressed as a ratio of real GDP, 
while economic growth is measured by the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. 
Figure 2.5: Public debt and economic growth trends in Zambia (1980-2017) 
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Public debt dynamics in Zambia, as portrayed in Figure 2.5, has three phases: (1) 
1980 to 2004, in which government debt exceeded national output; (2) 2005 to 2014, 
when public debt levels were below 40% of GDP; and (3) 2015 to 2017, where public 
debt levels exceeded the World Bank and IMF debt sustainability threshold of 40% of 
GDP, averaging 59.9% (World Bank, 2018a; IMF, 2017a). The gradual increase in 
Zambia’s public debt after 2010 was due to the priority of the government to transform 
the country into an upper-middle-income country as stated in the country’s Vision 2030 
policy document (MOF, 2006b). Figure 2.5 reveals a strong negative correlation 
between public debt and annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in Zambia. 
Explicitly, the analysis of Zambia’s public debt manifests an upward trend during 
periods of economic slump and a stable, slowing-down trend during the post public 
debt crisis period. This analysis is consistent with the proposition that, at least on some 
level, low real growth could lead to higher debt levels.  
Conclusively, the dynamics of public debt during the period under review are reflected 
in the rapid changes in both domestic and foreign public debt components, especially 
after the debt relief initiatives. Figure 2.6 presents the public sector debt composition 
of Zambia in the period after the public debt relief initiatives, expressed as a 
percentage of real GDP per capita. 
Figure 2.6: Domestic, foreign public debt and economic growth in Zambia (2006-
2017) 
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In Figure 2.6, although both components of public debt grew since 2006, the rate of 
foreign public debt growth accelerated after 2014. From 2014 to 2017, an assortment 
of poor performances in key economic sectors, such as copper mining and agriculture 
widened the primary deficits and exacerbated both domestic and foreign public 
borrowing (IMF, 2017a). The period 2006 to 2017 has two distinct phases, 2006 to 
2014, and 2015 to 2017. In the first phase, 2006-2014, public debt levels were 
sustainable according to the IMF/World Bank sustainability threshold, while in the latter 
phase, sovereign debt is unsustainably elevated placing the country at a high risk of 
approaching a condition of public debt overhang (IMF, 2017a).  
While foreign public debt was driven up by both new external borrowings and 
exchange rate depreciation, the domestic counterpart was determined by the 
intensified issuance of state securities and central bank riding loans (IMF, 2017a). The 
proportion of domestic public debt to GDP rose from 12.7% in 2011 to 25.6% in 2017 
(IMF, 2017a). The rise in domestic public debt after 2011 arose typically from rising 
issuance of treasury bills, treasury bonds and accumulation of arrears and loan 
financing from the banking system (IMF, 2017a). The turn towards the domestic debt 
market by the government in 2008 and 2009 follows the global economic recession 
and public debt crises that adversely affected most developed economies, including 
Zambia’s prime markets for copper exports and foreign aid.  
While the Fifth National Development Plan had prescribed a maximum limit of 0.5% of 
GDP on domestic public borrowing, the government exceeded it by 2% for several 
reasons, including a large number of carryover funds, expansionary monetary policy 
and issuance of long-term government securities (GRZ, 2009). Beginning 2013, as 
seen in Figure 2.5, there was also a general rise in domestic borrowing in a bid by the 
government to reduce over-reliance on foreign loans to finance its budget (GRZ, 
2015b). 
2.2.4 Challenges facing public debt management in Zambia 
Public debt dynamics in Zambia are currently confronted with an unstable global 
economic and financial environment, which present serious challenges for effective 
public debt management (World Bank, 2016b). According to the World Bank (2016b), 
some factors that directly affect public debt management in Zambia are weak 
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economic growth rates in industrialised countries, unpredictable world commodity 
prices, as well as drastic rises in domestic and foreign interest rates.  
In general, public debt management in every country is an essential component within 
the fiscal strategy, especially when public debt stock, domestic and foreign, is large 
and growing, leading to issues of sustainability (IMF, 2016a). A sound fiscal strategy 
is one that reduces the risks associated with contracting substantial public debts and 
fosters the achievement of sustainable economic growth rates (World Bank, 2015b). 
Thus, the country’s laws and regulations governing public borrowing need to be plainly 
defined and enforced (IMF, 2016a).  
Notwithstanding the existence of several government debt management statutes and 
strategies, some of the public debt management challenges faced by the government 
of Zambia are (1) the lack of a comprehensive long-term plan or institutional 
arrangements to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies; and (2) the absence of public 
debt analysis methodology to ensure that government debt is kept within sustainable 
levels, and risks associated with future public borrowing are known and carefully 
calculated (World Bank, 2019; IMF, 2017a; BOZ, 2015b). 
Zambia’s current legal and administrative system on public debt is fraught with loose 
ends, which include duplication of functions and the absence of clear borrowing limits 
to all government divisions and associated institutions (AFRODAD, 2011). For 
instance, whereas the General Loan and Stock Act, Chapter 350 of the laws of Zambia 
empowers the central bank to administer government securities that were publicly 
issued, this law also allocates the mandate of registering government securities to the 
national treasury (GRZ, 2012). Also, whereas the law provides the maximum 
borrowing limit for the central government, it is silent about this issue for local and 
other sectors of the government, except when requesting guarantees (AFRODAD, 
2015). Additionally, according to AFRODAD (2015), currently there are no clear 
statutes to govern the approval of guarantees from the Ministry of Finance.  
There is also the potential for conflict between debt issuance for monetary and fiscal 
policy objectives. Government domestic debt issuance directly affects the domestic 
capital market through the establishment of benchmark prices, which also impact the 
financial sector stability and growth and, hence, affect the value of monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms (World Bank, 2015b). Therefore, government issuance of 
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domestic debt can restrain the options open to monetary policy authorities, and vice 
versa. Even with prescribed limits on domestic public borrowing, the maturity structure 
of government debt securities can directly affect the shape of the yield curve and thus 
influence the operations of monetary authorities (World Bank, 2015b). 
According to the Bank of Zambia (IMF & IDA, 2000), the absence of a proper 
government debt management framework, weak fiscal performance, exchange rate 
instability and high inflationary pressures in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to 
unsustainable domestic public debt levels. During this period, the government failed 
to effectively monitor and control the expenditures of its line ministries according to the 
stipulated public sector financial rules and regulations, leading to huge fiscal deficits 
(World Bank, 2004a: 3). Consequently, the government had to borrow additional 
financial resources to finance its budget. Moreover, the domestic market for 
government securities in Zambia is still narrow, and the banking sector dominates 
treasury securities – mainly commercial banks (OECD, 2014; 2010). The challenge 
with this arrangement is that commercial banks should match short-term liability 
deposits with short-term treasury bills, thus depressing the full development of the 
government bond market (OECD, 2007; World Bank and IMF, 2001). The dominance 
of the banking sector in government securities also reflects weakness in the 
commercial lending operations, particularly to the private sector (OECD, 2007).  
Although in 2012 the government issued Eurobonds, which possibly attracted foreign 
investors to the government securities, there are still challenges associated with the 
development of more long-term domestic public debt instruments to diversify the 
market for government securities (IMF, 2014b). Domestic public debt maturity periods 
of between two and three years make the government extremely susceptible to short-
term maturity risks and refinancing vulnerabilities, especially given the volatility of 
inflation and world interest rates (IMF, 2014c). Also, since the market for government 
securities is still underdeveloped, it is difficult and costly to introduce tax incentives to 
promote the demand for treasury bills and government bonds in Zambia (OECD, 
2010). While non-resident holders of government bonds are typically low, their 
presence increases volatility, meaning that Zambia’s domestic markets can suffer from 
exogenous shocks (OECD, 2014).  
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The other challenge that makes domestic public debt management difficult in Zambia 
is that local governments (municipal councils) are not involved in the overall national 
debt management strategy formulation (AFRODAD, 2012). The implication, according 
to AFRODAD (2012), is that local councils end up making too many financial demands 
on the central government, leading to continuous fiscal deficits, which ultimately lead 
to either domestic or foreign public borrowing. This challenge can be alleviated by 
inclusive policy and strategy making, where local governments are involved in the 
shaping of national policies that affect their operations. Also, local governments should 
seek suitable approval from the central government to ensure that their borrowing 
conforms to the national developmental objectives.  
Pertaining to the powers to borrow, the Local Loans Act authorises the president 
and/or the minister responsible for finance to acquire funds in the domestic financial 
markets through the issuance of specified government securities, that is, bonds and 
debentures (GRZ, 2016b; ZIPAR, 2015). The president can issue a warranty without 
an appropriation act or approval from the parliament (World Bank, 2005: 1). This 
arrangement makes both government expenditure management and domestic public 
debt control highly difficulty and unmanageable (World Bank, 2005).  
Although Zambia has explicit statutory measures governing the contracting and 
servicing of foreign public debt, the framework is not always adequately implemented 
and is poorly harmonised (IMF, 2015a: 9). For example, the Loans and Guarantees 
Act of the Laws of Zambia is only limited to the contraction, and not reporting, of foreign 
public debt. Hence, there are no proper foreign public debt management guidelines 
regarding the types of foreign public debt reports to be produced by either the central 
bank or the Ministry of Finance (IMF, 2012c). Also, since the President’s Office has 
exclusive control over national foreign debt contraction, the arrangement makes the 
management of foreign public debt difficult (AFRODAD, 2011: 27).  
Furthermore, the management of foreign public debt is constrained by the weak 
institutional arrangements in the country, resulting in duplication or overlapping of 
functions between government authorities, especially between the central bank and 
the Ministry of Finance (AFRODAD, 2011). Other challenges associated with foreign 
public debt management in Zambia include the absence of clearly set out foreign 
public borrowing limits to local government authorities and the lack of foreign public 
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borrowing thresholds, like public debt/GDP ratio, interest paid/ GDP ratio, and interest 
paid/tax revenue ratio, which are fundamental principles for foreign public debt 
management (World Bank, 2013). The Zambian government should also establish 
commitment control rules while empowering the Ministry of Finance to undertake 
foreign public debt audits in local municipalities – the government’s main sources of 
public guaranteed debt – which are currently non-existent (GRZ, 2011b: 21).  
2.3 The dynamics of public debt service in Zambia 
2.3.1 The evolution of public debt service in Zambia  
Many factors influenced the evolution of public debt stocks and public debt service in 
Zambia over the years, not limited to the sagging of global copper prices in the mid-
1970s until the late 1990s (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; McCulloch et al., 2000a; 2000b). 
These adverse global economic developments eroded the central government 
revenues from mineral taxation and commodity exports (McCulloch et al., 2000a; 
Mudenda, 1984). The swift rise in fiscal deficits, global interest rates on public debt, 
and rolling over of domestic public debt between 1975 and 1991 made Zambia a highly 
indebted poor country in sub-Saharan Africa (UNCTAD, 2014; McCulloch et al., 
2000a; World Bank, 1993). By the late 1980s, the high stocks of domestic and foreign 
public debt translated into unsustainable public debt service obligations (World Bank, 
2018a).  
For this reason, the huge budget outlays towards foreign public debt repayments in 
Zambia in the 1980s and 1990s were perceived as one of the obstacles to the 
country’s economic growth process and upsurge in poverty levels (World Bank, 2012; 
2003). During this period, the government reduced its budgetary allocations on both 
social services, such as health and education, and productive activities that could have 
expanded the country’s revenue base (IMF, 2007; World Bank, 2004a). The high costs 
of honouring foreign public debt arrears worsened in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, 
and the government started to contract new non-concessional debt to offset existing 
foreign debt and arrears (IMF & IDA, 2000). For instance, in 1990, Zambia spent over 
23.5% of its GDP on foreign public debt repayments (UNDP, 2013).  
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Describing the public debt service trap in most African states in the 1980s and 1990s, 
including Zambia, the former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, wrote “the constant 
need to borrow in order to service debt; the constant need to service our debt in order 
to borrow – we can no longer get out of this vicious circle…Is human development a 
possibility when so much of Africa’s wealth is channelled into debt servicing?” (SADC, 
2000: 6). More so, the high domestic public debt repayments were not transformed 
into productive uses by the recipients resulting in accelerated economic deterioration 
during this period (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; World Bank, 1993).  
Despite the public debt relief and a stable macroeconomic environment that 
characterises the Zambian economy between 1999 and 2014, the newly contracted 
public debts pose a severe threat to sustainable economic growth in future (IMF, 
2016a). A significant proportion of government expenditure allocations will by 2020 be 
directed towards debt service payments when these newly contracted loans begin to 
mature (IMF, 2016a). For instance, in 2013, 9% of domestic revenues were channelled 
towards government debt interest payments, and in 2017, this rose to 25% (MOF, 
2017). 
Overall, the major implications of the high levels of public debt stocks in Zambia 
between 1973 and 2005 were: (1) huge public debt service commitments, comprising 
of principal and interest payments; (2) contraction of the country’s capital base through 
massive capital flight and depressed investment activities; and (3) retarded economic 
growth rates (MOF, 2014b; Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; Andersson et al., 2000). 
Following the realisation that public debt repayment costs were drawing substantially 
on scarce financial resources that otherwise could be used for entrepreneurial 
activities and poverty alleviation purposes, the Zambian government implemented a 
number of public debt service and economic reforms during the period under study.  
2.3.2 Public debt service reforms in Zambia 
In Zambia, the rising burden of public debt service and poor economic performance 
caused a stern reduction in government’s real discretionary spending (World Bank, 
2004a). As a consequence, beginning in the 1970s, the government undertook a 
series of measures and reforms to ease public debt repayments and enhance 
economic performance. For instance, in 1973, 1976 and 1978, the government 
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entered into a series of agreements with the IMF and World Bank with the prime 
objective of seeking public debt relief and rescheduling (Wold Bank, 1993). However, 
these agreements failed to last because of the government’s default on scheduled 
debt service repayments – following depressed income inflows from mineral taxation 
and export proceeds (Andersson et al., 2000). 
In 1980, the government renegotiated for a more orchestrated and coordinated foreign 
public debt service package under the EFF with the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club 
(Andersson et al., 2000). In 1981, however, the EFF broke down and was replaced 
with a new set of public debt rescheduling agreements beginning 1983, particularly 
with the Paris Club (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; World Bank, 1993).  
Between 1984 and 1986, most African governments, Zambia included, went into 
several foreign public debt service agreements with London Club commercial banks, 
the IMF and World Bank, and several other multilateral and bilateral creditors 
(Ndikumana & Boyce, 2015; 2003; Elbadawi et al., 1996). In Zambia, in 1986, these 
agreements were augmented by the introduction of a foreign exchange auction system 
– the main motive was to rebalance the economy through fiscal adjustments, and 
restoration of production incentives, especially to the exporting sectors (BOZ, 2012). 
However, the abrupt depreciation of the exchange rate and sudden economic 
meltdown of the economy led the government to abandon the foreign exchange 
auction system and revalue the currency in 1987 (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000).  
Between 1987 and 1990, the government instituted public expenditure reforms, 
including setting a 10% limit of government revenue directed towards foreign public 
debt payments (World Bank, 1993). The government also started to adopt the IMF 
supported structural economic adjustment reforms. These IMF economic and financial 
reforms came as a result of Zambia’s failure to settle its arrears to the institution (IMF 
& IDA, 2000).  
To resume foreign public debt servicing initiatives to Zambia, struggling with high debt 
levels, the IMF set up a new facility called the Rights Accumulation Programme (RAP), 
which stipulates clearance of arrears (Andersson et al., 2000). Within this 
arrangement, financial support from the donor community to Zambia rose rapidly from 
10% of GDP in 1989 to 30% in 1992 (McCulloch et al., 2000a; World Bank, 1992). On 
attaining the RAP set conditions in 1995, Zambia again qualified for resumed IMF 
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lending in the form of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). 
Furthermore, in 1992, the Paris Club wrote off US$1.5 billion worth of debt owed to it 
by Zambia, under what was termed the “Toronto terms”, leading to a marginal 
reduction in public debt service (World Bank, 1992). 
The period between 1995 and 1999 was characterised by a somewhat broad 
adherence to the ESAF programme and foreign public debt service conditions set out 
by the World Bank and IMF (IMF, 2000). In 2000, Zambia reached the HIPC Decision 
Point and qualified for interim public debt relief from its creditors. In 2005 and 2006, a 
significant proportion of the country’s foreign public debt was written off by its major 
creditors, such as the IMF, World Bank, Paris Club, and AfDB, lessening the foreign 
public debt service burden (GRZ, 2006a; IMF, 2005a; 2000).  
Overall, from 2000 to 2005, foreign public debt service reforms were limited, since 
debt service costs constituted a small proportion of government spending – the debt 
service payments were limited due to both incapacity and debt relief initiatives 
extended to the country mostly by the Bretton Wood institutions, African Development 
Bank and Paris Club (World Bank, 2018a; IMF, 2005a; 2005b). More so, during this 
period, the statutory reforms on foreign public debt commitments were stipulated in 
the country’s Public Finance Act of 2004 (GRZ, 2004). In this act, the government 
specified both the contraction and repayment arrangements of newly contracted 
foreign public debt (GRZ, 2004). 
The domestic public debt service reforms in Zambia consisted of major shifts in fiscal 
and monetary policies as well as structural economic reforms. The Zambian 
government, like most sub-Saharan African countries, acquired a large number of 
state-owned enterprises in the first 20 years of independence (ZIPAR, 2015; Hill & 
McPherson, 2004). Most of these state-owned enterprises encountered severe 
viability challenges, in addition to the rising civil service bill – the outcome was a severe 
deterioration in fiscal balances (Hill & McPherson, 2004; Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000). 
The adverse fiscal developments compelled the government to supplement its 
dwindling revenues through short-term domestic borrowing (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 
2000).  
By the end of the 1990s, domestic public service costs, emanating from parastatal 
losses and a huge wage bill, skyrocketed leading to massive public sector reforms 
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(Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; Mudenda, 1984). Through the Public Service Reform 
Programme, the government restructured most state enterprises, with some being 
privatised, commercialised or merged (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000). After 1991, the 
government continued to contain its domestic public debt service outlays through 
financial and economic reforms and money printing. Among the fiscal reforms was the 
adoption of a cash budgeting system in 1993 (GRZ, 2006a). More so, in a move meant 
to promote the efficient functioning of the domestic capital markets, and also reduce 
inflationary pressures, the government in 1993 began to redeem its domestic public 
debt with the help of an increased level of concessional foreign borrowing (Bigsten & 
Mugerwa, 2000). The government reintroduced the cash budget system in 2014 in 
which the expenditure of both government ministries and divisions was supposed to 
be limited to the disbursed funds (GRZ, 2015b).  
2.3.3 Public debt service and economic growth trends in Zambia 
The high levels of public and publicly guaranteed debt in Zambia and other African 
states between the mid-1970s and 2006, brought about substantial implications on the 
countries’ debt servicing obligations and overall negative economic performance 
(Ndikumana & Boyce, 2015; 2003; Clements et al., 2003). The active participation of 
the African governments in the domestic capital markets in the early 1990s, in addition 
to increased foreign borrowing, not only affected domestic interest rates and thus 
crowded out private investments, but also brought about severe tax reforms to raise 
revenue for servicing public debts and massive capital flight (Ndikumana & Boyce, 
2012; 2003; Clements et al., 2003). Zambia was not an exception.  
As public debt increased in Zambia since the 1970s, so did the cost of servicing the 
government debt (World Bank, 2018a). The country’s ability to make consistent foreign 
debt repayments was constrained by successive world economic crises and 
plummeting international copper prices, as well as the swift rises in world interest rates 
(World Bank, 2018a). In the post-HIPC period, the increase in public debt service costs 
emanated from the drastic increase in the size of tradable government securities and 
the rise in coupon rates (GRZ, 2015a; 2015b). For instance, the coupon rate increased 
from 5.4% in 2012 to 8.5% in 2014 and further to 9.0% in 2015 (GRZ, 2017b).  
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Between 2015 and 2017, the foreign public debt repayment outlays increased by 
74.5%, from US$381.7 million in 2015 to US$666.2 million in 2017 (BOZ, 2017). As 
reported by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2017: 9), 
public debt service costs in Zambia constituted 47% of the total foreign currency 
outflows between January and August of 2017. The rising public debt repayment costs 
in recent years means that the government of Zambia diverts a substantial amount of 
its tax revenues towards meeting debt service commitments (World Bank, 2019).  
Regarding economic growth dynamics in Zambia, upon attaining independence in 
1964, the country undertook institutional and economic reforms which can be put into 
broad categories; command economy (1964-1990) and market-oriented economy 
(1991-2017). In the early years of independence, the country adopted a socialist 
economic ideology, which in these stages generated considerable economic growth 
(GRZ, 1965; 1964). However, the economic success of Zambia was halted by the 
global economic crisis of 1973 and 1978, which led to the deterioration in the country’s 
terms of trade, particularly in copper and agricultural exports, and to the rise in oil 
imports (Adam et al., 1993a; 1993b). As a result of the economic problems that the 
Zambian economy experienced during the 1970s and 1980s, the government was 
compelled to seek financial assistance from the IFIs, with the consequence of high 
repayment costs beginning in the early 1990s (Andersson et al., 2000). 
At this time, the Zambian government endeavoured to stabilise the economy through 
a number of economic and financial reforms – leading to a market-driven economy. 
The reforms focused on liberalising the economy, enhancing private sector 
participation, privatising and commercialising state-owned businesses, eliminating 
foreign exchange and investment controls, among others (Chirwa & Odhiambo, 2016; 
GRZ, 2006b; Andersson et al., 2000). Between 2000 to 2017, the macroeconomic 
drivers performed well, characterised by positive and stable economic growth rates, 
averaging 4.6% (World Bank, 2018a). These were a result of the high accumulation of 
domestic and foreign investments and reduced public debt service costs following the 
debt relief initiatives (GRZ, 2006b). 
Figure 2.7 shows the trends in public debt service and economic growth in Zambia for 
the period 1978 to 2017. 
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Figure 2.7: Public debt service and economic growth trends in Zambia (1978-
2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
 
RGDP  = Real Gross Domestic Product GNI  = Gross National Income 
PDS  = Total Public Debt Service  XGS = Exports of Goods and   Services 
 
Figure 2.7 shows that the public debt service trends in Zambia can be split into three 
phases; 1978-2005, 2006-2013, and 2014-2017. In the first phase, 1978-2005, the 
high public debt service burden of Zambia exceeded the rate of economic growth 
(World Bank, 2018a). During this period, the public debt service-to-exports of goods 
and services ratio also declined, suggesting the country’s incapacity to pay its debt 
dues. As Figure 2.7 depicts, between 1978 and 2004, the ratios of public debt service-
to-GNI and public debt service-to-exports of goods and services were the worst in the 
country’s history, and so was economic performance (GRZ, 2006b). The noticeable 
decline in the two ratios between 1986 and 1990 also follows the government’s debt 
service policy that set a ceiling on foreign public debt repayments (World Bank 1993: 
60). 
The observable spikes of the PDS/GNI and the PDS/XGS ratios in Figure 2.7 between 
1991 and 1995 coincided with major structural and political developments in this 
country and associated with the lowest economic growth rates of the period, that were 
-2.9% in 1992 and -9.8% in 1994 (World Bank, 2018a). Following the HIPC initiative 
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ratios between 1996 and 2001. The decline in public debt service costs after 1996 is 
also associated with an economic rebound of the Zambian economy, especially, on 
foreign public debt, providing a boost to public savings and investment, thereby freeing 
resources for infrastructure and human capital development, and hence, economic 
growth (World Bank, 2019; IMF, 2014b).  
Between 2000 and 2005, Zambia received tremendous foreign public debt relief from 
most of its creditors, resulting in a saving of $233 million in foreign public debt service 
obligations (World Bank, 2014a). The collective debt relief effort by Zambia’s creditors 
between 2000 and 2005 increased the country’s creditworthiness and widened the 
government’s fiscal space (IMF, 2005b). For instance, foreign public debt as a ratio of 
exports and GDP averaged 50% and 49% in 2004, respectively, relative to 539% and 
172% in 1990 (World Bank, 2018a).  
The second phase, 2006-2013, is associated with a very low and stable PDS/GNI 
ratio. Although Zambia was contracting new debt during this period, such as the 
issuance of the Eurobonds, the bulk of the debt was long term and had not yet matured 
(World Bank, 2017b). During this phase, the country was enjoying robust economic 
growth rates, and stable inflation rates averaged 6.1% and 10.6%, respectively (World 
Bank, 2018a). 
In the last phase, 2014-2017, Figure 2.7 shows that there is a new twist in public debt 
service ratios, which began trending upwards after 2013. The upward trajectory in 
government service costs was due to renewed short-term domestic borrowing 
following a gradual deterioration in international copper prices (United Nations, 2016). 
According to the IMF debt sustainability analysis, Zambia’s risk of foreign public debt 
service distress changed from low to moderate after 2013 (IMF, 2015a). Generally, 
phase three provides a futuristic outlook of Zambia’s public debt service burden, which 
should increase with the level of the country’s output by 2020 (IMF, 2017a). Table 2.4 
shows Zambia’s foreign public debt and scheduled debt service payments from 1990 
to 1999, while Table 2.5 shows Zambia’s foreign public debt and scheduled debt 





Table 2.4: Public debt service in Zambia (1990-1999) 
 Foreign public debt 
(US$ millions) 
Foreign public debt 
service (US$ millions) 
Foreign public debt service/ 
Foreign public debt stock (%) 
1990 7,237 647 8.9 
1991 7,271 718 9.9 
1992 6,971 678 9.7 
1993 6,791 522 7.7 
1994 6,583 541 8.2 
1995 6,859 590 8.6 
1996 7,181 453 6.3 
1997 6,758 376 5.6 
1998 6,862 315 4.6 
1999 5,950 386 6.1 
Sources: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
Table 2.5: Public debt service in Zambia (2000-2015) 
 





Foreign public debt 
service/ Foreign public 
debt stock (%) 
2000 5,831 169 2.9 
2001 5,771 158 2.7 
2002 6,684 148 2.2 
2003 5,286 151 2.9 
2004 7,080 211 3.0 
2005 4,528 302 6.7 
2006 2,513 96 3.8 
2007 1,189 121 10.2 
2008 1,982 130 6.6 
2009 3,638 137 3.8 
2010 3,202 135 4.2 
2011 3,544 139 3.9 
2012 4,281 121 2.8 
2013 5,318 101 1.9 
2014 6,170 101 1.6 
2015 7,805 109 1.4 
Sources: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
In Table 2.4, foreign public debt service payments were all above US$300 million. 
Despite being insignificant relative to the existing total foreign public debt stocks, the 
foreign public debt repayments constituted a significant percentage of the total 
government revenue (GRZ, 2017a). A period of high public debt service ratio of 9.9% 
was recorded in 1991, when the country made a once-off payment of US$300 million 
to the World Bank, thereby clearing all its debt service arrears to the institution (World 
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Bank, 1993). The government’s intention in making this debt repayment was to 
normalise relations and also subscribe to the World Bank’s new sponsored economic 
reforms (Andersson et al., 2000).  
In Table 2.5, the HIPC and MDRI debt relief initiatives reduced the foreign public debt 
service costs significantly (World Bank, 2018a). This suggests that the public debt 
relief initiatives generated huge savings for Zambia and contributed to the 
macroeconomic stability of the Zambian economy, and also the realisation of positive 
annual economic growth rates since 1999 (See Figure 2.7) (World Bank, 2018a). The 
reduction in scheduled foreign public debt repayments after 2012 can be attributed to 
the fact that the newly contracted public debt was partly used to settle existing debts 
(World Bank, 2019).  
Generally, prior to 2005, the average foreign public debt-to-GDP ratio was 154%, 
meaning that the Zambian economy could not generate sufficient financial resources 
to pay back its foreign financial dues (AfDB, 2010). The remarkable rise in public debt 
service burden in Zambia between 1990 and 2000 had been predominantly due to 
high domestic and foreign interest rates, not merely additional government borrowings 
(AfDB, 2010). In terms of foreign public debt service payment composition, half of the 
money went towards interest payments while the balance was channelled towards 
principal debt repayment (World Bank, 2003; IMF & IDA, 2000). Figure 2.8 shows the 
trend in public debt interest payments in Zambia during the first phase of public debt 










Figure 2.8: Foreign public debt service and interest payments in Zambia (1990-
2000) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
In comparison to the average annual government revenue, the foreign public debt 
service payments indicated in Figure 2.8 signify a high proportion of the country’s 
budget expenditure. More importantly, however, the public debt service payments 
shown in Figure 2.8 slightly reduced the foreign public debt crisis in Zambia. The 
foreign public debt service payment reduction visible in 1993 was due to the US$1.5 
billion debt cancellation by the Paris Club (IMF, 2005a). According to the IMF (2005a), 
between 1990 and 2000 almost 20% of Zambia’s GDP was spent on foreign public 
debt repayments in comparison to the 3% and 2% allocated to education and health 
sectors, respectively (World Bank, 2004a). This massive disparity in budget allocation 
between foreign public debt repayments and social sectors suggests the direct 
adverse impact of foreign public debt payments on economic growth and poverty 
levels in Zambia during this period (World Bank, 2003). Table 2.6 presents the foreign 
debt sustainability of Zambia in the post public debt relief era. The higher the ratio, the 
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Table 2.6: Foreign debt sustainability ratios of Zambia (2005-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a); IMF (2017a) 
Table 2.6 indicates that between 2000 and 2005, the average foreign public debt-to-
GDP ratio was 154%, meaning that the Zambian economy could not generate 
sufficient financial resources to pay back its foreign dues (World Bank, 2018a; AfDB, 
2010). From Table 2.6, it can be deduced that foreign public debt service ratios 
decreased from 2006 to 2010, then followed by a steady increase after 2011. In 
particular, foreign public debt service/exports ratio reduced from 11.2% in 2005 to 
1.9% in 2010, implying an increase in fiscal space for the government (IMF, 2017a). 
With all the public debt sustainability ratios given in Table 2.6 falling to within the 
indicative thresholds after 2006, Zambia was dropped from the IMF and World Bank 
list of countries eligible for additional debt relief under the extended MDRI initiative 
(GRZ, 2007).  
In Table 2.6, it is significant to note the fall in the foreign public debt/GDP, foreign 
public debt service/government revenue and foreign public debt service/exports ratios 
in 2010. The drop in these ratios suggests the slowing down in economic performance 

















40% 150% 250% 20% 20% 
2000-
2005 
86.7 215.6 56.8 11.2 4.0 
2006 43.4 56.7 46.8 3.5 3.2 
2007 23.8 59.3 48.4 2.6 2.6 
2008 21.2 58.2 41.2 3.2 2.1 
2009 23.8 82.7 65.6 3.7 2.4 
2010 20.4 57.0 57.7 1.9 1.8 
2011 24.3 48.1 49.1 2.1 2.2 
2012 27.7 42.8 82.3 2.4 6.8 
2013 26.9 56.7 94.3 3.7 7.1 
2014 28.2 61.8 101.1 4.4 7.3 
2015 38.7 54.2 97.6 4.3 6.9 
2016 38.6 52.7 87.1 4.1 7.1 
2017 38.4 56.3 84.4 4.2 7.4 
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these economies. Faced with little room to pursue countercyclical interventions, 
Zambia in 2011 diversified its foreign sources of finance by issuing Eurobonds (ZIPAR, 
2015).  
2.3.4 Challenges facing public debt service management in Zambia 
The challenges facing public debt service management in Zambia since 1964 
emanated from the unmanageable accumulation of public debt (domestic and foreign), 
decrease in value of copper and other agricultural exports and an increase in oil 
imports (Hill & McPherson, 2004; Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; Mugerwa, 1984). Crucial 
to the challenges of public debt service management in Zambia are the relentless 
economic crises that characterised the country in the 1970s and 1980s (Bigsten & 
Mugerwa, 2000). The performances of the productive sectors are consistently weak 
and more often negative, with occurrences of drought, poor export performance and 
world recessions aggravating the crisis (Andersson et al., 2000). The collapse of the 
global commodity market, especially of raw copper and agricultural products, led to 
heavy foreign and domestic public borrowings, leading to high proportions of public 
debt service expenditure (UNCTAD, 2014).  
The other fundamental cause of Zambia’s increasing inability to service its public debts 
over the years is the restricted productive base which had a negative bearing on the 
revenue base of the government (IMF, 2007). The deterioration in Zambia’s economic 
performance in the late 1980s, and the high domestic and foreign interest rates 
worsened the repayment position of the government (GRZ, 2006c). The high domestic 
nominal interest rates in the 1980s and 1990s caused structural imbalances as the 
interest cost on outstanding domestic public debt exceeded primary fiscal surpluses 
(GRZ, 2007). As a result, the government after 1994 was unable to meet the financing 
of maturing domestic and foreign public debt as well as interest due on its securities 
(IMF and IDA, 2000).  
Debt payments to local-currency denominated public debt were further adversely 
affected by the country’s narrow tax base (Langmead et al., 2006; MOF, 2004). This, 
in addition to ineffective tax collection strategies, loss-making state-owned 
enterprises, and massive capital flight, are among the reasons that led to the 
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accumulation of public debt service arrears in the 1980s and 1990s (Andersson et al., 
2000; IMF & IDA, 2000).  
Also, since the servicing of foreign currency-denominated public debt requires liquid 
foreign currency assets, the adverse movements in terms of trade for commodity 
exports, particularly copper, meant that Zambia could only generate low levels of 
foreign exchange (IMF, 2009a, 2009b). Thus, foreign public debt service problems in 
Zambia were mainly influenced by the rising world interest rates and deteriorating 
terms of trade (World Bank, 2018a; Andersson et al., 2000).  The foreign public debt 
service difficulties and currency mayhem experienced in Zambia between 1987 and 
1993 caused sharp increases in public debt repayment defaults and the emergence 
of non-performing loans in the domestic financial sector (Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000).  
Following the public debt service defaults in the late 1980s, some international 
creditors, such as the IMF and World Bank, decided to suspend both their financial 
support and new loan facilities to Zambia (Andersson et al., 2000). This development 
exacerbated the flow of new capital injection to the country and the inability to honour 
foreign financial commitments (Andersson et al., 2000). There is a need to broaden 
the country’s revenue base by attracting long-term investments and upgrading the 
export structure to curtail domestic public debt service challenges  (World Bank, 2019; 
IMF, 2017a). This policy direction will help in diversifying and expanding the export 
base of the Zambian economy (IMF, 2017a). 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the growth trends of public debt, public debt service and 
economic growth for the Zambian economy from 1964 to 2017. The primary objective 
was to examine the dynamics of public debt (domestic and foreign), public debt service 
and economic growth during the sample period. The discussions focused on the major 
economic and financial policies and reforms that helped to explain the evolution, 
structure and composition of both public debt stock and public debt service, and the 
associated economic growth trends in Zambia during the study period. From the 
discussions in the chapter, Zambia experienced high and rising economic growth rates 
between 1960 and 1967. The major source of these economic growths was the 
buoyant demand for copper on the international markets. As a result, government 
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borrowing, domestic and foreign, reduced as revenues could adequately fund 
recurrent government expenditures and infrastructure development projects. Public 
debt repayments on both domestic and foreign public debt was not an issue during 
this period, 1964-1969 since it constituted only a small proportion of the total 
government revenues. 
However, the copper price bubble in the mid-1970s caused severe deterioration in the 
country’s fiscal balance position, since the Zambian economy was undiversified, 
relying mainly on the mining sector. The overall effect was chronic macroeconomic 
instability and perpetual build-up of public debt stocks. These adverse developments 
compelled the government of Zambia to undertake a series of economic and financial 
reforms. Some of the public debt reforms include contractual debt agreements with 
major foreign creditors, such as the IMF, World Bank and Paris Club. The HIPC and 
MDRI initiatives led to substantial foreign public debt cancellations and debt 
rescheduling between 1990 and 2006.  
The foreign public debt initiatives of 1996-2006 eased the country’s public debt 
distress and reduced foreign public debt service obligations and other debt-related 
expenses. After 2006, the public debt stock and public debt service indicators of 
Zambia were within the IMF and World Bank sustainable threshold ranges. However, 
by the end of 2014, the country’s public debt burden rose considerably posing the 
threat of high repayment obligations by 2020.  
Among the discussed public debt service reforms were exchange rate policy changes, 
economic structural adjustment policies, and engagement of the international creditor 
community through contractual agreements. The chapter further revealed that the 
country’s major public debt service management challenges emanated from a narrow 
revenue base, high and volatile interest rates, and exceptionally high government debt 








PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
ZIMBABWE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the dynamics of public debt, public debt service and economic 
growth in Zimbabwe and includes four major sections. Section 3.2 discusses public 
debt and economic growth dynamics in Zimbabwe with four sub-sections that discuss 
the following issues: an overview of the evolution of public debt in Zimbabwe; public 
debt reforms; trends and challenges facing public debt management in Zimbabwe. 
Section 3.3 discusses public debt service and economic growth dynamics in 
Zimbabwe and is further structured into four sub-sections, namely: an overview of the 
evolution of public debt service in Zimbabwe; public debt service reforms; trends in 
public debt service and economic growth in Zimbabwe and challenges affecting public 
debt service management in Zimbabwe. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 The dynamics of public debt in Zimbabwe 
3.2.1 The evolution of public debt in Zimbabwe  
The dynamics of public debt in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the pre-independence 
era, the period before 1980 when the country was still under the administration of the 
Rhodesian government. Between 1960 and 1979, the state financed its expenditures 
from domestically generated revenues and foreign loans, acquired mostly from private 
financial institutions and individual governments (Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ), 
1982). In 1980, the new GoZ inherited both the domestic and foreign debt of the 
previous administration (Jones, 2011). More importantly, between 1980 and 1987, it 
contracted more debt from the domestic and foreign capital markets in a bid to fund 
increased economic, social and political demands (Mumbengegwi, 2002; GoZ, 1982).  
The government in 1980 adopted the “Growth with Equity” policy which focused on 
addressing the previous economic and social imbalances (GoZ, 1981). However, the 
implementation of this new policy led to sudden growth in recurrent public 
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expenditures relative to the central government revenues (Central Statistical Office 
(CSO), 1990). The resultant fiscal disequilibria encouraged the government to borrow, 
mostly from the IFIs (Besada, 2011). 
In general, the blending of domestic and external factors, mainly policy shocks and 
adverse developments in the global economy were behind the evolution of public debt 
in Zimbabwe since 1980 (Besada, 2011; Jenkins & Knight, 2002; Mumbengegwi, 
2002). On the one hand, the major domestic factors comprised of excessive public 
sector expansion, unbudgeted wage increases, huge domestic interest outlays and 
shrinking tax revenue base (UNDP, 2012; Jones, 2011; GoZ, 2009a). For instance, 
just like Zambia, numerous state-owned enterprises generated huge contingent 
liabilities for the central government, in addition to rising employment costs for the 
public service (GoZ, 2009a; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), 2003a).  
On the other hand, the external factors to public debt accumulation in Zimbabwe in the 
1980s and 1990s included sagging terms of trade for commodity exports – especially 
unprocessed mineral exports, radical falls in foreign direct investment and aid inflows 
due to economic sanctions, soaring global interest rates, and rising government 
expenditure (World Bank, 2018a; Mupunga & Le Roux, 2014). Other government 
expenditure demands emanated from the country’s commitment to fulfilling regional 
peace and security commitments in the Southern African Development Community 
region – for instance, in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Mupunga & Le Roux, 2014; World Bank, 2004b: 23). Furthermore, the country’s fiscal 
imbalance was aggravated by the severe drought between 1983 and 1985 and 1991 
and 1992 (Mupunga & Le Roux, 2014; GoZ, 1992). 
The country’s public debt overhang emerged in the early 1990s, but the condition 
worsened in 1999 following increased economic and political crises (IMF, 2001). 
Between 1999 and 2001, Zimbabwe’s major creditors, the World Bank, IMF and AfDB, 
abandoned their lending schemes to Zimbabwe, citing among other reasons, the 
violent land reform programme, political instability and failure by the country to repay 
principal foreign public debts and protracted arrears (Leo & Moss, 2009; Richardson, 
2004; IMF, 2001).  
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Furthermore, between 1998 and 2008, Zimbabwe experienced a severe economic 
meltdown which culminated into huge capital fight, cancellation of international lines 
of credit, cessation of foreign aid and grants, public debt repayment default and hence, 
the build-up of public debt arrears (World Bank, 2018a; GoZ, 2009b; IMF, 2001). By 
the end of 2000, Zimbabwe was one of the African countries in protracted arrears to 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Trust Fund (IMF, 2009c; 2001).   
Trapped by the foreign public debt crisis and the imposed financial restrictions by the 
main IFIs, Zimbabwe changed its foreign policy and began focusing on the Asian 
market for commodity markets, foreign direct investment and new loans in 2002 
(Stiftung, 2004). In the main, therefore, a mixture of public debt default, absence of 
new concessionary loans and successive economic crises exacerbated the public debt 
overhang condition of Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2008 (Mupunga & Le Roux, 
2014). Presently, Zimbabwe is one of the world’s highly indebted countries, 
characterised by acute fiscal challenges – caused by, among other things, a 
contracting tax base and an uncertain macroeconomic environment (Mupunga & Le 
Roux, 2015; 2014).  
Additionally, the domestic financial markets in Zimbabwe are still insubstantial, 
characterised by an undiversified investor base. Similar to Zambia and many other 
developing countries, financial institutions (mainly commercial banks) are the major 
investor groups in government securities in Zimbabwe (Macroeconomic and Financial 
Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI), 2013). Furthermore, 
the presence of unfavourable exchange control regulations in the country forbade 
foreign investors from actively participating in government-issued domestic debt 
securities (RBZ, 2016a). Overall, the revenues raised from the domestic debt markets 
of Zimbabwe could not equalise rising government expenditures, hence prompting 
excessive foreign borrowing during the period 1980-2017.  
3.2.2 Public debt reforms in Zimbabwe 
For more than four decades after independence, the Zimbabwean economy has been 
characterised by a severe deterioration in economic and financial systems, as well as 
a massive build-up of public debt stock (World Bank, 2018a). The economic meltdown 
inhibited the functioning of the financial system, and public debt repayment defaults 
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lowered the country’s world credit rating, which eventually increased the cost of foreign 
finance to the government and private sector (Sibanda & Dubihlela, 2013). The 
country’s public debt overhang led to the suspension or cancellation of several 
developmental financial support and poverty alleviating programmes and projects by 
most IFIs (Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit (ZEPARU), 2010). 
The termination of financial support was accompanied by the severe deterioration in 
foreign exchange reserves at the central bank through increased foreign public debt 
repayments (RBZ, 2003a). 
Cognisant of the rising public debt problem as an obstruction to national development, 
the GoZ embarked on an extensive reform of the economic and financial systems as 
part of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS). The public debt reforms 
pursued in Zimbabwe have many similarities with those undertaken in Zambia. Like 
Zambia, Zimbabwe adopted several reforms mostly centred on improving public 
finance management and minimising government expenditure. Reforms pursued by 
Zimbabwe in its quest to reduce the public debt problem include: amending central 
government tax laws; enacting new institutional arrangements, to ensure effective 
foreign aid and government debt synchronisation; reducing the social safety net; 
establishing the regulatory and supervisory framework on public debt management 
practices; reforming state-owned entities; and controlling domestic interest and foreign 
exchange rates (GoZ, 2015a; ZEPARU, 2013; Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development (MOFED), 2014; RBZ, 2007a; Brett, 2005).  
The implemented reforms just like in Zambia, aimed to solve the public debt problem 
by unlocking new finances for economic growth and enhancing private sector 
entrepreneurial activities (GoZ, 2011; MOFED, 2010). More so, some of the public 
debt reduction strategies implemented by the Zimbabwean authorities were guided by 
the need to accomplish the SADC benchmark of a public debt/GDP ratio of less than 
60% by 2008 (AFRODAD, 2010).  
The implementation of the “Growth with Equity, 1980-1990” policy by the Zimbabwean 
government aimed to stimulate economic growth while addressing economic, social 
and political imbalances in the country (Muir-Lereche, 1998). The policy led to a broad 
expansion of the state's role in the economy, which caused significant fiscal 
imbalances and an excessive increase in government borrowing requirements 
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(Muzorewa, 2003). Other financial pressures were springing from the high wage bill, 
disproportionate subsidies on state entities, along with increasing interest payments 
on the sovereign domestic debt – further intensifying the deteriorating fiscal position 
of the government (World Bank, 2004b; IMF, 2001). According to the World Bank 
(2004b), the continued losses incurred by state-owned businesses diverted credit 
facilities away from the private sector and kept real interest rates high (World Bank, 
2004b). These adverse economic developments in the economy prompted the 
government to undertake several domestic public debt reforms in the 1990s (UNDP, 
2012; Brett, 2005; RBZ, 2003b).  
Similar to Zambia, after the adoption of the economic structural adjustment 
programmes in the early 1990s, the Zimbabwean government first responded to the 
domestic public debt crisis by privatising and/or commercialising most public 
enterprises (Besada, 2011; RBZ, 2007a; Brett, 2005). The initiative was envisioned to 
turn public entities into profitable units. The government in 1991, through the RBZ, 
established a Parastatal Reorientation Programme (PRP) to privatise some state-
owned businesses, such as the Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited (DZL), Cotton Company 
of Zimbabwe (Cottco) and the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ Holdings). Others 
commercialised, such as the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) and the Zimbabwe 
United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) (RBZ, 2007a). According to the central bank, 
the PRP policy lessened the budget imbalances and eased the government’s domestic 
borrowing requirements (RBZ, 2007a). 
Second, still in 1991, the government instituted extensive revenue reforms through the 
newly adopted SAPs, recommended by the IMF and World Bank (GoZ, 1991a; 1991b). 
The purpose of the revenue reforms was to boost the revenue base of the government, 
thereby limiting the state reliance on seignorage and domestic borrowing (GoZ, 
1991a). Although Zimbabwe undertook general tax reforms from as early as 1975, the 
major ones happened after 1991 following successive economic crises and declining 
international financial support (Jones, 2011). Sales tax reforms, for instance, began in 
1985 with an increase in the general sales tax from 10% to 25% (GoZ; 1996). The 
government in 1994 amended the sales tax act to allow for instalments in tax 
payments, and in 1997, further revised it by adding provisions to deal with bad debts 
(GoZ, 1997). As with Zambia, when the sales tax revenue could not match the 
expenditure needs of the country, due to massive deindustrialisation, substantial 
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capital flight and high unemployment rate, the GoZ in 2004 replaced sales tax with 
Value-Added Tax (VAT)  – nine years later compared to Zambia (RBZ, 2005).  
Unlike sales tax, VAT is charged on transactions of goods and services, local or 
imported, rather than directly on income or profit. The adoption of VAT marginally 
reduced the country’s fiscal deficits, and also lessened both national public borrowing 
levels and inflationary pressures in the economy (GoZ, 2006). Other taxes that were 
modified and scaled up to boost government revenues in the 1990s were the individual 
income tax (Pay as You Earn (PAYE)) and the corporate income tax rates (Muzorewa, 
2003). In 1998, the GoZ adopted the Final Deductions Systems (FDS) in which PAYE 
was to be deducted by the employer (Muzorewa, 2003). These tax reforms sought to 
revamp and strengthen revenue collection by enhancing voluntary compliance, 
expanding the tax base and minimising corruption-induced revenue leakages. 
In 2003, the GoZ further expanded its tax base by introducing the Intermediated 
Money Transfer Tax (IMT) through the Finance Act number 15 of 2002. However, in 
2015, the government broadened the IMT tax by introducing the 5-cent levy on every 
mobile network transaction (GoZ, 2015a). In the same year, the tax authorities also 
introduced the 5% turnover tax on tobacco (GoZ, 2015a). Following surging domestic 
public debts, the government in 2018 modified the IMT tax by initiating the 2% charge 
on every electronic money transfer above Z$10 (GoZ, 2018a).  
Third, the country embarked on extensive institutional reforms to improve on domestic 
public debt management and also invigorate revenue collections. In 2001, the 
Department of Taxes and the Department of Customs and Excise merged to form the 
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) (GoZ, 2006). The aim in forming ZIMRA was 
to strengthen revenue collection, facilitate trade and improve efficiency in revenue 
administration, thus taming the borrowing needs of the country (GoZ, 2006). 
Fourth, after 2001, the domestic public debt reforms focused on the management of 
government debt maturity profile, through lengthening and introduction of new 
government debt securities. In 2002, the government also began to actively suppress 
domestic interest rates (RBZ, 2003a; 2003b). The interest rate policy was 
complemented by the application of a fixed exchange rate system and an introduction 
of the exporters’ foreign exchange surrender requirement (RBZ, 2016a; 2003b; IMF, 
2001). These government initiatives subdued the real value of the domestic public 
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debt. However, the policies destroyed the private sector impetus to invest and export, 
thus worsening the economic crisis in the country between 2003 and 2008 (GoZ, 
2009b).  
In 2014, the government of Zimbabwe introduced new financial market reforms, 
including the trading of infrastructure bonds in the secondary market (GoZ, 2014). The 
introduction of the 5-year tenor infrastructure bonds at a fixed interest of 9.5%, not 
only led to the financial strengthening of the economy but also assisted in changing 
the public debt composition in the country (GoZ, 2014). The introduction of these long-
term debt instruments minimised the rollover risk and also reduced the borrowing costs 
associated with short-term debt (Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe 
(IDBZ), 2016). The government raised US$5 million in 2015, US$15 million in 2016 
and US$22 million in 2017 through selling infrastructure bonds on the domestic capital 
markets (IDBZ, 2016). Presently, government debt instruments are traded on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in the same manner as other stocks. 
Fifth, the government’s domestic borrowing requirement was addressed by carrying 
out public expenditure reforms. Started in 1999, the government rationalised its safety 
net, and in 2004, reduced its recurrent spending related to military and civil service 
(RBZ, 2005; World Bank, 2004b). These cost-cutting measures were, however, short-
lived and from 2005 to 2009, it increased its military expenditures and grew its civil 
service (World Bank, 2016c). According to Karenga and Mutihero (2009), a number of 
government welfare programmes were either suspended or restructured to increase 
fiscal space. For instance, student grants and loans were discontinued in 1998 and 
2006, respectively, due to government cash flow constraints (Shizha & Kariwo, 2011; 
GoZ, 2006).  
In 2009, the Government of National Unity (GNU) adopted the cash budgeting system 
to curtail the rising domestic public debt burden (GoZ, 2009c). Just like in the case of 
Zambia, the cash budgeting system restricted government expenditures to actual 
revenue collected rather than to the cash flow profile associated with the approved 
estimates. In this regard, monetary operations were insulated from fiscal operations. 
Also, to control the growth of domestic public debt, the government announced in the 
annual national budget the volume of net treasury securities issuance to be conducted 
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for fiscal policy purposes each year, and how the raised money would be used (GoZ, 
2011).  
Furthermore, in 2009, the GNU appointed the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) 
to be the state’s bank following the need to stop the quasi-fiscal activities undertaken 
by the central bank – which ultimately led to the growth of both domestic and foreign 
public debt in Zimbabwe from 2003 (GoZ, 2009b). Additionally, the government’s 
economic policy, the Short-Term Emergency Recovery, implemented in early 2009, 
brought about market-based macroeconomic reforms. This, together with the adoption 
of the multiple currency system in February 2009, caused the domestic debt market 
to become inactive (GoZ, 2012). The growth in domestic public debt from 2009 to 2013 
was, therefore, moderate. However, the government in 2014 abandoned the cash 
budgeting system leading to the resurfacing of excessive fiscal deficits, which 
aggravated domestic public borrowing and a slowdown in economic growth (IMF, 
2015b).  
Sixth, on the legal front, the public debt reforms in Zimbabwe, mainly foreign public 
debt, included the institutionalisation and operationalisation of the Debt Management 
Office, stationed in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (GoZ, 2014). 
The responsibilities of the Debt Office are to undertake effective management of the 
national debt (domestic and foreign) through (1) public debt database validation and 
reconciliation with all creditors; (2) consolidation and administration of publicly 
guaranteed debt; and (3) amendment of the existing Public Finance Management Act 
[Chapter 22:19] (No. 11 of 2009) in line with effective debt management practices 
(GoZ, 2015b; 2014).  
The Public Finance Management Act (amended) of 2015 further stipulates that the 
Debt Office shall:  
(1) prepare and publish a Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy;  
(2) prepare and publish an annual government borrowing plan, which includes a 
public sector borrowing limit, and participate in the preparation and issuance of 
government securities calendar in line with the annual borrowing plan of the 
state;  
(3) undertake annual debt sustainability analyses;  
(4) prepare reports on the debt of local authorities and public entities; and 
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(5)  assess, monitor and keep track of debt levels of all local authorities (MOFED, 
2012).  
 
The amendment of the Public Finance Management Act is a part of the public sector 
financial reforms designed to achieve sustainable public debt in Zimbabwe. In other 
related institutional and structural reforms, the government in 2015 managed to 
combine all diamond companies into one under the name Zimbabwe Consolidated 
Diamond Corporation, as part of the measures to enhance the transparency of 
diamond proceeds and accountability (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2017). However, the 
progress on structural reforms, especially measures to increase diamond sector 
transparency, has been very slow.  
Seventh, in 2011, the GNU instituted numerous foreign public debt reforms, including 
the implementation of the Zimbabwe Accelerated Re-engagement Economic 
Programme (ZAREP). The primary objective of the re-engagement initiative was to 
seek both public debt arrears clearance and rescheduling from the traditional creditors, 
that is, the World Bank, the IMF and AfDB, in addition to opening up new financing 
opportunities (RBZ, 2014; MOFED, 2012). According to the central bank, ZAREP was 
to promote fiscal sustainability through proper expenditure management, monitoring 
and wage policy reviews (RBZ, 2014).  
The emergence of the Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) between the GoZ and IMF 
in 2013 is a testimony to the achievement of the re-engagement exercise with 
traditional creditors (IMF, 2015b). The SMP focused on putting public finances on a 
sustainable course, enhancing public financial management, facilitating diamond 
revenue transparency, and restructuring the central bank (IMF, 2014e). In particular, 
fiscal consolidation efforts aimed to reduce the primary budget deficit and provide a 
framework for the gradual rebuilding of fiscal buffers and international reserves (IMF, 
2014e). From 2013, the IMF continued to provide targeted technical assistance to the 
Zimbabwean authorities and also monitored progress in the implementation of 
economic programmes (IMF, 2016b).  
In other related foreign public debt reforms, the government also set out a floor limit 
on both primary budget balance and stock of usable international reserves, as well as 
a ceiling on the stock of new non-concessional foreign debt contracted or guaranteed 
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by the central government with an original maturity of one year or more (GoZ, 2015a). 
These reforms were embedded in the country’s Public Debt Management Act of 2015, 
which seeks to provide a comprehensive framework for public debt management 
(GoZ, 2015b). In the act, the government commenced the undertaking of financial and 
compliance audits in 2017 as part of an initiative to monitor and control its debts, 
domestic and foreign (GoZ, 2015b).  
In contrast to Zambia, despite the profound changes in the financial and economic 
order, Zimbabwe still suffers from high levels of public debt, domestic and foreign. 
From the previous discussion of public debt reforms, two significant conclusions 
assisted in achieving sustainable public debt levels in Zimbabwe: (1) increased 
political determination to pay contracted debts on maturity; and (2) solemn government 
commitment to adhere to the public debt principles outlined in the Public Finance and 
Public Debt Management acts.  
3.2.3 Public debt and economic growth trends in Zimbabwe 
The evolution of Zimbabwe’s public sector indebtedness dates back to the pre-political 
independence period. Between 1975 and 1979, the country borrowed from several 
financial institutions and other world governments to finance the liberation war (GoZ, 
1982). In 1980, the new Zimbabwean government assumed a total of US$700 million 
worth of debt from the previous Rhodesian government (Jones, 2011). Added to this, 
the government between 1980 and 1987, contracted new loans from the domestic and 
foreign capital markets in a bid to fund increased economic, social and political 
demands (Mumbengegwi, 2002; GoZ, 1982). The prime sources of the new foreign 
loans were multilateral institutions, mostly the World Bank, AfDB and IMF (Muzorewa, 
2003; GoZ, 1982).  
3.2.3.1 Domestic public debt trend in Zimbabwe 
Much like Zambia and many other developing countries, in the first decade of 
independence, Zimbabwe has relied extensively on foreign finance for the BOP and 
budgetary support, and less on domestic credit markets to fund its expansionary fiscal 
projects (Muzorewa, 2003). The country’s domestic debt markets were still narrow, 
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making the proportion of domestic public debt comparatively small relative to foreign 
public debt in the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 2018a; RBZ, 2018a).  
A combination of rising levels of government spending in the early years of 
independence – originating mostly from increased political demands, high public 
sector investments (such as infrastructure development), numerous social welfare 
programmes and an expanding civil service – as well as rising international financial 
constraints, forced the GoZ to fund its budget shortfalls through seigniorage and 
increased issuance of government debt securities. The domestic financial markets 
were limited to treasury bills of 30 days, 60 days, 91 days and 364 days, while medium-
term domestic public debt instruments were mainly two-year government bonds 
(Mupunga & Le Roux, 2014).  
The domestic public debt position of Zimbabwe further deteriorated in 1999 when the 
government defaulted on its international financial dues, compelling it to make a swift 
turn to the domestic debt market for budget financing (Rehbein, 2012; IMF, 2005c; 
RBZ, 2003a). As a result of the foreign public debt defaults, the country suffered from 
both a credit-rating degeneration – due to the country’s high-risk profile, which led to 
restrained access to new foreign finances, and the deterioration of economic relations 
with major creditors (Gono, 2008; GoZ, 2006). 
Fundamentally, the evolution of Zimbabwe’s domestic public debt over the period from 
1985 to 2002 can be split into two: (1) from 1985 to 1994, and (2) from 1995 to 2002. 
In the first episode, although Zimbabwe suffered from unrelenting fiscal deficits, the 
average government domestic debt was low, averaging Z$6.5 billion annually (RBZ, 
2018a). However, in the second episode, 1995 to 2002, a multiplicity of factors caused 
government expenditures to soar, which then culminated into exponential growth in 
domestic public debt. These factors include the 2001/02 drought, high domestic 
interest rates averaging 35.2% per annum between 1995 and 2002, unbudgeted Z$5 
billion gratuities paid to the war veterans in 1997, state participation in SADC 
diplomatic peace missions (such as the state involvement in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo civil war in 1997), the fast-track land reform exercise of 1999 and the El Niño 
flood disaster of 2000, among others (World Bank, 2018a; 2004b; Besada, 2011; Leo 
& Moss, 2009). 
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During this second phase, also, 1995-2002, the international community, particularly, 
the Bretton Woods institutions, withdrew their financial support to the structural reform 
programmes as well as the fiscus (Leo & Moss, 2009). The outcome was increased 
reliance on domestic public debt and a rundown on foreign exchange reserves at the 
central bank (Mupunga & Le Roux, 2014). The persisted lack of foreign fiscal support 
implied that the country had to depend greatly on internal borrowings to meet budget 
demand. For this and other reasons, the country’s domestic public debt stock rose 
from Z$2.8 billion in 1985 to Z$107 billion in 1998, and Z$2.2 trillion in 2002, and to 
more than Z$21.2 trillion in 2008 (Gono, 2008). The growth in domestic public debt 
could be attributed to the rise in issuance of treasury bills following a reduction in 
corporate tax payments (RBZ, 2008). 
In February 2009, the government introduced the multicurrency system and adopted 
a cash budgeting system, a mixture of which kept domestic public debt to within 
insignificant amounts, mostly between 2009 and 2010 (GoZ, 2011). In 2011, the 
government assumed the central bank debt, worth US$176 million, hence the birth of 
domestic public debt in the multicurrency system (GoZ, 2011). The RBZ contracted 
domestic debt of US$1.5 billion mainly through its quasi-fiscal activities embarked on 
before 2008 (MOFED, 2010). During the period 2000 to 2008, the RBZ rolled out 
several facilities including, among others, the Basic Commodity Supply Side 
Intervention Facility (BACOSSI), Productive Sector Facility (PSF), Operation Maguta, 
Agriculture Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) and Parastatal and 
Local Authorities Reorientation Programme (PLARP) (RBZ, 2007b). These facilities 
were partly financed by funds obtained from depositors’ foreign currency accounts and 
new foreign loans (GoZ, 2009c). Unfortunately, the central bank failed to pay back the 
funds, as well as its dues to gold dealers, resulting in the birth of RBZ debt (MOFED, 
2010).  
In October of 2012, the government resumed the issuance of government securities, 
both treasury bills and government bonds, and by the end of 2012, government 
securities worth US$69 million had been sold (GoZ, 2014). In the same fiscal year, the 
government also guaranteed the issuance of US$30 million infrastructure 
development bonds to the Zimbabwe Electricity and Transmission Distribution 
Company (ZETDC) pre-paid electricity meter project, further adding to the national 
domestic debt stock (GoZ, 2018a). 
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In line with the government’s assumption of the RBZ debt, the government issued in 
March and April 2014 debt instruments worth US$146 million to partially pay RBZ 
debts (IMF, 2014e). In December 2014, the total domestic public debt rose to US$1.7 
billion, and US$7.2 billion as at end of December 2017 (GoZ, 2018b).  
Overall, the growth in domestic public debt in post-2013 reflects the growth in the 
issuance of government securities. The domestic market for the newly issued treasury 
bills and bonds was financial institutions (RBZ, 2018a). Treasury bonds were issued 
in categories of 3-, 4- and five-year periods (RBZ, 2018a). Figure 3.1 presents the 
general domestic public debt trend in Zimbabwe for the period 1980 to 2017.  
Figure 3.1: Domestic public debt trend in Zimbabwe (1980-2017) 
Source: Author’s computation from RBZ (2018a) 
Figure 3.1 depicts a scenario in which the ratio of domestic public debt to Real Gross 
Domestic Product (RGDP) increased from 1980 to 1988, followed by a sharp decline 
between 1989 and 1990. The abrupt decline in the ratio between 1989 and 1990 
follows the high inflationary pressures in the economy, which reduced the real value 
of domestic public debt (GoZ, 1991a). In 1991, the central government domestic public 
debt was 30% of GDP, and the government paid 9.8% of its revenues on nominal 
interest, while inflation was 23% (World Bank, 2004a: 4). 
Despite the rise in public borrowing from the domestic capital markets between 1991 














































































































a stable domestic public debt, the financial liberalisation and tax reductions policies 
instituted by the government between 1991 and 2002 turned out to be fiscally costly 
and led to a domestic public debt trap in Zimbabwe. Rising interest payments 
squeezed public spending on social services, while high real interest rates stifled 
private sector growth (World Bank, 2004b). In 1996, domestic public debt was 25.4% 
of GDP, and the real interest rate was 8% on domestic public debt, while the interest 
bill rose to 9% of GDP (World Bank, 2004b).  
Other factors that intensified the fiscal deficit between 1991 and 1999 were the 
government’s hesitation in following through with civil service and public enterprise 
reform, and the 1992 drought which demanded increased public spending at the same 
time that tax revenues were declining (World Bank, 2004b). However, the quasi-fiscal 
activities by the central bank between 1998 and 2008, like the funding and distribution 
of agricultural equipment and inputs, and purchase and distribution of food items, 
caused substantial changes in the monetary and fiscal policy stances of the country 
which then culminated in the rise in domestic public debt in absolute terms (Muzorewa, 
2003).  
The active participation of the state in the domestic capital markets was pronounced 
between 2002 and 2008. In 2002, inflation in Zimbabwe was still below 50% per annum 
(CSO, 2005). The rise in domestic public debt vis-à-vis the growth in GDP catapulted 
the domestic public debt/RGDP in this particular year, hence the noticeable spike in 
2002 (CSO, 2005). However, the hyperinflationary environment that characterised 
Zimbabwe between 2003 and 2008, owing to excessive printing of money by the 
central bank, had a reducing effect on the monetary value of domestic government 
debt (Gono, 2008). Thus, the proportion of domestic public debt to GDP declined 
radically from 64.2% in 2001 to nearly zero in 2008, which essentially meant reduced 
domestic repayment obligation (GoZ, 2009b). In 2008, the government securities were 
no longer tradable, and the domestic debt market ceased to operate. 
Figure 3.1 also shows that the domestic public debt/RGDP ratio was trending upwards 
in the multicurrency era. The upward path follows the assumption of the RBZ debt by 
the government and the increased issuance of treasury bills and government bonds 
(GoZ, 2013). After 2014, the domestic public debt/RGDP ratio increased exponentially, 
signifying an increase in domestic public borrowing after the GNU period. Domestic 
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public debt rose from US$1.9 million in 2015 to US$7.2 million in 2017 (GoZ, 2018a). 
The increase in domestic debt financing emanated mostly from government 
expenditures on harmonised country elections in 2013, employment cost overruns, 
amounting to 3.2% of GDP and poor economic performance after 2014 (GoZ, 2018a; 
IMF, 2014e). 
More so, despite some stern measures taken by the government to cover the costs of 
the political process in 2013 and 2014, revenue collections deteriorated markedly 
towards the end of 2013, much lower than budgeted leading to the new issuance of 
government securities to fund the budget (GoZ, 2014). Also, the accumulation of new 
arrears to service providers added to the observable rise in the domestic public debt 
to GDP ratio in Figure 3.1 after 2013 (RBZ, 2015).  
3.2.3.2 Foreign public debt trend in Zimbabwe 
Unlike domestic public debt which became so pronounced in the 1990s, the foreign 
public debt of Zimbabwe manifested itself in the early 1980s. A combination of 
excessive public spending amid available government revenues led to the rise in 
foreign public borrowing requirements (Richardson, 2004). With limited fiscal space 
mostly between 1988 and 1991, the government reverted to offshore finances, mainly 
from the IFIs to fund its economic reforms (IMF, 2001). In 1991, the World Bank and 
the IMF agreed to assist Zimbabwe financially on condition that the country adopted 
structural adjustment reforms in the form of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) and Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social 
Transformation (ZIMPREST) (Richardson, 2004; GoZ, 1998). The resultant new 
borrowings made substantial changes to the size, structure and composition of 
Zimbabwe’s foreign public debt stock. 
Part of the structural adjustment loans from the Bretton Wood institutions was for the 
repayment of previous public debt, principal amounts and accumulated interest 
arrears, and the revival of the economy (Jones, 2011). The conditions of the Bretton 
Wood institutions loans were that:  
(1) government spending is reduced by over 40%;  
(2) trade is liberalised;  
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(3) commodity prices and interest rates are de-controlled; and that  
(4) the economy is private sector driven (Muzorewa, 2003; IMF, 2001).  
 
According to Jones (2011), approximately US$750 million of Zimbabwe’s foreign 
public debt came directly from economic structural adjustment loans by the World 
Bank, AfDB and IMF. Unfortunately, however, the newly adopted economic reforms 
and new financial injections did not transform the economy into realising sound 
economic growth rates as expected. By the end of 1997, the economy stagnated and 
subsequently entered into a severe recession, which exacerbated the foreign public 
debt position of the country (World Bank, 2018a). 
With mounting foreign public indebtedness and persistent economic contraction, the 
government in 1996 abandoned the IMF funded structural reforms, and implemented 
the ZIMPREST policy in 1996 (GoZ, 1998; 1996). This move by the government, 
together with protracted foreign public debt repayment default, led to the isolation of 
the country from the international community in 1997 (IMF, 2003b). This separation 
from the global economy, in addition to the fast track land reform exercise and active 
involvement in regional wars, restricted the various forms of aid flows resulting in the 
build-up of foreign public debt arrears to the multilateral and bilateral creditors (Leo & 
Moss, 2009). For instance, BOP support, budget support, donor funds and grants were 
suspended by the IFIs as well as European governments in 1999 (Leo & Moss, 2009).  
Trapped by the foreign public debt overhang and the imposed ban on new borrowings 
by its traditional creditors, Zimbabwe changed its foreign policy and began focusing 
on the Asian market for commodity markets, foreign direct investment and new loans. 
Through the Look East Policy, Zimbabwe amassed new foreign loans from the 
Chinese government and Kuwait Fund to fund its quasi-fiscal activities up to the end 
of 2008 (AFRODAD, 2015). Figure 3.2 tracks the foreign public debt dynamics in 






Figure 3.2: Foreign public debt trend in Zimbabwe (1980-2017) 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
As Figure 3.2 shows, the foreign public debt/RGDP ratio in Zimbabwe rose from 1980, 
reaching its period peak of 143.8% in 2008 (World Bank, 2018a). This noticeable rise 
on this ratio was due to several factors, and not limited to the piling up of foreign public 
debt arrears due to the contraction of the domestic economy and increase in non-
concessional foreign loans (World Bank, 2018a; Gono, 2008; Mumbengegwi, 2002; 
GoZ, 1982). 
The high foreign public indebtedness between 1990 and 2009 adversely affected the 
private sector in that it could not easily access new and low-cost offshore capital 
finances and inexpensive credit terms, thus leading to an accelerated economic 
contraction in Zimbabwe (World Bank, 2018a, IMF, 2017b; MOFED, 2010). The 
noticeable slump in foreign public debt/RGDP ratio between 1998 and 2001 in Figure 
3.2 can be a result of the decline in international borrowing following the suspension 
of the country’s borrowing rights by the IMF and World Bank, and the unwillingness of 
other creditors to extend new debt (IMF, 2001). After that, the rise in foreign public 
debt stock resulted mainly from the accumulation of interest on foreign debt arrears 
(World Bank, 2018a).  
In 2004, Zimbabwe made a payment of US$181 million towards the IMF General 













































































































year (IMF, 2010a). The payment of these arrears by Zimbabwe was in response to an 
IMF Board of Directors’ resolution to expel the country from the institution (IMF, 
2010a). In February 2009, Zimbabwe dollarised its economy, which ushered in 
macroeconomic stability and positive economic growth. During the GNU period, 2009 
to 2013, the economy rebounded with average growth rates of 9.8% per year (World 
Bank, 2018a). Between 2009 to 2013, there were frantic efforts to rebuild international 
creditworthiness to enhance new avenues for foreign borrowing (GoZ, 2014). 
However, the high interests on foreign public debt arrears kept the foreign public debt 
stocks substantively high (IMF, 2017b). 
Between 2012 and 2014, increased foreign borrowing stemmed from meagre inflows 
of non-debt financial flows, for instance, foreign direct investment, which remained 
subdued due to inconsistent government policies on investment, especially the 
indigenisation policy (Nyarota et al., 2015). Since 2014, the country has been 
contracting non-concessional debt, mostly from China, to finance its fiscal activities 
and current account transactions, a scenario worsening the country’s foreign 
indebtedness (IMF, 2017b). For instance, the contraction of new non-concessional 
loans of US$319 million and US$28.6 million from China Exim-bank and India Exim-
bank in 2013, respectively, contributed to the growth in foreign public debt in that 
particular year (IMF, 2014e). Furthermore, the non-payment of imported products and 
services from the region by the government, such as electricity from Eskom in South 
Africa, added to the growing foreign public debt in Zimbabwe since 2014 (GoZ, 2018a; 
2018b).  
By the end of 2017, the country’s foreign public debt was estimated at 53.1% of GDP 
(World Bank, 2018a). Generally, a combination of the continual international economic 
and financial isolation and absence of sound political initiatives to resuscitate the 
economy culminated into a continued deterioration in the BOP and heavy reliance on 
non-concessional foreign borrowing in recent years (GoZ, 2018b; IMF, 2017b).  
From the economic growth front, the economy of Zimbabwe evolved from global 
seclusion in the 1970s to a more centralised state-controlled system in the 1980s, and 
later a free-market type of system in the 1990s. The performance of the economy and 
associated economic growth reforms have six distinct periods: the pre-independence 
period (1965-1979); the corporatism period (1980-1990); the liberalism period (1991-
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1999); the economic recession period (2000-2008); the economic recovery period 
(2009-2013); and the economic stagnation and recession period (2014-2017). 
In the pre-independence period, economic growth was largely driven by policies that 
promoted self-sufficiency since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
government was under economic and political sanctions from the British government, 
the Commonwealth and United Nations (AfDB, 2012; GoZ, 1982). The focus of the 
government was on import-substitution industrialisation (GoZ, 1982). During this era, 
the government established strong backwards and forwards linkages between 
manufacturing, agricultural and mining industries to meet the country’s industrial and 
welfare needs. Consequentially, between 1961 and 1972, and between 1973 and 
1979, the economy grew by an average of 6.9% and 0.2%, respectively (GoZ, 1981). 
Figure 3.3 traces the various economic reforms and the economic growth trends in 
Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2017. Economic growth is measured by the annual 
growth rate of real GDP per capita. 
Figure 3.3: Economic reforms and economic growth trends in Zimbabwe (1980-
2017) 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a); GoZ (2013; 1991; 1982; 1981) 
 
ESAP   = Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
MERP  = Millennium Economic Recovery Programme 
MTP   = Medium-Term Policy 
NEDPP  = National Economic Development Priority Programme 
NERP  = National Economic Revival Programme 
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ZEDS  = Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy 
ZIMASSET = Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
ZIMPREST = Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation  
In the first decade of independence, 1980-1990, the economic policies in Zimbabwe 
promoted state-led corporatism as well as structural functionalism. The three major 
policies crafted and implemented during this period were the Growth with Equity of 
1981, the Three-Year Transitional National Development Plan of 1982 to 1985, and 
the Five-Year National Development Plan of 1986 to 1990 (Brett, 2005; GoZ, 1981, 
1991a; 1991b). Through the Parastatals Commission, the Growth with Equity policy 
brought about the formation of many parastatals as well as major labour reforms (GoZ, 
1982). The oscillating growth rates that characterise the corporatism period, averaging 
1.7%, depict an unstable domestic and external economic environment, a condition 
which contributed to a series of structural adjustment policies beginning 1991.  
The economic decline in the early 1990s, coupled with increasing poverty levels 
among the general populace, compelled the government to abandon its domestically 
crafted policies in favour of the IMF supported SAPs in 1991. The two major 
adjustment policies adopted during the 1991 to 1999 period were ESAP (1991-1995) 
and ZIMPREST (1996-2000) (Brett, 2005; GoZ, 1998; 1991a; 1991b). These two 
policies promoted increasingly rapid market-oriented reforms. According to the World 
Bank, the economy of Zimbabwe shrunk by an average of 0.7% between 1991 and 
1995, with a period low negative 11% recorded in 1992 (World Bank, 2018a). By the 
end of 1996, the economy was suffering from deindustrialisation, which in 1998 
degenerated into severe economic recession, forcing the government to abandon the 
ZIMPREST policy prematurely (Richardson, 2004).  
Figure 3.3 further shows that from 1998 to 2008, Zimbabwe recorded the worst 
consecutive annual economic growth rates, averaging negative 7.7% (World Bank, 
2018a). The AfDB described this period as “the lost decade”, where the country 
experienced severe droughts, huge capital outflows and massive company closures, 
among other problems (AfDB, 2012). During the period 1998-2008, the GoZ instituted 
a number of economic policies, mostly hinged on resuscitating the economy through 
enhanced agricultural sector production. These policies included the Millennium 
Economic Recovery Programme (MERP), the National Economic Development 
Priority Programme (NEDPP), the National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) 
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and the Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS). Despite the 
implementation of a multiplicity of economic policies, the performance of the economy 
remained subdued, characterised by the contraction in the manufacturing sector and 
poor performance in the agricultural sector (World Bank, 2018a; MOFED, 2010). 
Following the adoption of the multicurrency system in 2009, the country experienced 
an economic rebound which was, however, short-lived, lasting only to 2013. Between 
2009 and 2013, the country’s average annual economic growth rate was 9.8%, 
recording a period high of 13% in 2011 (World Bank, 2018a). During this period, the 
government implemented a series of short- and medium-term policies to stimulate 
economic growth. These policies included the Short-Term Emergency Recovery 
Programme I and II and the Medium-Term Policy (GoZ, 2011; 2010).  With the expiry 
of the GNU in 2013, the government implemented the Zimbabwe Agenda for 
Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET) policy, which continued to 
guide government activities until 2018. Nevertheless, most policy initiatives in the 
ZIMASSET policy were never implemented due to increased public sector financial 
indiscipline and lack of political will (IMF, 2017c). The economy was characterised with 
a severe deterioration in fiscal balance, cash shortages, rising domestic public debt 
and falling terms of trade for commodity exports, among other challenges (IMF, 2017b; 
2017c; MOFED, 2014). 
Figure 3.4 presents the trends in public debt and economic growth in Zimbabwe 
between 1980 and 2017. Public debt is expressed as a percentage of RGDP, while 









Figure 3.4: Public debt and economic growth trends in Zimbabwe (1980-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
Figure 3.4 shows an upward trajectory of public debt to RGDP ratio from 1980 to 2017, 
distinctly classified into two segments: 1980-1991 and 1992-2017. In the first segment, 
the ratio of public debt to real GDP steadily grew but remained within the IMF threshold 
of 40%. During this period, 1980-1991, a mixture of exogenous and endogenous 
factors – such as the post-war reconstruction initiatives, the increased social welfare 
expenditures, the civil war of the 1980s, the rising world interest rates, and the 
droughts in 1982 and 1985 – caused a noticeable growth in public sector indebtedness 
(Muzorewa, 2003; Mumbengegwi, 2002; GoZ, 1982). The period is also associated 
with rapid fluctuations in economic growth rate, although the average period growth 
rate remained positive, averaging 1.9% (World Bank, 2018a).  
In the second segment, 1992-2017, public debt grew swiftly, although it partially 
stabilised between 1995 and 1999. Despite the poor economic performance, the 
country made some partial debt repayments to the IMF and World Bank in 2000 and 
2001, leading to the fall in public debt to real GDP ratio, as seen in Figure 3.4 (RBZ, 
2003b). Generally, between 1997 and 2008, the country underwent massive 
deterioration in fiscal and current account balances, and the cessation of cheap lines 
of credit from the international community (IMF, 2009c). Characterising this period is 
the sharp increase in public debt, mostly from penalty charges arising from foreign 
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contracted by the RBZ in the absence of sound official development support from the 
international donor community (RBZ, 2014; MOFED, 2010). 
The economic rebound from 2009 to 2012 in Figure 3.4 is concomitant with the plunge 
in public debt to real GDP ratio, reflecting an improvement in the government’s ability 
to repay its loans. During this period, the country started to make paltry debt 
repayments, mostly to the IMF, in an effort to increase the prospects of opening up 
new lines of credit (RBZ, 2015). Also, the adoption of the multicurrency system in 2009 
reduced the domestic public debt component (MOFED, 2010). The stern liquidity 
challenges created by the multicurrency system made it impossible for the government 
to meaningfully borrow domestically, resulting in depressed volumes of domestic 
public debt between 2009 and 2013 (IMF, 2014e). 
From 2013 to 2017, public debt retook an upward trajectory. Although the country was 
making constant payments towards its IMF debt arrears, the growth in foreign public 
debt arrears from other creditors, such as the AfDB, World Bank and European 
Investment Bank outpaced this reduction (GoZ, 2018b). Also, between 2013 and 2017, 
there is a noticeable economic growth slowdown arising mostly from foreign currency 
supply and allocation problems, exchange rate misalignment, and high inflationary 
pressures in the economy (GoZ, 2018b; IMF, 2017b; 2017c). As a result, the 
government increased its issuance of treasury bills and government bonds, further 
subjecting the country to a high public debt maturity risk position (RBZ, 2018b: 30; 
IMF, 2017c). 
Overall, an inspection of Figure 3.4 shows that from 1992 to 2017, Zimbabwe was 
strictly under severe public debt burden springing from both domestic and foreign 
public debt. Figure 3.5 presents the public debt composition of Zimbabwe from 1980 






Figure 3.5: Domestic, foreign public debt and economic growth in Zimbabwe 
(1980-2017) 
Source: Author’s computation from RBZ (2018a); World Bank (2018a) 
Figure 3.5 shows that from 1980 to 1996, there was a gradual increase in foreign 
public debt, while domestic public debt remained low. However, between 1996 and 
2004 there is a noticeably rapid shift to domestic debt from foreign debt – a move 
perhaps necessitated by the drying up of official developmental finance by traditional 
creditors, particularly the IMF and World Bank (GoZ, 2009b). After the government’s 
fast-track land redistribution programme in 2000, financial and economic sanctions 
were implemented against the country (Richardson, 2004). The sanctions restricted 
the government’s borrowing sources to the local capital markets and the Asian 
community, hence the rise in domestic debt component from 1999, as shown in Figure 
3.5 (Stiftung, 2004). The share of domestic public debt in total public debt, however, 
decreased abruptly after 2005 due to escalating inflation, which eroded the real 
monetary value of all government securities and bank balances (Gono, 2008).  
The noticeable sudden rise in domestic public debt beginning 2012, in Figure 3.5, is 
associated with both the assumption of the central bank debt by the government and 
increased issuance of government securities (GoZ, 2018b). Of the US$2.1 billion 
government securities issued in 2016, only US$356.3 million (representing 17%) 
financed the budget deficit while the remaining US$1.7 billion (representing 83%) went 
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increased domestic borrowing by the government exacerbated liquidity shortages in 
the country’s economy between 2014 and 2017 (GoZ, 2018b; IMF, 2017b). 
3.2.4 Challenges facing public debt management in Zimbabwe 
Similar to Zambia and other Southern African countries, in Zimbabwe, the problem of 
government debt management is attributable to poor fiscal and monetary policies 
resulting in unsustainable levels of public debt or intermittent financial needs (IMF, 
2014e: 2). Among the harsh causes of public debt crises in Zimbabwe in the 1980s 
and 1990s was the weak government debt management policies, undeveloped 
domestic debt markets, weak institutional and legal public debt management 
frameworks, lack of proper public revenue transparency and accountability, as well as 
weak government loan contraction processes (AFRODAD, 2010; GoZ, 2010). Central 
also to the accumulation of government debt over the years is the absence of clear 
statutes that govern guaranteed debt of state-owned enterprises, other government 
agencies, and privately-owned companies (ZEPARU, 2010: 12). According to the 
African Network on Debt and Development (2010), despite having specific legal 
requirements governing domestic and foreign public debt contracting in Zimbabwe, 
the framework is not always adequately implemented and followed. In consequence, 
the legal requirements for public debt transparency and disclosure in Zimbabwe were 
limited.  
Proper government debt management in Zimbabwe was difficult in the 1980s and 
1990s due to the nonexistence of a semi-autonomous authority responsible for the 
evaluation of the concessionality of government loans and assessment of both debt 
service and absorptive capacities of the country (ZEPARU, 2013). By not undertaking 
absorptive capacity assessments, it implied that borrowed public funds could easily be 
diverted from desired national goals into unproductive activities or even personal uses. 
Also, although Zimbabwe had revised its public finance management laws, the 
absence of a proper institutional arrangement that facilitated and monitored the 
implementation and adherence to the stipulated public debt guiding principles, 
contributed to unsustainable government debt levels, especially between 2000 and 
2008 (ZEPARU, 2013). It is, therefore, imperative to state that some of the previously 
contracted government debts in Zimbabwe occurred without the full assessment of 
their future implication on the country. Consequentially, previous public debt dynamics 
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are presently affecting tax reforms, national savings and investment policies of the 
country (Mumvuma et al., 2013).  
Foreign public debt accumulation in Zimbabwe, and many other developing countries, 
has been inevitable due to the lack of (1) an efficient money market; (2) effective and 
efficient financial settlements arrangements; and (3) clear legal framework that guides 
and ensures the safe transfer of securities and financial resources among agents 
(ZEPARU, 2010). Thus, the effect of the undeveloped domestic debt markets in 
Zimbabwe led to the over-reliance on foreign loans as the primary vehicles for 
financing the budget needs (ZEPARU, 2010). With a small, short-term deposit base in 
Zimbabwe, it meant that banks found it difficult to hedge long-term lending in the 
economy, thus increasing economic and financial vulnerabilities of the country 
(ZEPARU, 2010). According to the IMF (2016b), the absence of deepened financial 
markets in any given country, Zimbabwe included, provides some debt management 
and macroeconomic challenges which include: (1) making the domestic economy 
susceptible to volatile capital flows; (2) increasing reliance on costly foreign borrowing; 
and (3) increasing the need for a sizeable precautionary reserve (IMF, 2016b; 2016c). 
Furthermore, like other developing countries, Zimbabwe has made some positive 
strides in promoting efficient and systematic domestic and foreign public debt 
management by enacting several legal statutes. However, the country retained some 
exclusive borrowing powers for the office of the president and the minister of finance 
(AFRODAD, 2010). For instance, Section 52 of the Public Finance Management 
(PFM) Act focuses on borrowing powers. It asserts that “the president authorises the 
responsible finance minister to borrow for any purpose the president considers 
expedient with one limitation, being that borrowing within Zimbabwe can only be up to 
30% of the revenues of the general revenues of the country in the preceding financial 
year” (Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD), 2010: 12).  
In other words, according to the ZIMCODD (2010), the act reinstated the finance 
minister’s power to borrow and give loan guarantees, with the consent of the president 
only. This arrangement, according to AFRODAD (2010), makes the overall public debt 
management process extremely cumbersome since it is challenging to get timeous 
information about the source and uses of the contracted debt by the state president. 
The view of ZIMCODD (2010) is that loans or guarantees should be determined by the 
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country’s capacity to repay as measured by debt sustainability ratios (AFRODAD, 
2010). Fortunately, however, the GoZ has in the Accelerated Arrears Clearance, Debt 
and Development Strategy (ZAADDS) acknowledged the weakness of granting some 
executive borrowing power to the president, thus providing some prospects for 
improved debt management review in future (MOFED, 2012).  
Domestic government debt management challenges in Zimbabwe have arisen from 
the absence of a general equilibrium domestic public debt analysis framework in the 
country, a condition which creates an opportunity for irresponsible borrowing by the 
government (Leo & Moss, 2009). Other factors that adversely impacted domestic 
public debt management in Zimbabwe include the lack of public finance transparency 
and accountability; an absence of qualified personnel to conduct domestic debt 
structure and sustainability analysis; as well as underdeveloped domestic debt 
markets for government securities (IMF, 2006). The range of funding sources to the 
government is often narrow, being limited mostly to treasury bills, thus restraining 
government discretion in terms of the risk characteristics of new debt.  
According to the IMF (2006), the country also lacks skilled personnel, and advanced 
technological resources to enhance professional management of existing domestic 
debt stocks and issuance of new government debt. With regard to public finance 
transparency and accountability, the political leadership should enforce laws and 
regulations that ensure full accountability of state revenues. For instance, in the 2010 
and 2011 Budget Statements, the Minister of Finance and Economic Development 
reported that the Chiadzwa diamond proceeds were not deposited into the official 
national revenue account, the Consolidated Revenue Fund (GoZ, 2011; MOFED, 
2010). The government in 2011 reported that only US$103,9 million out of more than 
US$360 million worth of diamond exports was paid to the national treasury GoZ, 
2011). This revelation implies that there are no strict accountability mechanisms in 
government financial matters, which exacerbated corruption activities and promoted 
misappropriation of public funds (AFRODAD, 2015; GoZ, 2011). The cumulative 
impact of this missing link was an unprecedented rise in government borrowing 
requirements and rising domestic public debt stocks.  
Other challenges associated with domestic government debt management in 
Zimbabwe are ineffective and irregular public financial audits within state institutions 
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(IMF, 2014e). Worse still, when these audits are conducted and there is evidence of 
public finance abuse, the culprit(s) tend not to be impeached as they are protected 
politically, leading to more corruption in this country (AFRODAD, 2010).  
Regarding guaranteed public debt and grants from the central government to local 
authorities and other government arms, it is vital to establish laws that compel state-
owned entities to account on all received funds to guide against abuse of state funds. 
According to ZEPARU (2010), in many instances, state funds are misappropriated in 
parastatals through unproductive activities, forcing the government to continuously 
borrow to support the loss-making state enterprises.  
Even though foreign public debt management institutional framework is partially in 
place, the debt management challenges arise from functional gaps and fragmentation 
in debt consolidation and coordination process. The foreign public debt management 
function is currently dispersed across three institutions, namely the president’s office, 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the RBZ’s External Sector 
and Financial Markets Departments (GoZ, 2017). The existence of such fragmentation 
in public debt management arrangement makes lines of action and debt accountability 
unclear. For instance, although the act mandates the External Loans Coordination 
Committee (ELCC) to contract new loans, there are incidences where credit lines and 
new loans are contracted on behalf of government by the president’s office outside the 
purview of the ELCC or without the involvement of the RBZ or parliament (AFRODAD, 
2010).  
Administratively, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development is responsible 
for Public and Publicly Guaranteed (PPG) medium-to-long term foreign public debt 
and the central bank for the capturing of domestic public debt (GoZ, 2015b). Typically, 
effective coordination, consolidation, recording and reporting of new and old debts is 
impaired by the absence of state-of-the-art software in Zimbabwe (IMF, 2017b; 
2015b).  
Economic factors, such as the underperformance of the Zimbabwean economy and 
low export revenues from commodity exports also explain the rise in demand for 
foreign government debt financing (GoZ, 2013). With such economic destitution, the 
GoZ had to contract new foreign debts at non-concessional terms from emerging 
international creditors (AFRODAD, 2010; Leo & Moss, 2009). More so, like Zambia, 
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Zimbabwe has no mechanisms to reinforce the undertaking of project appraisals and 
evaluations and ensure that only high return projects are embarked on by the state, 
and effectively managed to completion – to enhance the capacity of the government 
to repay the borrowed initial capital outlays.  
The primary contributors to rising foreign government indebtedness is the disregarding 
overlooking of the publicly guaranteed private sector foreign debt in establishing 
government borrowing limits and debt sustainability analysis, to the extent that the 
government’s overall debt position may not be fully revealed. Presently, the country 
does not have legal statutes that direct the reporting and dissemination of the country’s 
foreign public debts to the general citizens, fully detailing the structure and composition 
of the government debt (AFRODAD, 2010). The ideal situation would be to have 
mechanisms and channels to ensure that information relating to government debt and 
contraction of new loans is available at no or little cost to the citizens, thereby 
increasing accountability and transparency of public funds.  
From the challenges discussed above, this section concludes that although proper 
government debt management, domestic and foreign, is not an assurance against 
future debt challenges, it can, however, help to minimise Zimbabwe’s financial 
susceptibilities to domestic and foreign ad hoc economic and financial shocks. 
3.3 The dynamics of public debt service in Zimbabwe 
3.3.1 The evolution of public debt service in Zimbabwe  
Similar to the evolution of public debt stock in Zimbabwe, the origins of government 
debt repayments date back to the early 1980s. The escalating fiscal imbalances 
racked up government debt, domestic and foreign resulting in high domestic interest 
rates (Jenkins & Knight, 2002). By 1990, Zimbabwe’s cost of public debt servicing 
constituted a substantial percentage of public sector revenue (World Bank, 2004b). 
However, although from the 1980s until 1997, Zimbabwe amassed huge stocks of 
public debt with repayment costs increasing each year, the country promptly honoured 
all its repayment obligations (AfDB, 2012). The revenue performance of the country 
allowed the government to make prompt debt service repayments (AfDB, 2012). 
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However, the economic contraction and the country’s political risk stretching from 1998 
to 2008, undermined the economy’s ability to meet foreign public debt servicing 
obligations, resulting in the build-up of foreign payment arrears and subsequent debt 
service defaults (GoZ, 2014). The suspension of aid, budget and BOP support to 
Zimbabwe between 1999 and 2000 by the Bretton Woods institutions, AfDB and other 
donors, further worsened the liquidity and solvency position of the country (IMF, 
2003b; 2001). More so, the high volume of maturing government securities in the late-
1990s and early 2000s added to the rise in public debt repayment costs, which then 
limited the government’s welfare programmes, especially in critical areas such as 
health, education and provision of critical industrial enablers, such as electricity, road 
and rail infrastructure and water reticulation (Mumbengegwi, 2002). 
Between 1995 and 1999, the inexorable cost of public debt servicing began to erode 
the capability of the state to effectively fund social development programmes and 
public sector investments (Mupunga & Le Roux, 2014). In 2000, the Bretton Woods 
institutions further suspended general lending to Zimbabwe as a result of the country’s 
failure to service its dues (IMF, 2001). In 2003, the central bank of Zimbabwe began 
to carry out quasi-fiscal activities, further worsening the ability of the state to meet its 
financial commitments, both domestic and foreign (Mupunga & Le Roux, 2014). 
Despite the government’s default on domestic and foreign debt service payments, 
some emerging creditors, such as China, India and Brazil, continued to advance non-
concessional loans to the country in the pretext of Look East Policy and South-South 
Partnerships (MOFED, 2016). A considerable amount of the newly contracted debt 
was used in the procurement of agricultural-related equipment and inputs, as well as 
in repayment of old debts, especially the IMF arrears (Besada, 2011; Leo & Moss, 
2009). Overall, according to Jones (2011), the average annual public debt service of 
Zimbabwe throughout the 1990s was US$600 million, approximately 30% of exports, 
while between 2003 and 2013, it was much lower, causing a rise in total debt arrears. 
During the multicurrency era, although the principal foreign public debt remained low, 
interest on foreign public debt arrears increased astronomically, causing deterioration 
in public debt service ratios (IMF, 2016b).   
The economic challenges and government debt service defaults, however, set a stage 
for negotiations with international creditors and the implementation of several public 
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debt service and economic reforms in a bid to improve the country’s risk profile and 
also as part of the measures to open up new lines of credit, to both the public and 
private sectors. These revenue reforms included the introduction of new taxes, upward 
adjustment of existing tax rates, introduction of interest and exchange rate controls, 
as well as the lengthening of the government debt maturity profile (Gono, 2008; RBZ, 
2007b; Muzorewa, 2003; Mumbengegwi, 2002). 
In the multicurrency period, the government initiated the re-engagement process with 
the main creditors, the IMF and World Bank. Within this policy direction, the GoZ 
sought to reduce the public debt repayment burden by undertaking the following 
initiatives: (1) carrying out joint SMPs; (2) implementing the ZAADDS and ZAREP; and 
(3) functionalising the Debt Management Office, among other reforms (RBZ, 2016c; 
GoZ, 2013; 2012).  
Despite these public debt service management measures in Zimbabwe, the cost of 
public debt service payments is likely to remain high throughout the next several years 
because of the continued underperformance of the economy and continual rise in new 
non-concessional loans (IMF, 2016b). More so, the low commodity prices, especially 
of unrefined minerals, on the global markets since 2014 has continued to worsen the 
revenue base of the government and thus further depress the government’s efforts to 
make sound public debt repayments on protracted international debt arrears (IMF, 
2016d; RBZ, 2016c). 
3.3.2 Public debt service reforms in Zimbabwe  
In the 1970s and 1980s, Zimbabwe amassed huge foreign public debt, which 
subsequently became problematic to service in the late 1990s, prompting a series of 
public debt service reforms (IMF, 2001). Spontaneously, the IMF, World Bank and 
Paris Club were in 1992 and 1996 embarking on numerous debt reforms, targeting 
countries in serious repayment problems (Das et al., 2012: 30-31). Unlike Zambia, 
Zimbabwe was not among the beneficiaries of these public debt relief initiatives by the 
Bretton Woods institutions, Paris Club and other creditors (World Gold Council, 1999: 
49). Therefore, Zimbabwe’s public debt repayment challenges during the review 




According to the IMF (2001), Zimbabwe’s high stock of public debt and high public 
debt service outlays are proof of poor debt management and an indicator of the 
country’s need for significant structural policy and public debt service reforms. In the 
early 1990s, the country began to undertake a series of economic and financial 
reforms to find lasting solutions to the public debt servicing crisis, and also as a means 
of seeking ways to unlock fresh capital injections and alleviating poverty 
(Mumbengegwi, 2002). While domestic public debt service reforms centred mostly on 
fiscal and monetary policy adjustments, the foreign public debt service reforms 
concentrated primarily on re-engaging the traditional creditors and proper foreign 
public debt service management. Therefore, beginning in the 1990s, the country 
adopted a series of public debt service reforms designed with the complementary 
macroeconomic objectives of (1) lowering the level of public debt stock and its 
exposure to currency risk; and (2) stabilising the local currency to insulate the country 
from transitory shocks to public finance (RBZ, 2003a; 2003b).   
The servicing of foreign public debt, especially, was absorbing budgetary and foreign 
exchange resources, thus impacting negatively on the government’s spending on 
health, education and social service delivery (GoZ, 2012). To restrain the high foreign 
public debt service costs, the government employed a number of foreign debt service 
reforms which included:  
 
(1) negotiations for new loan agreements with private banks and the IFIs – bridging 
finance loans;  
(2) establishment of a new structured framework for re-engaging with the 
international community – to normalise relations and seek the removal of 
economic and political sanctions;  
(3) the utilisation of donor grants, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and new loans;  
(4) introduction of new institutional arrangements; and  
(5) massive economic, finance and public debt restructurings (IMF, 2017b; 2017c; 
RBZ, 2015; GoZ, 2009a; 2009b).  
One of the foreign debt service initiatives undertaken by the GoZ was to seek 
sovereign debt restructuring from the Paris Club, AfDB and Bretton Woods institutions 
(GoZ, 2010: 69). Sovereign foreign public debt restructuring, according to Das et al. 
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(2012: 16) “is an exchange of outstanding government debt, such as bonds or loans, 
for new debt products or cash through a legal process”. In line with this initiative, the 
GoZ prepared the ZAADDS (GoZ, 2012). The principal intention in crafting this policy 
guide was to restore financial and economic relations with its creditors and ensure 
financial re-engagement with the international community – leading to the 
rescheduling and restructuring of debt, and regaining investor confidence (GoZ, 2010).  
In response to the policy ZAADDS, Bretton Woods institutions, AfDB and Paris Club 
prescribed several conditions prior to granting the country some of its requests. These 
conditions included diamond revenue transparency, wage bill rationalisation, fast-
tracking of the restructuring of the central bank to enhance financial sector stability, 
among others (IMF, 2014e). In 2009, the GoZ started to implement economic recovery 
programmes in the interest of conforming to the stipulated structural reforms by its 
creditors. These economic reforms include the implementation of both the Short-Term 
Recovery Programme I and II, and the Medium-Term Plan (GoZ, 2011; MOFED, 
2010). More so, the government also implemented ZAREP in an effort to speed up its 
commitment to finding a lasting solution for its foreign debt service payments (MOFED, 
2012).  
The implementation of the IMF supported SMP and clearance of the IMF arrears in 
October 2016 is evidence of the country’s commitment to ZAREP (RBZ, 2016b). The 
government’s approach to the IMF for emergency assistance between 2009 and 2013 
assisted the country in building its currency reserves and boosting its economic 
performance (GoZ, 2013). During this period, the IMF helped in addressing 
macroeconomic stabilisation, monetary and exchange rate policy, financial sector 
restructuring, promoting public finance transparency, especially mineral proceeds and 
in capital account liberalisation (GoZ, 2013; RBZ, 2013). However, unlike Zambia, 
Zimbabwe did not receive any form of public debt relief from its creditors. 
In 2014, the government passed a resolution to put a floor on payments to the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Trust in a bid to settle its outstanding arrears with the IMF and 
the World Bank (RBZ, 2014). In 2015, the government used SDRs holdings to clear 
the US$110 million external payment arrears owed to the IMF (RBZ, 2016b). In line 
with this arrangement, in 2015, it also took a bridging loan facility from the African 
Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), to partly pay its debt arrears of US$585 million and 
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US$16 million to the AfDB and the African Development Fund (AfDF), respectively 
(RBZ, 2016b). Additionally, the government used another bridging loan facility from 
China in the amount of US$1.1 billion to make part payments to the outstanding foreign 
payment arrears to the World Bank Group, comprising of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (US$896 million) and the International Development 
Association (US$218 million) (RBZ, 2016b). 
Major institutional reforms began in 2011, aimed at enhancing foreign public debt 
consolidation and servicing (GoZ, 2011). The government with the support of the AfDB 
set up a Debt Management Office, which has, among other responsibilities, the 
implementation of the country’s arrears clearance and debt relief strategies (AfDB, 
2012).  
In terms of currency reforms, the government in 2016 introduced Bond notes and coins 
to curb the externalisation of foreign currency and thus help mobilise foreign exchange 
required for the payment of foreign debts and arrears (RBZ, 2017). In the same vein, 
the government in 2016 implemented stern foreign exchange measures, such as the 
requirement to seek approval from the RBZ by corporates and individuals, before 
making any foreign payment (MOFED, 2017; RBZ, 2017). The government’s objective 
was to accelerate the use of domestically generated revenues towards honouring its 
international financial obligations. 
In addition to structural and institutional reforms, the country also increased its efforts 
to strengthen its foreign public debt management capabilities. In September 2015, 
Zimbabwe enacted a new debt management law, the Public Finance Management Act 
to provide comprehensive guidance on the issuance of debt and guarantees, as well 
as public debt servicing and reporting (GoZ, 2015b). This act, and all other reforms 
described above, were among the government’s adopted initiatives to enhance the 
country’s commitment and capabilities to clear its external financial obligations during 
the period under review. In general, the foreign public debt service reforms aimed to 
boost the country’s liquidity and solvency position of this country. However, despite 
these foreign public debt payment reforms, Zimbabwe continues to be in high public 
debt service distress. The country is among the few in Southern Africa with protracted 
foreign public debt arrears with the World Bank and AfDB in 2017 (IMF, 2017b). 
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Regarding domestic public debt, the government reforms started in the late 1990s. 
During this period, the contribution of domestic public debt to total public debt 
increased markedly, such that, in 2000, approximately 60% of government revenue 
was channelled towards interest payments on the domestic public debt (OECD and 
AfDB, 2003). Faced with increased cash flow constraints, the GoZ started to stagger 
payments to its domestic creditors as well as freezing both civil service employment 
and wages (Brett, 2005).  
Between 2000 and 2004, the cumulative domestic public debt stock reached a period 
high of Z$2.2 trillion in August 2004 prompting the government to undertake domestic 
debt restructuring measures, mostly a movement from short- to long-term debt (RBZ, 
2005). In 2000, the government began to issue two-year government bonds, such by 
the end of December 2000, the bonds accounted for 56% of the total outstanding 
domestic public debt (RBZ, 2005). Furthermore, in 2003, the government started to 
issue long-term treasury bills of 91 days last issued in April 2000 and 3-year Variable 
Coupon Insurance Industry Bond worth Z$4.3 trillion (RBZ, 2005). By December 2007, 
the component of 365-day treasury bills, the government’s main instrument for 
borrowing from the domestic money market, had reached a share of 99.4% relative to 
5% in 1990 (Gono, 2008).  
The government also implemented revenue reforms between 2005 and 2017, aimed 
at strengthening tax collection efforts, mainly because of the increase in informal 
business activities and a decline in the formal sector. These revenue reforms included 
the enforcement of the presumptive tax to the informal sector in 2015, and the 
introduction of a monthly payment system of the presumptive tax instead of the 
quarterly system (GoZ, 2015a). These revenue restructurings were to mobilise 
financial resources and enhance the government’s capacity to honour its national debt 
dues. Other domestic public debt service reforms embarked by the government in the 
multicurrency era included: (1) putting a ceiling on total stock of arrears to domestic 
service providers, especially, agricultural input suppliers, and on capital certificates; 
and (2) putting a floor on protected social spending (GoZ, 2015a; MOFED, 2015). 
The legislation reforms of domestic public debt reforms encompassed the enactment 
of the Reconstruction of State-Indebted Insolvent Companies Act in 2004 (AfDB, 
2012). The act provided for the reconstruction of state-indebted enterprises that 
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cannot repay amounts made available to them from public funds (GoZ, 2006). This 
government initiative curtailed the rise in domestic public debt burden originating from 
loss-making parastatals and other government-guaranteed businesses.  
Despite these reforms, domestic public debt service payments remained very high, 
reaching Z$5.9 trillion, or 27.8% of total outstanding government domestic debt, in 
January 2008 (Gono, 2008). Between 2005 and 2008, the domestic public debt service 
burden of Zimbabwe was significantly reduced by the hyperinflationary environment 
(World Bank, 2018a). Nonetheless, Zimbabwe’s high public debt service cost 
persisted, especially for the foreign debt component (IMF, 2017b). In view of the 
foreign public debt service burden, the IMF, World Bank and AfDB reiterated that they 
would only make new loan disbursements to the country after existing debts had been 
cleared (IMF, 2017c). 
3.3.3 Public debt service and economic growth trends in Zimbabwe 
Public debt service cost in Zimbabwe became a source of anxiety in the early 1980s 
due to a number of factors, which included high public debt stock arising from non-
concessionary loans, maturing debt contracted prior to 1980, soaring world interest 
rates between 1981 and 1985, shrinking government revenue base, and low export 
competitiveness (IMF, 2017b; 2017c; Jones, 2011; Brett, 2005; Jenkins & Knight, 
2002; IMF, 1998). Following the rise in global interest rates between 1981 and 1985, 
and the massive deterioration in the country’s terms of trade in the late 1990s, 
aggregate public debt payments reached US$435.4 million in 1983, and averaged 
US$402 million for the period 1983 to 1999 (World Bank, 2018a). 
According to Jenkins and Knight (2002), the rising public debt repayment burden in 
Zimbabwe and its inability to access new concessionary loans on the foreign capital 
markets affected the country’s economic growth rates and ability to service its debts 
between 1998 and 2002. More so, a combination of the excessive devaluation of the 
Zimbabwean currency, severe foreign exchange shortages, and high nominal 
exchange rates (from the hyperinflationary environment) between 2003 and 2008, are 
among the factors which contributed to Zimbabwe’s public debt service overhang 
(Gono, 2008). In 2014, Zimbabwe was considered to be in public debt service distress, 
as evidenced by perpetual revenue constraints, springing from suppressed industrial 
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performance and low export competitiveness (IMF, 2014e: 17-18). In 2017, 
approximately 79% of the country’s foreign public debt was in arrears (IMF, 2016c).  
On the economic growth front, the economic growth dynamics in Zimbabwe between 
1980 and 2017 were predominantly driven by the political economy in this country. 
Following the lifting of economic and political sanctions in 1980, Zimbabwe enjoyed a 
quick economic recovery. Real economic growth rate per capita in the first two years 
of independence, 1980-1981, averaged 9.5% (World Bank, 2018a). However, reduced 
foreign demand for the country's unprocessed mineral and agricultural exports, and 
the onset of a drought, cut sharply into the economic growth rate of Zimbabwe in 1982, 
1983, and 1984 (Brett, 2005). In 1985, the economy recovered strongly, recording 3% 
annual economic growth rate per capita, before decreasing between 1986 and 1987, 
recording an average annual economic growth rate per capita of a negative 1.9%, 
primarily because of the drought and foreign exchange crisis (World Bank, 2018a).  
From 1990 until 2008, Zimbabwe was characterised by increased dependence on 
primary commodities; deindustrialisation and informalisation of the economy; 
dissaving and depressed domestic and foreign investment levels; deterioration of 
physical infrastructure; unsustainable fiscal imbalances; and rising domestic and 
foreign public debt and debt (Kanyenze et al., 2017; Confederation of Zimbabwe 
Industries (CZI), 2015). The share of the manufacturing sector in GDP reached a 
period peak of 26.9% in 1992 before deteriorating to below 7.2% in 2002 (CZI, 2015). 
Furthermore, the weakening public institutions, coupled with fiscal and public debt 
mismanagement, corruption, and public policy uncertainty, intensified the 
deindustrialisation and increased informalisation (Kanyenze et al., 2017).  
Zimbabwe began experiencing severe economic hardships between 1998 and 2008 
as evidenced by foreign exchange shortages; large differences between the official 
rate and parallel-market rate; hyperinflation; massive capital flight; and deterioration in 
agricultural output (Tyson, 2017; Gono, 2008; IMF, 2003b). During this period, the 
country amassed domestic and foreign public debt arrears due to the contraction in 
the government’s revenue base and hence, no debt repayment (Gono, 2008).   
The economy of Zimbabwe in the GNU period, 2009-2013, and multicurrency regime 
witnessed an economic rebound, with annual growth rate real GDP per capita 
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averaging 11.4% between 2009 and 2012, before falling to 3.1% in 2013 (World Bank, 
2018a). The weakening of global commodity prices, particularly of raw minerals that 
began in 2013 coupled with persistent public policy inconsistency, caused the 
country’s economic rebound to slow and subsequently trend downwards in 2014 until 
2016 (IMF, 2017b; GoZ, 2013). Zimbabwe’s budget deficit, for instance, widened from 
8.5% in 2016 to 15.2% in 2017 (World Bank, 2018a). However, the GoZ announced 
in its recent Transitional Stabilisation Programme (2018-2020) that it plans to restore 
financial stability, attract more foreign direct investment and boost economic growth 
(GoZ, 2018b). Figure 3.6 shows the trends in public debt service and economic growth 
in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017. 
Figure 3.6: Public debt service and economic growth trends in Zimbabwe (1980-
2017) 
Source: Author’s computation from RBZ (2018a); World Bank (2018a)  
In Figure 3.6, from 1983 to 1998, Zimbabwe suffered from liquidity challenges as 
evidenced by the public debt service-to-export of goods, which was on average above 
the IMF/World Bank indicative sustainability threshold of 18% (World Bank, 2004b; 
IMF, 2003b). During the periods, 1980-1989, and 1990-1999, the share of total public 
debt service in exports of goods and services reached a period peak of 36.9% in 1983 
and 36.8% in 1998, respectively (World Bank, 2004b). From 1983-1998, an average 
of 28.8% of Zimbabwe’s exports receipts were channelled towards public debt 
repayments, mostly foreign debt – an indication of acute resource outflow (World 
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towards debt and interest payments, a condition which could have contributed to a 
stern reduction in education, health and other social service expenditures in the 1990s 
(UNDP, 2012: 14). The financing of fiscal deficits and public debt repayment costs 
between 1990 and 1999 absorbed substantial private savings, around 8% of GDP per 
annum, thus further depressing the economic growth prospects of this country (World 
Bank, 2004b). 
Despite the high public debt service costs during this period, the government still 
honoured both its domestic and foreign debt obligations (IMF, 2001). However, Figure 
3.6 shows that between 1998 and 2008, Zimbabwe was unable to make consistent 
service repayments owing to the severe economic and financial problems that 
characterised the country during this period. With contraction in foreign exchange 
receipts due to: (1) the erosion of competitiveness; (2) depressed commodity prices; 
and (3) restricted access to foreign financing because of sagging creditworthiness, 
usable official foreign exchange reserves depleted (IMF, 2001: 3). The stock of foreign 
public debt arrears reached about US$500 million by end of 2000 (IMF, 2001). As 
illustrated in Figure 3.6, the compounding effect of the economic crisis was a reduction 
in public debt service payments beginning 1999, leading to decreased public debt 
service/GNI and public debt service-to-export of goods ratios – which from a fiscal 
sustainability perspective appears to be an improvement. However, the decline is due 
to a default on debt service payments and, therefore, a worsening of fiscal 
sustainability (IMF, 2001). The GNI also declined, and a fall in the ratio shows a chaotic 
situation with fiscal sustainability spinning out of control in Zimbabwe. 
In 2001, the government said, “we are committed to fulfilling these obligations, but it’s 
clear that our economy is in no state to generate sufficient funds to clear the arrears...” 
(Bond, 2005: 20). Zimbabwe stopped paying its foreign public debts in 1999, 
perceiving them as being too costly in terms of the country’s economic and social 
objectives (Gono, 2008: 46).  
Furthermore, Figure 3.6 shows that the ratio of public debt service to gross national 
income declined abruptly in 2000 and remained minimal until 2009. This decline in 
public debt service payments after 2000 is not a result of an improvement in revenue 
and export receipt performance but could be attributed to a deliberate government 
policy to postpone indefinitely the payment of all international debt and interest arrears, 
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and also to the government’s incapacity to pay its foreign debt component (Mupunga 
& Le Roux, 2015). Also, the inflationary environment, which stretched from 2003 to 
2008, and high seigniorage revenue permitted the government to redeem its entire 
domestic debt by December 2008 (Mupunga & Le Roux, 2015).  
In contrast to the period before 2009, when the government would service its domestic 
debt through seigniorage revenue, under the dollarisation period (post-2009), the 
government needed to generate the foreign currency to pay its debts, both domestic 
and foreign. For example, the issuance of treasury bills worth US$4417 million by 
2014, with a total of US$1,1 billion having matured and liquidated, describes the 
mounting cost of government debt service in Zimbabwe, in USD terms (MOFED, 
2017). Beginning in 2014, the government made regular payments to the domestic 
government debt holders and IFIs with the hope of opening up new lines of credit 
(RBZ, 2015). For instance, the government made monthly instalments of US$150,000 
to the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, in addition to the quarterly payments 
of US$900,000 and US$500,000 to the World Bank and AfDB, respectively (RBZ, 
2015). The finances were drawn down from the SDRs and bridging loans (RBZ, 
2016b).  
Overall, during 1980-2017, the public debt build-up in Zimbabwe and resulting 
squeeze on foreign exchange resources were destructive to economic institutions. 
With severe depletion of foreign exchange resources, arrears on both government 
debt-service and international commercial payments became common in Zimbabwe 
(IMF, 2017b; 2009c; 2003). The depletion of foreign exchange reserves and 
subsequent foreign public debt default impaired the creditworthiness of Zimbabwe and 
the number of domestic and foreign firms willing to invest or do business in this country 
plummeted (IMF, 2009c).  
3.3.4 Challenges facing public debt service management in Zimbabwe 
While external factors have contributed to the public debt service problems in 
Zimbabwe, domestic policies also bear a large part of the blame. For instance, 
Zimbabwe opted for major development programmes and highly expansionary fiscal 
policies in the 1980s, leading to the acquisition of foreign public debt as spending 
increases outpaced the rise in tax receipts (Jenkins & Knight, 2002; GoZ, 1981). These 
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government spending policies continued for years despite the deterioration in global 
commodity prices.  
Like Zambia and other Southern African countries, Zimbabwe continued to rely on 
foreign borrowing in the 1980s to meet its fiscal imbalances (IMF, 2001; 1998). This 
was despite falling export earnings, increasing inflationary pressures in the economy 
and adverse developments in foreign exchange rates (IMF, 2001; 1998). The 
escalating fiscal deficits also reduced the ability of the government to make consistent 
public debt-service payments (IMF, 2001). The domestic private savings were also 
discouraged by government policies designed to keep domestic interest rates low 
(Richardson, 2004). The outcome was negative real interest rates and 
disintermediation in the financial sector (World Bank, 2004b; Richardson, 2004). 
Zimbabwe, just like Zambia, has a very high proportion of foreign public debt 
compared to its domestic debt counterpart (World Bank, 2018a; RBZ, 2018a). As a 
result, the public debt service problems in Zimbabwe relate mainly to the settlement 
of foreign currency-denominated government debt, both arrears and principal amounts 
(World Bank, 2016c: 3). According to the IMF (2017b: 3), the exponential rise in public 
sector indebtedness in Zimbabwe since the 1980s forced the country to commit 
substantial foreign exchange reserves towards public debt service payments. The 
enormous government debt service burden crowded out both public and private sector 
investments, thereby aggravating liquidity shortages, and hence intensified public debt 
service distress (IMF, 2017b: 3, 11; GoZ, 2009a: 53).  
In general, the government debt service payment challenges in Zimbabwe are largely 
a result of, among other reasons:  
 
(1) liquidity constraints due to poor economic performance;  
(2) lack of proper public sector financial management principles;  
(3) improper composition and structure of the public debt (mostly short-term and 
non-concessional);  
(4) low investor confidence;  
(5) low industrial and export competitiveness; and  
(6) poor economic relations with the international donor community (Danha et al., 
2015; IMF, 2015b; 2014e). 
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Public debt repayment challenges for the local currency-denominated government 
debt have generally concentrated on poor economic performance and rapid 
contraction of the central government revenue base (GoZ, 2013). Apart from the 
economic deterioration, the high concentration of short-term government debt in the 
mid-1990s exacerbated the government’s repayment costs on domestic debt (RBZ, 
2003a). The compounding impact of rising nominal interests on domestic debt, 
narrowing tax revenue base and adverse developments in commodity export prices 
contributed to the increased problems of domestic public debt servicing in Zimbabwe 
in the late 1990s (RBZ, 2005). Furthermore, the lack of public sector financial 
transparency, especially on mineral export revenues, contributed to domestic public 
debt servicing problems in Zimbabwe (MOFED, 2012; 2010). 
Furthermore, the active participation of the government in domestic capital and money 
markets in the mid-1990s and between 2003 and 2008, caused domestic nominal 
interest rates to rise, leading to an upsurge in debt servicing cost on maturing domestic 
public debt – with the consequence of defaulting in 1999 (Sibanda & Dubihlela, 2013). 
The economic agents interpreted the public debt repayment defaults, both domestic 
and foreign, as an eminent future rise in tax obligations and an impending depreciation 
of the local currency, resulting in the erosion of investor and savers’ confidence (World 
Bank, 2016c). The implication was a massive capital outflow, which further worsened 
the revenue base of the government – crippling the government’s ability to service the 
domestic and foreign debts (Mupunga & Le Roux, 2015). 
Unlike domestic public debt payment challenges, the challenges of foreign public debt 
servicing in Zimbabwe originated mostly from the magnitude, composition and 
structure of the foreign public debt (RBZ, 2014). The foreign public debt in Zimbabwe 
is principally non-concessional (IMF, 2017b; 2014e). In 1999, more than 80% of 
previously contracted foreign public debt had matured, resulting in severe debt service 
defaults (RBZ, 2003a). Liquidity challenges further deteriorated due to the economic 
crisis and increased financial sector vulnerabilities that rocked the country between 
1998 and 2009. The fall in terms of trade of mineral and agricultural exports further 
intensified the problem of servicing foreign currency-denominated debt in Zimbabwe 
during the period 1998-2008 (Gono, 2008).  
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Foreign public debt servicing problems in Zimbabwe were also exacerbated by the 
imposition of financial and economic sanctions on the country by both the western 
economies and most IFIs (GoZ, 2013: 8, 11-12). The sanctions contributed to the 
foreign public debt service challenges in numerous ways, which included:  
 
(1) the cancellation of foreign grants, which the country used to receive from 
developmental partners, especially from multilateral financial institutions;  
(2) the cancellation of budget and BOP financial support from the Bretton Woods 
institutions, thus constraining the revenue base of the state;  
(3) the loss of most lucrative commodity export markets, especially that of beef to 
the European market;  
(4) the disappearance of cheap lines of offshore finances; and  
(5) the intensification of capital flight (World Bank, 2016c: 3-9; GoZ, 2013; Besada, 
2011).  
The cumulative outcome of these adverse economic developments was a general 
contraction of the Zimbabwean economy, leading to the excessive fiscal imbalances 
and increased contraction of new non-concessionary foreign public debt – and 
ultimately, an excessive public debt servicing burden (GoZ, 2009c). Overall, the 
decline in net capital inflows, including foreign financial assistance in the late 1990s, 
adversely affected the ability of Zimbabwe to meet its public debt service obligations. 
As a result, the combined net foreign borrowing and non-debt-creating flows, including 
the absence of public debt relief, worsened the ability of the country to honour its 
external obligations between 1998 and 2017. In 2017, the IMF suggested that 
Zimbabwe’s indebtedness continued to outgrow its capacity to pay, mainly due to 
incessant amassing of interest arrears on foreign public debt, and so, there is little 
chance that the country could emerge from this public debt servicing problem in the 
near future (IMF (2017b: 66).  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the growth dynamics of public debt, public debt service, 
both domestic and foreign, and economic growth in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017. 
Among the issues discussed were the major economic policies and reforms that 
described the growth in public debt stock and public debt service payments and the 
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corresponding economic growth trends in Zimbabwe during the period under review. 
From the chapter discussions, like in the case of Zambia, Zimbabwe’s expansionary 
fiscal activities in the 1980s, primarily funded by public borrowing (mostly foreign), 
culminated into huge public debt stock by 1990. 
Some of the highlighted challenges that led to the high public debt levels in Zimbabwe 
were weak institutional and legal public debt frameworks; lack of accountability, 
transparency and inclusiveness of the institutions involved in public debt management 
and loan contraction processes; declining gross domestic and foreign direct 
investment; massive company closures; and the absence of international financial 
support. However, like the case of Zambia, poor economic performance; public sector 
financial indiscipline; high composition of short-maturing debt; and absence of political 
will were identified as leading to the public debt service management challenges in 
Zimbabwe during the period under review.  
In response to the public debt overhang and massive public debt service obligations, 
this chapter discussed some of the adopted public debt management reforms, which, 
like in Zambia’s case, included improvement in public finance management through 
statutory amendments; implementation of new institutional arrangements; 
engagement of the international creditor community; and adoption of new currency 
reforms. 
On the economic growth front, six distinct policy periods were identified; the pre-
independence period (1965-1979); the corporatism period (1981-1990); the liberalism 
period (1991-1999); the economic recession period (2000-2008); the economic 
recovery period (2009-2013); and the economic stagnation and recession period 
(2014-2017). The chapter reviewed the period 1998 to 2008, which the AfDB referred 
to as the “lost decade”, when Zimbabwe recorded the worst consecutive annual 
economic growth rates, averaging a negative 6.9%. It is during this time that the 
country amassed huge foreign public debt arrears, and also funded its recurrent 
expenditures through seigniorage. Although the hyperinflationary environment 
reduced domestic public indebtedness to near zero in 2008, rising world interest rates 





PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the dynamics of public debt, public debt service and economic 
growth in South Africa and has four main sections. Section 4.2 debates public debt 
and economic growth dynamics in South Africa. Section 4.2 has four sub-sections that 
consider the following issues: an overview of the evolution of public debt in South 
Africa; public debt reforms; trends and challenges facing public debt management in 
South Africa. Section 4.3 discusses public debt service and economic growth 
dynamics in South Africa with four sub-sections, namely: an overview of the evolution 
of public debt service in South Africa; public debt service reforms;  trends in public 
debt service and economic growth in South Africa and challenges affecting public debt 
service management in South Africa. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 The dynamics of public debt in South Africa 
4.2.1 The evolution of public debt in South Africa  
Public debt in South Africa has evolved quite substantially since the apartheid era, 
1948-1994. Beginning in the 1950s until the late 1970s, South Africa had no active 
secondary bond markets, except for the underdeveloped primary debt markets, and it 
lacked distinct separations between monetary and fiscal operations (Leape & Ncube, 
2009). The government, therefore, would periodically issue its securities, mainly 
treasury bills, on an open-ended tap basis, and mostly at a discount, until the early 
1980s (Hirsch, 2005). In the 1980s, the government changed its public debt 
management approach and started to consolidate short-term debt issues into long-
term benchmark bonds in ranges of 5 to 20 years (Mboweni, 2006; National Treasury, 
2004).  
In the same vein as Zambia and Zimbabwe, during this period from 1980 to 1993, 
South Africa experienced rising fiscal deficits stemming largely from adverse 
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movements in mineral world market prices, particularly gold, rising domestic interest 
rates, increasing costs to service government debts, high levels of disinvestment and 
divestment by foreigners, capital flight and low foreign exchange reserves 
(Government of South Africa (GSA), 1994). In 1993, South Africa returned to the 
international capital market when the IMF approved, for the first time since 1982, a 
loan of US$850 million under the institution’s Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility (IMF, 2000). The growth in public debt was further compounded by 
the introduction, in 1994 and 1995, of the global bonds worth US$750 million and 
US$573 million, respectively (Cross, 2004).  
Contrary to Zambia and Zimbabwe, the South African government relied heavily on its 
domestic debt market for debt financing, especially in the mid-1980s and early 1990s 
when the country was under anti-apartheid economic and financial sanctions, 
particularly from the European countries and the United States of America (Carmody, 
2002). As a result, the growth in domestic public debt was pronounced and surpassed 
the growth in foreign public debt. Until 2017, the local currency, Rands, mostly 
denominates South African government debt, with a small proportion of the country’s 
domestic debt held by non-residents (National Treasury, 2018a).  
Also, from 1976 to 1993, none of South Africa’s existing foreign public debt was with 
major international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF (National 
Treasury, 1995; 1994). Due to the economic and financial sanctions, foreign loans 
were obtained from a few individual world governments and other private financial 
institutions (National Treasury, 1995; 1994; Hirsch, 1989a; 1989b). The foreign loans 
were mainly to fund the huge public sector investments, aimed at making the country 
self-sufficient, economically and financially (Cross, 2004; Clark, 1994). During the 
apartheid period, the evolution of public debt in South Africa was mostly influenced by 
political and macroeconomic instability.  
In the post-apartheid period, 1994-2017, growth in public debt, both domestic and 
foreign, was primarily determined by several factors including: (1) the inheritance of 
previous debts by the state; (2) the rising budget imbalances due to domestic and 
global financial and economic crises; and (3) the revaluation of foreign government 
securities and loans (National Treasury, 2018a; 2012a; 2012b; 1995; Mboweni, 2006). 
Much like other emerging economies, the global financial crisis of 1997/98 and 
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2008/09, and the economic recession that followed, inevitably led to the introduction 
of countercyclical fiscal policy measures by the South African government – to sustain 
increased public sector investments in infrastructure, and also, to continue supporting 
welfare programmes (National Treasury, 2014a; 2014b). The outcome of the 
government intervention measures was large budget deficits and increased 
government borrowing from domestic capital markets to fund the escalating budget 
imbalances (South African Reserve Bank (SARB), 2014). Additionally, in 2017, the 
government of South Africa marginally increased its funding of external financial 
obligations by borrowing from international capital markets (National Treasury, 
2018b). 
Furthermore, in the post-1994 period, the government of South Africa singled out 
public debt as one of the major threats to domestic economic recovery leading to 
massive institutional, legal, public finance, public debt management and economic 
reforms. These reforms resulted in: (1) the deepening of domestic capital markets – 
now characterised by sound public debt management policies and modern financial 
settlement mechanisms; (2) significant variations in government debt structure and 
composition; and (3) the formation of several public debt management institutions, 
such as the Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA), the Fiscal and Finance 
Commission, the Debt Management Office and the Asset and Liability Management 
division of the National Treasury (GSA, 2014a; 1994). Further, in the late 1990s, the 
country ratified the Public Finance Management Act to continuously improve on the 
management of public sector indebtedness (GSA, 1999). More so, between 1994 and 
2017, the South African government, through the Department of Finance, promulgated 
a series of revenue, expenditure and financial frameworks aimed at narrowing fiscal 
deficits. 
Presently, as opposed to Zambia and Zimbabwe, the South African domestic capital 
market is among the most developed and liquid markets in Africa and remains the 
government’s leading source of budget financing (National Treasury, 2018a). The 
public debt portfolio remains well-structured characterised by longer-dated loans 
(National Treasury, 2018a). Finally, the short-term loans in South Africa are mainly 
stable, constituting less than 12% of total public debt stock in 2018 (National Treasury, 
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2018a). Also, the proportion of foreign public debt remained low, amounting to 8.8% 
of GDP in 2017 (National Treasury, 2018a). 
4.2.2 Public debt reforms in South Africa 
The exceptional growth in fiscal and political challenges in the 1960s pressed most 
emerging economies, such as South Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Thailand and Mexico, 
to make substantial public debt and public finance management reforms (Abbas et al., 
2011). In the 1970s, South Africa lacked comprehensive legal and regulatory public 
debt policy frameworks so that public spending and financing decisions were mainly 
driven by political desires and partially by the need to ease public debt servicing costs, 
regardless of the public debt composition or structure (Ajam & Aron, 2007). 
Nonetheless, during this period, South Africa had some ad hoc public financial 
management measures, which included strict financial market regulations, mostly the 
exchange and domestic interest rate controls (Hirsch, 1989a; 1989b; Harris, 1986; 
GSA, 1975). Also, between 1970 and 1979, the state introduced new debt instruments 
and also practised partial public debt sustainability analyses (Bhorat et al., 2014).  
In the late 1980s, the government of South Africa implemented more formalised and 
prudent approaches to financial and public debt management. The government debt 
reforms included carrying out partial domestic debt risk assessments, especially on 
the linkage between debt and the general performance of the economy (National 
Treasury, 1994). The deregulation of domestic financial markets by the South African 
government further enhanced the development of domestic debt markets and the 
separation of fiscal and monetary operations (SARB, 2006). The government’s 
deregulation initiative meant that the government placed its focus on selling its debt 
securities in the secondary debt markets while the central bank concentrated on 
auctioning government securities in the primary debt markets (National Treasury, 
2008). In the early 1990s, the increased macroeconomic instability and heightened 
volatilities in domestic and world interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices 
forced the government to intensify its liberalisation of capital markets, in addition to 
seeking regularisation of financial and economic relations with the outside world 
(Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2011; IMF, 2005d). 
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Public debt reforms in the post-apartheid period were concentrated extensively on 
enhancing public debt management practices, both domestic and foreign, through:  
(1) broadening of public debt instruments by lengthening the maturity periods of 
government securities - thus increasing the diversification of government debt 
portfolio;  
(2) restructuring of the domestic financial market;  
(3) establishing appropriate public debt management institutional arrangements;  
(4) carrying out comprehensive public debt analysis and risk management 
frameworks;  
(5) integrating cash and government debt management roles; and  
(6) improving the legal and regulatory frameworks that guide in the issuance, 
management and payment of government debt securities (National Treasury, 
2018a; 2015; 2012a; 2012b; 2008; 1994; Bhorat et al., 2014; World Bank, 
2011; Calitz et al., 2010; Faulkner & Loewald, 2008).  
 
Inevitably, the adopted public debt reforms increased the strengthening of the 
domestic debt market and reduced both the country’s fiscal risk and exposure to 
external financial and economic shocks. 
Among the newly introduced domestic debt instruments, after 2000, were retail 
savings bonds, retirement annuities, post-retirement savings bonds, fixed-rate bonds, 
zero-coupon and inflation-linked bonds (through reverse purchase facility), in addition 
to switch or exchange programmes (National Treasury, 2013; 2004; BESA, 2006). 
According to the National Treasury (2013), the introduction of these new government 
securities increased the participation of local and foreign investors in government-
domestic securities, mostly in the secondary markets. With the above instruments at 
its disposal, the South African government could finance its total budget requirements 
in a sophisticated and liquid domestic debt market without reverting to foreign 
borrowing (National Treasury, 2013). In 2018, long-term loans denominated in Rands, 
mostly fixed-rate and inflation-linked bonds, were the main public borrowing 
instruments, representing 78.9% of the government debt stock (National Treasury, 
2018a).   
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As opposed to Zambia and Zimbabwe, whose public debt management roles are the 
primary responsibility of the central bank, the South African government in 1996 
assigned to the Asset and Liability Management (ALM) division of the National 
Treasury (formerly the Department of Finance) the responsibility of controlling 
domestic and foreign public debt portfolios (GSA, 2001). The ALM division was, 
therefore, mandated to:  
(1) perform cash management operations, including trading government financial 
instruments in the money market and making cash flow forecasts;  
(2) undertake credit risk assessments for government securities;  
(3) invest government money; and  
(4) manage government loans and guarantees (GSA, 2001).  
This debt management rearrangement fostered effective public debt management 
resulting in sound improvement in the country’s international creditworthiness. 
On the institutional front, the domestic public debt management reforms in South 
Africa included the establishment of the South African Revenue Service (SARS) in 
1994, through the Katz Commission (National Treasury, 2002). It is an autonomous 
revenue service body formed by combining the Inland Revenue and the Customs and 
Excise departments (National Treasury, 2002). The purpose of establishing SARS was 
to curtail rising fiscal deficits through improved revenue collection mechanisms (GSA, 
1997). To accomplish this state mandate, SARS had the responsibility of enacting and 
implementing extensive tax reforms and more efficient tax collection approaches 
(GSA, 1997: 6). Still, on institutional reforms, the government in 1997 constituted the 
Fiscal and Financial Commission, an independent body mandated with researching 
on government spending and revenue matters and making appropriate financial 
recommendations to Parliament (National Treasury, 1997).  
In other related institutional domestic public debt reforms, the South African 
government made the office of the Auditor-General (AG) an autonomous entity to 
improve the oversight of public finance management in the country (GSA, 2004). This 
measure of including the AG office in public finance management complements the 
responsibility of the National Assembly, which is mandated to supervise budget 
preparation and implementation. Complementary revenue and expenditure 
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management measures include the provision by the government to have public 
enterprises audited by private firms, with the findings forwarded to the AG’s office 
(Parliament of South Africa, 2011). Additionally, since 2003, the government of South 
Africa introduced Internal Audit Units in all government institutions and departments 
with the prime goal of reducing the budget deficit, government debt and borrowing 
costs (Parliament of South Africa, 2011). 
Other domestic public debt management reforms in South Africa after 2003 included 
massive revenue and expenditure management restructuring. For instance, the 
government of South Africa implemented computerised systems on countrywide 
networks for purposes of facilitating revenue administration for income tax, value-
added tax and customs duties (National Treasury, 2005). To effectively contain public 
sector salary payments, transverse computerised payroll management systems, Basic 
Accounting System (BAS) and Personnel and Salary Administration System 
(PERSAL), were established (Ecorys, 2014; 2008). The BAS, which replaced the 
Financial Management system in 2004, provides computerised accounting across 
government departments and sets public sector expenditure ceilings using the 
drawdown schedule (Ecorys, 2008). According to Ecorys (2008), the PERSAL system 
is a useful government budgetary control tool integrating the establishment of 
government posts. The two systems, BAS and PERSAL, made it possible for the 
government to make meaningful public debt forecasts based on the analysis of debt 
maturity profiles and see if they meet the requirements of the drawdown schedule 
(Ecorys, 2008). Thus, the implementation of the BAS and PERSAL, as well as the 
introduction of the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement in 1997, enhanced the 
government’s capacity to integrate cash and internal public debt management in South 
Africa (National Treasury, 2003).  
The legal framework on public debt management in this country is underpinned by the 
constitution and the Public Finance Management Act Number 29 of 1999. The 
enactment of the Public Finance Management Act resulted in increased fiscal 
transparency and the formation of the National Treasury, a merger of the former 
departments of Finance and State Expenditure (Siebrits & Calitz, 2004: 767-768). The 
Public Finance Management Act of 1999 of South Africa stipulates that the responsible 
minister of finance is the sole authority for the contracting of loans and guarantees that 
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bind the National Revenue Fund (Ecorys, 2008). However, in making borrowing 
decisions, the minister of finance is guided by the Budget Review and 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review, which are budgetary instruments tabled before 
parliament, which stipulate the country’s government debt targets (National Treasury, 
2003).  
Also, in South Africa, the country’s 1996 constitution incorporates domestic public debt 
management reforms. Prior to the enactment of the country’s constitution in 1996, 
public finance and expenditure management systems in this country were highly 
disjointed and lacked strict oversight resulting in increased government indebtedness 
(National Treasury, 1996). The 1996 constitution promotes effective public financial 
management by ensuring transparency and accountability of budget processes at all 
three levels of government (GSA, 1999). The constitution further limits the borrowing 
powers of provincial and local governments (GSA, 1999). Additionally, it mandates the 
parliament to be an overseer of budget formulation and implementation, in addition to 
the function of amending money bills (GSA, 1999). Furthermore, in 2009, the Money 
Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act (Number 9 of 2009) was passed 
for purposes of increasing the role of the parliament in overseeing fiscal operations 
and strengthening parliament’s contribution to policy implementation (Parliament of 
the Republic of South Africa, 2011).  
In 2003, the government’s Municipal Finance Management Act extended the budget 
reforms to local governments. As was the case with Zambia and Zimbabwe, additional 
domestic public debt reforms in South Africa included the restructuring and 
rearrangement of public sector entities, resulting in the privatisation and 
commercialisation of some state-owned enterprises, with part of the privatisation 
receipts channelled towards public debt service repayments (World Bank, 2011). The 
restructuring of state-owned companies fostered the government’s efforts to curtail 
fiscal imbalances and lessen the overall public debt service costs (Donaldson, 2000: 
17). 
Foreign public debt reforms, both before and after 1994, were less pronounced owing 
to the smaller foreign public debt size relative to the domestic public debt component 
(World Bank, 2018a). In the 1980s, the government adopted a foreign borrowing 
policy, in which the government would not rely extensively on foreign debt as a means 
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of funding fiscal imbalances (National Treasury, 1995). Also, at the same time, foreign 
public debt reforms took the form of stringent capital and exchange rate controls 
(SARB, 1998; Leap, 1992). For instance, in 1985, the government introduced a two-
tier exchange rate system, the managed float commercial Rand and the free-floating 
financial Rand, and strict exchange controls. The exchange rate reforms were partly 
in response to the punitive economic and financial isolation, as well as a strategy of 
managing foreign debt through reducing rampant capital outflows (Bhorat et al., 2014; 
SARB, 1998: 6). Supplementary foreign public debt management measures 
comprised: (1) the imposition of a foreign public debt repayment moratorium in the 
mid-1980s; (2) a revamp of the foreign public loan contraction process stipulated in 
the country’s constitution of 1996 and the Public Finance Management Act of 1999; 
and (3) the undertaking of scheduled comprehensive annual foreign public debt 
sustainability analyses by the National Treasury after 1996 (Bhorat et al., 2014; 
National Treasury, 2014a; 2014b). 
4.2.3 Public debt and economic growth trends in South Africa 
Most emerging economies, South Africa included, have been depending on both 
domestic and foreign capital and money markets to finance budget requirements and 
stimulate economic growth (Fedderke & Romm, 2005; Ovenden & Cole, 1989). Thus, 
the growth of public debt in South Africa over the period from 1960 to 2017 was 
influenced by movements in domestic and foreign interest rates, exchange rates and 
inflation rates, as well as the government’s net borrowing requirements (IMF, 2005d).  
With the demise of the apartheid regime in 1994, the new South African government 
inherited foreign public debt worth more than R14 billion, owed mostly to the private 
banks in Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America 
(National Treasury, 1995). In regard to section 239 of South Africa’s constitution, these 
debts and other financial commitments of the apartheid government, which could 
directly link to asset acquired in accordance to the constitution in the provinces, were 
adopted by the provincial governments (National Treasury, 1995). Further, the debts 
and liabilities which could not be related plainly to the assets assigned to the provinces 
were adopted by the federal government (National Treasury, 1995).  
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Since then, the country has also embarked on the fiscal, economic and financial 
reforms which ultimately moulded the current structure, composition and trends of its 
public debt and economic growth process. The South African government’s austere 
economic and financial measures after 1994 not only reduced the country’s foreign 
public debt stock but also made the domestic government securities more attractive 
to both residents and non-residents (National Treasury, 2012a).  
4.2.3.1 Domestic public debt trend in South Africa 
Unlike Zambia and Zimbabwe, the domestic public debt in South Africa has always 
constituted the most substantial proportion of total government debt since the 1970s, 
averaging 92.2% between 1975 and 2017 (National Treasury, 2018a). In December 
2017, the total public debt, domestic and foreign currency-denominated debt, of South 
Africa amounted to R2.5 trillion (or 50.7% of GDP) compared to R2.3 trillion (or 49% 
of GDP) in 2016 (National Treasury, 2018b: 11). The rise in public sector indebtedness 
could mostly be attributed to the increase in domestic public debt, which accounted 
for more than 53% of GDP in December 2017 (National Treasury, 2018b). According 
to the National Treasury (2017), the increase in government’s domestic indebtedness 
had been a cumulative effect of the need to finance rising annual budget deficits, 
refinancing maturing government debt securities and/or where necessary as a tool to 
regulate the domestic monetary situation.  
The domestic debt market of South Africa provides residents of the country with an 
alternative option to banking for allocating their savings. Between 1970 and 1994, 
extensive government interference on market processes greatly expanded state 
expenditures, which led to runaway fiscal deficits (Faulkner & Loewald, 2008). The 
combined effect of (1) exchange control regulations and stringent asset requirements; 
(2) international isolation; (3) high world interest rates; and (4) new government 
borrowing preferences, all contributed to limited access to international finance, 
resulting in the need to develop a vibrant domestic debt market to fund growing budget 
deficits (GSA, 2014a; SARB, 2006; Moss & Obery, 1987).  
Apart from a large non-banking private sector, the success of the country’s 
macroeconomic policies in stabilising the economy between 1994 and 2017 and high 
yield rates in South Africa, contributed to increased confidence and participation of 
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domestic and foreign investors in government securities (National Treasury, 2018a; 
SARB, 2014). Generally, the establishment of BESA in 1996 spearheaded the 
development of the country’s domestic debt market (National Treasury, 1996). Since 
then, the focus of the country was to develop the domestic debt market, maintain 
creditworthiness and promote a balanced government debt maturity structure 
(National Treasury, 2017; 2012a).  
From a backward perspective, the development of BESA in South Africa, a formal 
bond exchange, resulted from the recommendations made in the Stals and Jacobs 
reports, and dates back to the Bond Market Association of 1989 (IMF & World Bank, 
2003). Following the recommendations, the South African authorities recognised the 
need to have a self-regulated bond market, controlled by domestic market participants 
rather than imposed foreign control (IMF & World Bank, 2003). Consequently, in 1996, 
BESA was formed (National Treasury, 1996). 
After 1999, the government’s focus switched towards the minimisation of debt-related 
costs, risk management, diversification of domestic debt instruments and increased 
access to domestic capital markets (National Treasury, 2016a). These developments 
have shaped the structure of the South African government domestic debt during the 
period under review. The total domestic public debt of South Africa, marketable and 
non-marketable, was R2.3 trillion as at 31 December 2017 (National Treasury, 2018b: 
86). The growth in domestic public debt was a consequence of significant issuances 
of domestic marketable debt instruments, both bonds – comprised of fixed-rate, 
inflation-linked and zero-coupon bonds, and treasury bills (National Treasury, 2018b). 
Table 4.1 shows the composition of domestic public debt in South Africa over the past 




Table 4.1: Composition of domestic public debt in South Africa (by instrument) 
(2012-2017) 
 Composition by instrument (R billion) 












2012 190.9 793.3 224.5 11.3 1.0 0.1 
2013 214.1 917.7 298.7 9.5 1.0 0.1 
2014 223.6 1039.8 358.7 9.0 0.9 0.1 
2015 236.5 1158.3 418.9 9.0 0.1 0.1 
2016 256.2 1300 443 8.9 0.2 0.1 
2017 332.7 1424 516 9.1 0.1 0.1 
Source: Author’s computation from National Treasury (2018a); SARB (2018) 
 
Table 4.1 presents a scenario in which a high proportion of the government’s domestic 
debt between 2012 and 2017 was sourced from the local capital markets, mainly from 
the issuance of two types of savings bonds, that is, fixed-rate and inflation-linked 
bonds. Fixed-rate savings bonds were issued in categories of 2, 3 and 5 years, and 
the inflation-linked bonds in categories of 3, 5 and 10 years (National Treasury, 2017). 
In 2000, the government of South Africa introduced, in the domestic bond market, fixed 
income bonds and inflation-linked bonds, to be sold weekly (BESA, 2006). Inflation-
linked bonds, together with retail savings bonds (introduced in 2004), deepened the 
domestic debt market of South Africa and thus reduced the over-reliance on monetary 
financing of deficits, that is, treasury bills, as shown in Table 4.1 (National Treasury, 
2018a).  
The retail savings bonds were sold to the public by the National Treasury, and any 
other organisation or retail outlet registered with BESA, but mostly, any South African 
bank, broker or Pick and Pay retail outlets (SARB, 2018). Furthermore, the issuance 
of retail bonds also helped to boost the country’s gross national savings and diversify 
the government domestic debt portfolio (National Treasury, 2019; 2012b). Also, the 
government’s initiative in increasing the issuance of fixed interest rate bonds, 
denominated in Rands, was to minimise the risks of future currency depreciation (The 
Presidency, 2006). Other government bonds in South Africa are vanilla bonds, variable 
bonds and consumer price index bonds (The Presidency, 2006). In South Africa, 
treasury bills are auctioned every Wednesday by the central bank on behalf of the 
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government (SARB, 2018). Table 4.2 shows the structure of domestic public debt in 
South Africa for the period 1970 to 2017. 


















1970 122 5022 5144 2.4 97.6 
1975 1088 8120 9208 11.8 88.2 
1980 1571 17809 19380 8.1 91.9 
1985 2551 33282 35833 7.1 92.9 
1990 8041 81223 89264 9.0 91.0 
1995 8360 254007 262367 3.2 96.8 
2000 25500 339731 365231 7.0 93.0 
2001 17910 331505 349415 5.1 94.9 
2002 22050 328820 350870 6.3 93.7 
2003 28600 359700 388300 7.4 92.6 
2004 34450 394143 428593 8.0 92.0 
2005 40400 417380 457780 8.8 91.2 
2006 45800 422064 467864 9.8 90.2 
2007 51850 426415 478265 10.8 89.2 
2008 65000 462751 527751 12.3 87.7 
2009 114540 585992 700532 16.4 83.6 
2010 136150 733438 869588 15.7 84.3 
2011 155159 890256 1045415 14.8 85.2 
2012 171985 1038849 1210834 14.2 85.8 
2013 192206 1217512 1409718 13.6 86.4 
2014 202217 1399282 1601499 12.6 87.4 
2015 209468 1572574 1782042 11.8 88.2 
2016 249970 1731657 1981627 12.6 87.4 
2017 292970 1990643 2283613 12.8 87.2 
Source: Author’s computation from National Treasury (2018a) 
 
In Table 4.2, bonds accounted for the main component of the outstanding stock of 
domestic public debt in South Africa, representing 97.6% and 87.2% in 1970 and 2017, 
respectively (National Treasury, 2018a). The government’s preference for bonds over 
Treasury bills was partly because bonds provided a reliable source of current income 
and enhanced domestic liquidity. As part of the government’s effective control of its 
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domestic debt portfolio, state bonds are either redeemed or swapped into new bonds 
(National Treasury, 2018b). Table 4.2 also shows an abrupt rise in the issuance of 
treasury bills in 2016 and 2017, which was in expectation of increased revenue-
expenditure mismatches and periodic cash flow pressures (National Treasury, 2018b: 
84). 
As a result of the country’s unfavourable economic experience of the 1997 and 1998 
global financial crisis, the government of South Africa decided to make the 
development of a vibrant corporate bond market a policy objective (National Treasury, 
1998). The most likely cause of this policy development direction by the South African 
authorities was the assertion that a burgeoning domestic currency corporate bond 
market would directly impact on the stability of both the financial system and overall 
economic performance. The capital markets are a significant source of funds for 
infrastructure and other investment activities (National Treasury, 1998).  
The increased issuance of government bonds from 1970 to 2017 broadened the 
sources of funding the fiscal financial requirements and also stimulated the growth of 
the country’s bond market (see Table 4.2). The other possibility for issuing government 
bonds could have been to stabilise domestic interest rates and facilitate competition 
in financial services in the South African economy, particularly given the reduction of 
fiscal deficits between 1996 and 2008 (SARB, 2013).  
The intention of increasing domestic debt instruments and lengthening their maturity 
periods was in part to limit and/or spread domestic public debt service costs (SARB, 
2016). More so, the strong demand in domestic public debt securities by non-residents 
was necessitated by robust economic growth rates, sound financial management 
policies in South Africa and continued low yield rates on debt securities in developed 
countries (World Bank, 2018a; National Treasury, 2018b). In 2011, the government 
further diversified its debt securities through the issuance of Sukuk (Islamic) bonds – 
further increasing the proportion of domestic public debt held by foreigners (National 
Treasury, 2014c; 2014d).  
Sukuk bonds are a financial tool which differ from conventional bonds in that they are 
an asset-backed security – they  represent ownership in a tangible asset, usufruct of 
an asset, service, project, business, or joint venture (National Treasury, 2014d). In 
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South Africa, Rand-denominated Sukuk bonds were issued based on an al-Ijara 
structure priced at a coupon rate of 3.9% (National Treasury, 2014d). The 
government’s strategy to issue an Islamic bond also set a benchmark for state-owned 
enterprises seeking diversified sources of funding for infrastructure development 
(National Treasury, 2014d). 
The Sukuk bonds increased domestic-debt issuance and reduced the share of foreign 
public debt from 19.9% in 2007/08 to 5.4% in 2011/12, respectively (National Treasury, 
2014c; 2014d). Also, the inclusion of South Africa in the World Government Bond 
Index in October 2012 contributed positively to the rise in non-resident participation in 
government bonds (National Treasury, 2012a). Table 4.3 provides a summary of the 
investor base in South Africa over the period from 2010 to 2017. 
Table 4.3: Domestic government bonds in South Africa (by holder) (2010-2017)  
Bondholder 
% 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Pension funds 36.5 35.2 31.8 29.1 31.7 30.7 28.2 25.8 
Monetary institutions 17.7 16.3 17.0 14.6 14.7 17.6 18.1 15.4 
Insurers 14.1 11.6 9.4 8.6 8.2 8.3 8.6 7.3 
Other financial 
institutions 
8.1 8.0 5.8 8.2 8.7 10.3 10.1 10.2 
Others 1.8 2.0 2.1 3.1 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.1 
Residents 78.2 70.9 64.1 63.6 64.0 67.6 65.2 58.8 
Non-residents 21.8 29.1 35.9 36.4 36.0 32.4 34.8 41.2 
Source: Author’s computation from National Treasury (2018a)  
 
As shown in Table 4.3, foreign investor holdings of domestic government bonds 
reached 41.2% in 2017 compared to 21.8% in 2010 (National Treasury, 2018b). In 
absolute terms, holdings by these investors increased from R557.6 billion in 2016 to 
R602.4 billion in 2017 (National Treasury, 2018a). With regard to domestic investor 
holdings of domestic public debt in South Africa, as was the case with Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, financial institutions were the largest holders of government debt, partly 
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due to the need to meet their prescribed liquid asset requirements (National Treasury, 
2018b). Overall, the composition of holders of government debt in South Africa varies 
immensely on the type of instrument. For instance, investors aged 50 years and above 
generally hold retail savings bonds; foreign investors mainly hold fixed-rate bonds; 
while domestic pension funds who would want to hedge against inflation hold inflation-
linked bonds (National Treasury, 2016b: 37-44). Figure 4.1 shows the growth in 
domestic public debt in South Africa from 1990 to 2017. 
Figure 4.1: Domestic public debt in South Africa (1990-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from National Treasury (2018a) 
 
In Figure 4.1, domestic public debt (mostly constituted of treasury bills and bonds) 
rose steadily between 1990 and 2008, and exponentially from 2009 to 2017. The 
average ratio of domestic public debt in South Africa increased from 30% of GDP 
between 1980 and 1989 to 37% of GDP between 1990 and 1994, and 45% of GDP 
between 1995 and 2000 (Christensen, 2004). The domestic public debt trend 
portrayed in Figure 4.1 further suggests that South Africa’s debt and financial markets 
were expanding, as evidenced by the country’s broad money that amounted to 46% 
of GDP between 1980 and 1989, 53% of GDP between 1990 and 1994, and 56% of 
GDP between 1995 and 2000 (Christensen, 2004). From 2008 to 2017, Figure 4.1 
indicates that the South African government increasingly met funding requirements 


























































































4.2.3.2 Foreign public debt trend in South Africa 
While the evolution of domestic public debt in South Africa was so pronounced at the 
beginning of the 1970s, the growth of South Africa’s foreign public debt dates back to 
the 1940s. According to Davies and Seventer (2004), South Africa’s foreign borrowing 
increased after 1946 mainly due to its import-substitution industrialisation policies, and 
the country’s extensive infrastructural development activities, especially in transport 
and energy sectors (Clark, 1994). Between 1946 and 1982, South Africa was the 
primary recipient of loans from the Bretton Woods institutions in sub-Saharan Africa 
(World Bank, 2001b; IMF, 2000). Additionally, the rising world interest rates and 
marginal new borrowings from a few private creditors contributed to the steady 
increase in foreign public debt stocks in South Africa in the 1970s and early 1980s 
(World Bank, 2018a; Clark, 1994).  
In the post-apartheid era, 1994-2017, the new government’s objective was to reduce 
the government’s reliance on foreign loans in financing its budget requirements (GSA, 
1994). The outcome of this policy directive was a progressive increase in foreign public 
debt denominated in Rands (SARB, 2014). The country’s Public Finance Management 
Act of 1999 compelled the government to increasingly source its funding from the 
domestic market – an initiative which further reduced the overall government’s reliance 
on foreign capital markets (GSA, 1999). During the review period, foreign loans came 
mostly from Development Financial Institutions (DFIs), and the loans came with a 
grace period for drawdowns ranging from two to five years (GSA, 2017). The relatively 
longer drawdown periods lessened the foreign currency risk of the South African 
government. In 2017, the total foreign currency-denominated debt (marketable and 
non-marketable) of national government amounted to R226 billion (or US$73.4 billion) 
as at 31 December 2017 (National Treasury, 2018b). Figure 4.2 shows the evolution 
of foreign public debt in South Africa from 1980 to 2017, expressed as a percentage 






Figure 4.2: Foreign public debt trend in South Africa (1980-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
As shown by Figure 4.2, foreign public debt constituted a tiny proportion of total 
government debt in South Africa, averaging 7.3% of real GDP between 1980 and 2017 
(World Bank, 2018a). Although the proportion of foreign public debt on real GDP was 
rising gradually between 1980 and 1993 averaging R2.1 billion in Rand terms, in the 
post-apartheid era, the ratio was generally stable, averaging R2.2 billion in Rand terms 
(World Bank, 2018a, SARB, 2018).  
On the economic growth front, the South African economy experienced eight 
recessions since 1960, with the last three being in 1991/92, 1997/98 and 2008/09 
fiscal years (GSA, 2010; 1999; 1994). These recessions were mainly a result of spill-
over effects of global economic crises. South Africa’s GDP growth rate averaged 2.3% 
between 1975 and 2017, reaching a period high of 6.4% in 1980 (World Bank, 2018a). 
Also, South Africa generally experienced two distinct economic growth phases; 1980 
to 1992 and 1993 to 2017. In phase one, 1980-1992, economic growth rates were not 
impressive – this was against a background of intensified international economic and 
financial sanctions on the apartheid regime which dried up funding for new state 
projects, increased political uncertainty, and massive decline in foreign direct 
investment inflows (World Bank, 2018a; Clark, 1994). The economic growth rates 













































































































swings reaching a period low of a negative 1.8% in 1983 and a period high of about 
5.1% in 1984.  
From 1993, economic growth rates steadily increased, reaching a peak of about 4.4% 
in 2006 and then declined again to a negative 2.6% in 2009. Economic growth 
recovered to about 1.8% in 2010, but since then, the country has had a negative 
growth trajectory up to 2017. Overall, after 1994, the South African economy made a 
remarkable economic rebound following the adoption of stern structural policies, which 
stressed among other things, trade liberalisation, removal of discriminatory labour 
policies and practices, restructuring and privatisation of some state-owned 
businesses, sectoral deregulation and real exchange rate stabilisation (World Bank, 
2018a; 2001b). Most of these economic and financial reforms were embedded in the 
country’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994; Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy of 1996, the Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) of 2006, the New Growth Path (NGP) of 
2010, the National Development Plan of 2011 and the Medium-Term Strategic 
Framework of 2014 (GSA, 2014b; 2011; 2010; 2007; 1994; The Presidency, 2006).  
The ASGISA policy was an extension of the GEAR programme aimed to make 
government expenditure more effective in achieving social goals (The Presidency, 
2006). Following these economic reforms, the South African government increased its 
allocation of funds to public enterprises for investments in various economic 
infrastructures and to increase participation by the private sector in the economic 
development of the country. In the main, the country’s 1994-2017 economic 
philosophy prompted a rise in industrial and trade activities, and hence an overall 
positive economic growth rate (National Treasury, 2019; GSA, 2014a; 2010).  
Figure 4.3 presents the trends in public debt and economic growth in South Africa 
between 1980 and 2017. Public debt is expressed as a percentage of RGDP, while 






Figure 4.3: Public debt and economic growth trends in South Africa (1980-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from World Bank (2018a) 
Figure 4.3 shows three distinct phases in the evolution of public debt in South Africa, 
that is, 1980-1994, 1995-2008 and 2009-2017. Generally, between 1984 and 1994 
public debt/RGDP per capita ratio maintained an upward trajectory, mainly from rising 
fiscal deficits, which reached a period peak of 47% in 1994 (Statistics South Africa, 
2017). A marked decrease followed this in the public debt/RGDP per capita ratio 
during the period from 1995 to 2008.  
As Figure 4.3 illustrates, between 1993 and 2001, South Africa was in public debt 
distress, a condition which prompted the country to continue restructuring financially 
and economically. These reforms facilitated the reduction in budget deficits and 
promoted remarkable economic growth rates, resulting in the downward trend of the 
public debt to real GDP ratio displayed in Figure 4.3; reaching a period low of 25.9% 
in 2008 (World Bank, 2018a). Also, during this phase, 1995-2008, there was a massive 
industrialisation drive, which assisted the economic diversification of this economy 
(AfDB et al., 2017).  
In the last phase, 2009-2017, there is a noticeable upward trend in the public 
debt/RGDP per capita ratio, which can be attributed to the tail-effects of the 2008 
global financial crisis and introduction of new government debt instruments (Statistics 


































































































Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita Public debt
119 
 
of the composition of public debt in South Africa between 1980 and 2017, expressed 
as a ratio of real GDP. 
Figure 4.4: Domestic, foreign public debt and economic growth in South Africa 
(1980-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s computation from SARB (2018); World Bank (2018a) 
 
As portrayed in Figure 4.4, the government of South Africa relied predominantly on the 
domestic capital markets to finance its budget needs. Domestic public debt constitutes 
a major part of the total public debt, while the share of foreign public debt in the total 
public debt has, on average, declined over time. In the period between 1995 and 2001, 
the decrease in public debt/RGDP per capita ratio was a result of the government’s 
drive to reduce the foreign debt component and also from the overall growth of the 
economy, as shown in Figure 4.4 (World Bank, 2018a). The blending of a 
comprehensive basket of government securities and attractive interest rates has 
added to the broadening of the country’s investor base (National Treasury, 2016b; 
2016b; 2016c). Figure 4.4 also shows that South Africa breached the IMF and World 
Bank public debt indicative threshold of 40% between 1993 and 2002, and 2012 and 
2017 – caused by an exponential growth in domestic public debt that reached 43.1% 
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4.2.4 Challenges facing public debt management in South Africa 
In the period 1970-1993, public sector debt in South Africa grew because of several 
factors, including widening fiscal deficits and deteriorating current account imbalances 
(Lowenberg, 1997). During this period, South Africa had no institutional and legal 
framework to promote effective public debt management, and the country’s 
coordination of both monetary and fiscal policy was generally fragmented (Nattrass & 
Ardington, 1990). As a result, there was an exponential accumulation of public debt, 
both domestic and foreign, until it reached unsustainable levels in 1985 (Hirsch, 2005). 
The international economic and financial sanctions instituted against the apartheid 
regime further compounded the situation by compelling the government to borrow 
excessively, both domestically and externally on a non-concessional basis to meet 
rising budgetary demands (Clark, 1994; GSA, 1994).  
Initially, prior to the establishment of the ALM division in 1996, the management of 
both public debt, domestic and foreign, and government’s financial assets was highly 
fragmented (Wheeler, 2004: 65). According to Wheeler (2004), the central bank of 
South Africa was responsible for foreign currency borrowing, and the Department of 
Finance had little input into these decisions. However, after the borrowing, the 
Department of Finance was constitutionally mandated with the management of the 
foreign currency loans, while the responsibility for managing the government’s cash 
was spread across several state agencies (Wheeler, 2004). The disintegration in the 
public debt contraction and management processes contributed to the unabated rise 
in the government debt stock in the 1990s. 
Additional public debt management challenges in South Africa stemmed from (1) the 
lack of proper coordination of government-guaranteed debt to state-owned entities; (2) 
limited understanding of the full nature of the government’s asset and liability 
portfolios; and (3) an uncoordinated method of accessing financial markets, both 
domestic and foreign, by the government (Wheeler, 2004; IMF & World Bank, 2003). 
Furthermore, the period from 1950 to 1980 is notable for undeveloped secondary debt 
markets, and the government relied heavily on limited short-term debt instruments 
(Hirsch, 2005). The government debt securities were illiquid, resulting in high costs of 
raising government finances (Hirsch, 2005: 38-41). Hirsch (2005) added that public 
sector financing and expenditure procedures lacked transparency and financial 
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discipline, further adding to rising fiscal imbalances and costly short-term state 
borrowings. Thus, the high proportion of short-term maturity domestic public debt 
profile caused the government to experience severe liquidity problems in the 1980s 
(SARB, 1998). 
Other factors that triggered domestic public debt management challenges, particularly 
between 1980 and 1994, were economic growth sluggishness and massive capital 
outflow (National Treasury, 1995; 1994). From 1980 to 1993, overall investment in 
South Africa contracted by an average of 3.1% annually (National Treasury, 1995; 
1994). With restricted revenue flows, the fiscal deficit went up to 7.8% of GDP in 1993 
(Statistics South Africa, 2017). Constrained by poor revenue performance, the South 
African government reverted to domestic debt markets to increase its fiscal space, 
hence the exponential growth in domestic public indebtedness during this period. The 
need to balance fiscal demands and the lack of stringent statutory debt control 
frameworks caused a continuous rise in the overall public sector indebtedness, 
reaching a debt standstill in 1985 (National Treasury, 1995; Leap, 1991). As a result 
of the public debt standstill, there was a deliberate policy by the South African 
government to stall the Prescribed Asset Requirement act of 1958 and to start 
instituting minimum debt consolidation mechanisms (Financial and Fiscal 
Commission, 2015). 
From 1994, domestic public debt management challenges were mainly associated 
with the lack of legal state borrowing statutes for local governments, whose debt was 
mostly guaranteed by the central government (IMF, 2005d). Other factors which 
contributed to public debt management difficulties in South Africa between 1994 and 
2017 are: (1) budgeted and unbudgeted bailouts to state-owned businesses, such as 
the Eskom, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, the South African Post Office, 
South African Airways, and the South African National Roads Agency, among others; 
(2) unreported deferred funding through public-private partnerships; and (3) 
unreported unconventional debt instruments for addressing losses in state-owned 
businesses (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2015; IMF, 2005d; National Treasury, 
1995). 
Contrary to Zambia and Zimbabwe, after political independence in 1994, there was 
deliberate action by the South African government to actively institute economic and 
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financial reforms to provide for sound public debt management and promote 
macroeconomic stability. The reforms led to (1) the deepening of domestic debt 
markets, with the establishment of domestic capital markets; (2) the establishment of 
public finance and public debt management laws and institutional frameworks; and (3) 
the setting up of public debt analysis frameworks (National Treasury, 2012a; 2012b; 
1996). A combination of these factors led to the:  
(1) containment of domestic and foreign public debt to within sustainable levels;  
(2) increase in foreign and domestic investment, averaging 4.7% annually between 
1994 and 2003, with the capital account recording a cumulative amount of 
R169.6 billion by 2003;  
(3) establishment of a semi-autonomous Reserve Bank of South Africa;  
(4) establishment of the BESA in 1996;  
(5) spreading of the government’s domestic debt maturity profile; and  
(6) development of deep domestic money and capital markets (National Treasury, 
2018a; 2016b; 2014b; 2012a; 2012b; 1996; SARB, 2018; GSA, 1998). 
Thus, unlike Zambia and Zimbabwe, South Africa adheres to its public debt 
management principles, making the country one of the few African economies with a 
well-structured government debt portfolio (Ecorys, 2008). According to proper public 
debt management principles, the country also instituted constitutional-based fiscal 
reforms. These fiscal reforms eliminated some public debt management challenges 
by containing government spending at all levels using the multi-year budgeting system 
– making government expenditures more transparent and accountable (Farell & 
Todani, 2004). Effective public debt management in South Africa has also been 
brought about by the adoption of a three-year fiscal framework which enhanced the 
matching of revenue and expenditure outturns (National Treasury, 2003). According 
to the National Treasury (2003), improved revenue forecasting techniques since 2000 
also curtailed the country’s budget imbalances. 
More so, under public sector financial discipline and accountability, the government 
publicises an annual debt management report, specifying the public sector’s annual 
borrowing requirements (National Treasury, 2012a). The debt report provides 
comprehensive details on the state’s debt levels, public debt composition and structure 
and size of issues, auction dates, public debt instruments issued and to be issued, 
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and their respective price trends, as well as the associated public debt repayment 
costs (National Treasury, 2012a; 2012b). 
The other element which makes South Africa’s public debt management practices 
distinctive from Zambia and Zimbabwe is that of effective collaboration with 
international organisations in promoting public debt management. For instance, in 
2011, the National Treasury and OECD mutual agreed to foster sound public debt 
management policies, as well as facilitate the development of domestic debt markets 
in South Africa (National Treasury, 2012a). The government also partnered with the 
World Bank Treasury and the Swiss Secretariat of Economic Affairs under the World 
Bank’s Government Debt and Risk Management Programme (GDRM) to develop a 
new architecture for the secondary debt market to boost liquidity and price discovery 
of government securities (World Bank, 2014b). Also, the enactment of several legal 
debt statutes, such as the Public Audit Act of 2004, which compels the government to 
undertake annual financial audits at all levels of government and in state-owned 
enterprises, culminated into reduced public sector borrowing requirements.  
In conclusion, unlike Zambia and Zimbabwe, South Africa is currently perfectly  aligned 
with international capital markets, which makes it possible to borrow at reasonable 
rates. Also, the international demand for South African debt instruments has remained 
strong since 2012 (National Treasury, 2018a). Prudent fiscal policy decisions and 
growth in the government’s contingency reserve have helped to enhance the 
government’s capacity to manage financial, public debt and economic risks. More so, 
unlike Zimbabwe, but much like Zambia, improved policy certainty in South Africa, 
along with sound economic reforms, will further support fiscal consolidation and 
effective public debt management. 
4.3 The dynamics of public debt service in South Africa 
4.3.1 The evolution of public debt service in South Africa 
The evolution of public debt service in South Africa dates to the 1940s when the state 
used to rely extensively on loans from the World Bank, IMF and other world 
governments and private financial institutions (Davies & Seventer, 2004). Since then, 
the country has made consistent debt repayments to its domestic and international 
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creditors (National Treasury, 2018a; World Bank, 2018a; SARB, 2018; GSA, 1994; 
Clark, 1994).  
Similar to other Southern African countries, such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, South 
Africa’s public debt repayments were vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices, 
movements in exchange rates, maturity profile of domestic debt instruments, world 
interest rate volatilities, among other factors (National Treasury, 2018a; World Bank, 
2018a; GSA, 2014a). The rising public debt service costs in the early 1990s and the 
subsequent reduction in economic growth rates forced the government to undertake 
restrictive demand management policies, as well as expansionary investment policies 
to enhance the country’s capacity to honour its growing public debt repayment 
obligations, both domestic and foreign (GSA, 2014a; Nattrass & Ardington, 1990). The 
economic crises of 1997/98 and 2008/09 further worsened public debt servicing 
burden in South Africa (National Treasury, 2012a).  
Owing to escalating public debt servicing costs, the South African government in 1994 
entered into several economic and financial partnerships with international 
development partners (National Treasury, 2012a; 1998; 1994). The primary objective 
of the agreements was to seek public debt relief and rescheduling, principally the 
inherited foreign public debt (National Treasury, 2012a; 2003). Contrary to Zambia, 
but similar to Zimbabwe, South Africa was not a recipient of foreign public debt relief 
from its creditors. Thus, since 1994, the government of South Africa has focused much 
on reducing and maintaining sustainable levels of public debt stock (domestic and 
foreign) and minimising public debt repayments costs (National Treasury, 2019; 
2018a). The government’s deliberate policy direction of restricting the growth of foreign 
public debt and actively controlling the debt maturity profile was to limit and lessen the 
associated public debt interest costs, and also broaden the fiscal space of the 
government (GSA, 2014a).  
The devaluations in Rand against the country’s major creditor country currencies, 
especially between 1993 and 1996, further increased the foreign public debt 
repayment burden (SARB, 2004). Annual public debt payments of around US$1.5 
billion between 1993 and 1998 and US$2.6 billion between 1997 and 2001 made the 
country prone to BOP crises and growth in domestic public debt stocks in a bid to 
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cover foreign public debt repayments and also finance the central government budget 
needs (IMF, 2005d).  
4.3.2 Public debt service reforms in South Africa 
Growing public debt repayment obligations from decades-long debt collection put 
pressure on the government’s ability to fund public sector investments and expand 
social welfare programmes (National Treasury, 2019). As with Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
the cost of servicing government debt in South Africa was mostly an outcome of the 
size of public debt stock; new loans; and various macroeconomic variables, such as 
domestic and world interest rates, inflation rates and exchange rates (National 
Treasury, 2019; IMF, 2005d).  
Initially from the 1960s, South Africa had accumulated enormous domestic and foreign 
debt, and the burden of debt service became an obstacle to the country’s economic 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Calitz et al., 2010). Conscious of the rising debt stocks 
and a shrinking revenue base, the South African government in 1994 undertook 
numerous fiscal, financial and debt reforms designed to promote macroeconomic and 
financial stability. In this regard, statutory instruments intended to control rising fiscal 
deficits and promote prudent financial management frameworks were implemented 
between 1994 and 2017 (National Treasury, 2018a; 2012a; GSA, 2001).  
For instance, in 1995, the country formulated the State Debt Management Committee 
responsible for the planning, control and management of public debt on an ongoing 
basis (National Treasury, 1995). The committee’s responsibilities included the 
developing of an effective public debt maturity profile, continuously improving 
government debt composition and reducing other debt related expenses, such as 
interest rates (National Treasury, 1995). 
In common with Zambia and Zimbabwe, the public debt service reforms in South Africa 
focused mostly on establishing stringent revenue collection initiatives and improving 
revenue collection; broadening the country’s tax base; creating new government debt 
management principles and new institutional arrangements; restructuring of 
government debt securities; establishing legal and regulatory frameworks that 
enhance budget credibility and transparency; reducing budget deficits by cutting on 
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recurrent expenditures; as well as economic growth reforms. More so, to strengthen 
oversight and minimise the risk posed by contingency liabilities, the government of 
South Africa with the World Bank worked to enhance public debt assessment 
approaches (National Treasury, 2019). 
From 1994, the government of South Africa enacted new institutional arrangements 
which included the establishment of the Debt Management Office, SARS, Fiscal and 
Financial Commission, and Asset and Liability Management (ALM) (GSA, 2001; 
1999). The Debt Management Office of the National Treasury of South Africa was 
mandated to assess government debt repayment ability through undertaking 
consistent annual debt sustainability analyses, annual financial risk assessments, 
establishing public debt risk benchmarks, as well as making public debt portfolio 
projections (National Treasury, 2003). These institutional reforms were further 
strengthened by the enactment of the Public Finance Management Act in 1999 and 
the development of accurate debt recording and reporting systems (National Treasury, 
2006). Also, the disposal of certain state assets between 1994 and 1995 enabled 
public debt and associated interest costs to be reduced (National Treasury, 1995). 
To restrict rising contingency liabilities and mounting domestic public debt service 
repayments costs from public entities and public-private partnerships, the government 
increased its supervision of the commitments that may give rise to financial and fiscal 
obligations in future (Parliament of South Africa, 2011). These obligations include 
guarantees to state-owned businesses, underfunding of social security funds, 
guarantees to both independent power producers and public-private partnerships with 
the risk being of default and callability. The measures taken by the central government 
to administer debt from affiliated organisations included:  
(1) monitoring of borrowing plans and debt maturity profiles of the central 
government and state-owned entities;  
(2) enforcing stringent regulatory frameworks, such as the compilation of a treasury 
best practice manual;   
(3) setting up of maximum borrowing restrictions on all government levels and 
public entities; and  
(4) managing contingent liability exposure (National Treasury, 2016b; 2016c; GSA, 
2014a; GSA, 1999).  
127 
 
Other domestic public debt service control measures included the regular publication 
of outstanding stock and composition of central government debt liabilities, the 
publication of loan guarantees and other contingent liabilities, including currency 
denomination, maturity, and interest rate structure (GSA, 2014a). 
Further, after 1994, the government instituted a public debt portfolio and funding 
strategy to limit government debt service costs, both domestic and foreign. The 
adopted funding strategy included the establishment of fixed and floating rate domestic 
debt ratio, lengthening of government debt instruments and establishment of switch 
and buy-back programmes, all of which fostered proper management of the 
government debt maturity profile (SARB, 2006). The setting of a fixed and floating rate 
domestic debt ratio minimised the South African government budget exposure to 
changing economic growth and financial market conditions and reduced variations in 
the country’s creditworthiness when refinancing the debt.  
From 2012, the government established an expenditure ceiling target, a nominal limit 
on federal budget non-interest expenditure (National Treasury, 2013). For instance, 
the government announced a spending limit of R1.03 trillion, R1.11 trillion and R1.18 
trillion in 2014/15, in 2015/16 and 2016/17, respectively (National Treasury, 2017). 
The objective of putting government spending parameters in place was to restrain 
rising fiscal deficits and foster a considerable reduction in mounting domestic public 
debt service obligations (National Treasury, 2018a; 2017; 2016b; 2016c; 2015). 
Additionally, after 2000, the government of South Africa increased transparency and 
simplicity in domestic public debt management operations and designing government 
debt instruments with the prime goal of lowering transaction costs, reducing 
uncertainty among investors, diversifying the investor base and reducing debt 
servicing costs (National Treasury, 2012a). 
Foreign public debt service reforms since 1960 have mainly focused on diversifying 
maturity periods of foreign debt instruments and the establishment of liquid benchmark 
bonds across the yield curve (SARB, 2013). The benchmark exercise recommended 
a net foreign currency exposure of 15%, comprised of foreign currency debt and 
foreign exchange reserves (National Treasury, 2012a; 2012b). To reduce risks 
associated with transacting swaps, the government between 2001 and 2011 replaced 
duration targets with foreign debt portfolio risk benchmarks of between 20% and 25% 
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of total government debt (National Treasury, 2012a). By establishing targets and 
ranges for foreign debt portfolios – to guide borrowing activities and other government 
debt transactions – the South African government maintained sustainable foreign 
public debt repayment structures from 2001 (GSA, 2011). In 2015, for instance, the 
foreign public debt risk was 10.5% against a benchmark range of 20% to 25% of GDP 
(SARB, 2016). 
From 2012, the government began to carry out risk benchmarks using the World 
Bank’s GDRM (National Treasury, 2014d). Overall, the post-1994 foreign public debt 
service reforms helped the South African government to keep objective sustainable 
budget balances and record favourable economic growth rates, as well as improve the 
country’s public debt repayment capability.  
Unlike Zimbabwe, the application and adherence to the above public debt repayment 
reforms led to the following:  
(1) a remarkable decline in budget deficits as a percentage of GDP since 1994;  
(2) substantial reduction in public debt repayment costs since 1999; 
(3) a notable increase in government funding instruments diversification;  
(4) distinguishable smooth public debt redemption profile of domestic debt 
securities;  
(5) significant increase in sovereign credit ratings; as well as  
(6) considerable increase in access to cheap credit for the public and private 
sectors (National Treasury, 2019; 2014a; 2014b; SARB, 2018; 2006).  
Therefore, the prudent public debt service management reforms, together with sound 
economic policies, created the required fiscal space and minimised the country’s 
susceptibility to contagion and financial risk (IMF, 2014d). The robust government debt 
service portfolio placed South Africa in a better position to effectively implement 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy initiatives and manage financial crises. 
4.3.3 Public debt service and economic growth trends in South Africa 
The trends in public debt service repayments in South Africa during the study period 
are largely influenced by the overall size, structure and composition of public debt; the 
rate of new government borrowings; the general economic performance of the country; 
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and the fluctuations in market variables such as interest, exchange and inflation rates 
(National Treasury, 2019; IMF, 2005d). According to the National Treasury (2019: 67), 
the public debt service cost of South Africa will in the next three years to 2021 take up 
over 62% of total government revenue (IMF, 2018: 50). Public debt service costs in 
South Africa rose to approximately R163.2 billion (or 3.5% of GDP) in 2017/18 and 
anticipated to further rise to R213.9 billion (or 3.7% of GDP) in 2020/21 (National 
Treasury, 2018b: 81). From 2010, public debt service costs were the fastest-growing 
spending category of the government, reflecting the increase in the stock of public 
debt, mostly the domestic component (National Treasury, 2018b). Higher treasury bill 
and government bond trading and increased contraction of bridging finance increased 
short-term borrowing costs between 2000 and 2017 (National Treasury, 2018b). 
Prior to 1990, the interest due each year on the accrued public debt, both domestic 
and foreign, constituted a significant category of recurrent government expenditure 
and represented a first statutory claim on state revenues (National Treasury, 1994). 
For instance, according to the AFRODAD (2005), South Africa paid approximately 
US$1.7 billion towards foreign public debt by 1990, and about US$300 million bonds, 
denominated in Deutsche Marks and Swiss francs, were either rolled over or swapped 
in 1990. These public debt payments contributed to the marginal reduction in foreign 
public debt in that year (AFRODAD, 2015).  
In February of 1994, the South African government paid US$500 million towards 
foreign debt, and during this period, the proportion of foreign public debt-to-GDP was 
around 3.4% (National Treasury, 1995). Although South Africa recorded a cumulative 
net capital inflow in excess of R8 billion by the end of 1994, the country contracted 
more foreign loans and domestic debt, which increased public debt repayments costs 
beginning 1999 (SARB, 2006). However, the adopted fiscal, financial and legal 
reforms since 1994 helped to contain public debt service costs after 1999 (National 
Treasury, 2016b; 2016c; 2012a). The prudent public debt service reforms focusing 
mostly on improving government debt management, in conjunction with robust 
economic growth rates, brought about considerable public savings owing to the 
spreading of the government debt maturity profile (National Treasury, 2012b; 2005).  
From a macroeconomic-wide perspective, South Africa’s economic growth experience 
changed from a long period of economic contraction in the 1970s until early 1990s, to 
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robust economic growth performances from 1994 until 2017 (World Bank, 2018a). The 
possible causes of economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s were trade, financial and 
political sanctions against the apartheid government, which culminated in higher 
inflation, increased economic uncertainty, declining investment and rising public debt 
levels (Faulkner & Loewald, 2008). During this period, pre-1994, the apartheid 
government instituted foreign exchange controls, which prevented capital flight 
(Faulkner & Loewald, 2008). In the same period, also, rising public sector spending, 
due to the government’s effort to expand physical and social infrastructure, and 
subsidise many state-owned businesses, led to large fiscal deficits and mounting 
public sector debt service costs (Pitcher, 2012). 
From 1994, the government focused on economic, social and financial consolidation, 
leading to the realisation of positive economic growth rates (World Bank, 2018b). The 
economic reforms in South Africa started with the implementation of the RDP in 1994 
(GSA, 1994). The GEAR policy succeeded the RDP in 1996 focusing on 
macroeconomic stability (GSA, 1996). Contrary to the Zambian and Zimbabwean 
experiences, in South Africa, the more sustainable fiscal deficits and public policy 
consistency resulted in a steady increase in private sector investment in the post-
apartheid period (World Bank, 2018b). In 2017, South Africa was the second-largest 
economy in Africa, after Nigeria (World Bank, 2018b). The South African economy is 
a regional manufacturing and financial hub – the most industrialised and diversified 
economy on the African continent (World Bank, 2018b). Figure 4.5 shows the trends 









Figure 4.5: Public debt service and economic growth trends in South Africa 
 
Source: Author’s computation from National Treasury (2018a; 2012a; 1994); World Bank (2018a) 
 
Figure 4.5 displays three distinct phases of public debt service in South Africa, 1990-
1999, 2000-2009 and 2010-2017.  The period 1990-1999 describes the period in which 
the public debt servicing costs grew dynamically along with the increase of public debt 
stock in South Africa. The build-up in public sector indebtedness prompted a rise in 
public debt service repayments, particularly on domestic debt (National Treasury, 
2012a). The reduction in inflation rate between 1994 and 2005 and the accumulation 
in public debt, imposed a rising interest burden on the fiscus (IMF, 2005d; National 
Treasury, 1995). After hovering at between 10-15%, in the early 1990s, inflation 
progressively lowered to around 3% by mid-2005 (IMF, 2005d). The corresponding 
economic growth rates were not impressive during the period, oscillating around 1.4% 
with wide swings. Overall, economic growth rates were erratic from 1998 to 2003, with 
no distinct pattern. 
In the second phase, 2000-2009, the country instituted several financial and economic 
reforms easing budget deficits and promoting remarkable economic growth rates. The 
implication was a downward trajectory in both the public debt to real GDP and public 
debt service to real GDP ratios, with the former reaching a period low of 2.9% in 2009 
(World Bank, 2018a). Economic growth rates steadily recovered from the 2001 bottom 
of 1.2% to a peak of about 4.6% in 2006 but slid back again to a negative 2.6% in 2009 
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After years of fiscal consolidation in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the South African 
government in 2009 again embarked on expansionary fiscal policies in response to 
adverse economic and financial developments in the world economy (National 
Treasury, 2019; 2014b). Thus, during the period 2009 to 2017, public debt service 
costs rose steadily, averaging 3.3% between 2009 and 2017, but remained lower 
compared to 12.5% and 18% in most emerging market and advanced economies, 
respectively (World Bank, 2018a). According to the National Treasury (2016a), the rise 
in public debt payments after 2008 crowded out the government’s allocations on 
productive activities, a condition which prompted the government to re-examine other 
fiscal measures to improve the fiscal position of the country continuously. It is worth 
noting that lower public debt servicing costs in the years 2011-2017, relative to the 
period from 1982 to 1998, were a result of radically low interest rates (World Bank, 
2018a). In this last phase, economic growth rates steadily decreased from the 2011 
high of 1.9% to a period low of negative 0.7% in 2016 (World Bank, 2018a). 
The rise in public debt service costs from 2016 may have been caused by escalating 
treasury bill yields from multiple repurchase rate hikes by the central bank, 
deteriorating bond yields and a sharp depreciation of the South African Rand against 
major currencies in which foreign public debt was denominated (SARB, 2018; National 
Treasury, 2016b; 2016c). Figure 4.6 presents the average annual interest rates on 
government domestic debt securities in South Africa from 1960 to 2017. 
Figure 4.6: Average annual interest rates on government domestic debt 
securities in South Africa (1960-2017) 
 
 






































































































Figure 4.6 depicts a scenario in which interest rates were high between 1982 and 
1998, averaging 14.3%. This period was associated with exogenous economic and 
financial shocks exacerbating the rise in both domestic interest rates and public debt 
service costs (SARB, 2006; National Treasury, 2003). The economic recession 
between 1989 and 1993 led to the sluggish growth in revenues than expenditures 
resulting in the rise in annual public sector borrowing requirement (National Treasury, 
1995). Consequentially, there was surge in public debt stocks and repayment costs 
(National Treasury, 1995). For instance, in 1993/94, interest payments were nearly 
17% of government expenditure (National Treasury, 1995). 
In response to the rising public debt service costs, the government instituted numerous 
revenue reforms between 1996 and 1999, in addition to public debt service 
management reforms (SARB, 2006). The effect of these reforms culminated into a 
significant reduction in domestic interest rates, reaching 6.9% in 2005 from 16.5% in 
1998 (SARB, 2006). The initiative of diversifying government debt instruments, 
beginning 2000, including the introduction of inflation-linked bonds across the yield 
curve, and the lengthening of public debt maturities, improved management of 
domestic interest rate, currency, and credit risks, and thus eliminated the net open 
forward position of the central bank (National Treasury, 2012a). The upward trend in 
interest rates after 2014 increased public debt service costs by 10.2% to R118 billion 
in the 2015/16 fiscal year, relative to R76.46 billion in 2011/12 (National Treasury, 
2016b).  
The rise in fiscal deficits recorded at the beginning of 2009 in Figure 4.6 is associated 
with rising public debt service costs between 2008/09 and 2015/16. The rise in public 
debt payments competed with the government’s allocations on productive activities 
(National Treasury, 2016b). To guard against the crowding out influence of sovereign 
debt service burden on developmental programme spending, the government of South 
Africa increased the issuance of domestic public debt, especially after 2014 (National 
Treasury, 2016c). Despite the noted rise in public debt service costs in Figure 4.6, the 
proportion of public debt service payments to GDP remained relatively low compared 
to most African states (World Bank, 2018a).  
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4.3.4 Challenges facing public debt service management in South Africa 
Unlike in Zambia and Zimbabwe, the problems of public debt service management in 
South Africa, both before and after 1994, are largely rooted in economic and 
developmental choices of the government in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
Additionally, as with Zambia and Zimbabwe, developments in the world economy also 
directly affected the movements in interest rates, demand for exports, levels of terms 
of trade and the inflows of investment and financial resources into South Africa 
(Frankel et al., 2007; Du Plessis et al., 2007; 2006). Other government debt repayment 
problems prior to 1994 emerged from a large proportion of short-term debt and 
massive capital flight, due to perceived political risk (Hirsch, 1989a; 1989b).  
Other problems of public debt service in the pre-apartheid era originated mostly from 
subdued economic growth rates and depressed commodity demand and prices of the 
country’s major exports. Following the international economic sanctions instituted 
against the apartheid regime in the mid-1980s, there was massive disinvestment and 
considerable withdrawal of foreign credit facilities, which exacerbated the cost of 
servicing both domestic and foreign financial commitments (Evennet, 2002). 
As with Zambia and Zimbabwe, domestic public debt in South Africa in the 1980s until 
2000 consisted mostly of short-term papers, which significantly increased rollover and 
market risk (SARB, 2013). During this period, interest rates were high, in both nominal 
and real terms, and the average maturity of the public debt portfolio was below ten 
years; about 60% of which required refinancing within five years (SARB, 2006). This 
also includes foreign commitments to the amount of R199 million. According to the 
IMF and World Bank (2003: 218), the high possibility of falling into a public debt service 
trap and increased uncertainty of potential liabilities in the mid-1990s, prompted the 
South African authorities to make a swift turn towards new prudent public debt service 
management practices.  
Public debt service management challenges in South Africa after 1994 emanated from 
lack of sound borrowing and spending principles among the three levels of 
government, that is, federal, provincial and local; and the sluggishness in economic 
growth rates after 2014 (National Treasury, 2019; Ecorys, 2008). According to Ecorys 
(2008), the scope of the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment, 
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for instance, was limited to the federal government, leaving out provincial governments 
and local authorities. However, these contributed significantly to the upsurge in public 
sector debt service commitments of the central government. The persistent decline in 
economic growth rates since 2014, relative to the projected rates, caused a significant 
contraction in fiscal space, and a rise in public debt stocks and servicing obligations 
(SARB, 2016). More so, the recent surge in world interest rates pushed up the cost of 
servicing public debt, especially the one denominated in foreign currency (World Bank, 
2018a).  
Contrary to the Zambian and Zimbabwean experiences, despite these government 
debt service challenges, sound fiscal and financial management reforms in South 
Africa drastically enhanced the public debt service management. Structural public debt 
service management improvements in South Africa included, among other things, the 
setting up of an effective legal framework and proper institutions responsible for public 
debt management, and also the introduction of risk management systems in the 
National Treasury (National Treasury, 2012a; 2012b; IMF & World, 2003: 217; GSA, 
1999). For instance, to systematically administer government debt payments, the 
country in its Budget Reviews, stipulated the government debt management strategies 
to be followed, including its net borrowing targets over a three-year prospective 
timeframe (National Treasury, 2003). These projections provided detailed information 
on the breakdown of public debt, both domestic and foreign, maturity profiles and the 
respective repayment schedules.  
For instance, the Debt Management Office of the National Treasury of South Africa 
undertakes annual debt sustainability analyses, risk assessments and risk 
benchmarks, as well as public debt portfolio projections. Further, the country, through 
the SARB, carries out and publishes annual public debt sustainability analysis reports 
on domestic and foreign debts. The undertaking of these aforementioned public debt 
monitoring, and control measures have helped to keep the country’s public debt stocks 
and debt service levels within sustainable levels and reduce the risks of debt rollovers 
(SARB, 2016). In 2015, for instance, the foreign public debt was 10.5% against a risk 




This chapter has discussed the growth dynamics of public debt, public debt service, 
both domestic and foreign, and economic growth in South Africa from 1960 to 2017. 
The analysis established that when the country was under pressure from intensified 
international economic sanctions in the 1970s and 1980s, the apartheid government 
adopted an inward-looking economic growth policy, financed largely from domestic 
borrowing. This gave rise to a massive increase in the domestic component of the 
public debt. During this period, growth in public debt was mainly driven by rising budget 
imbalances due to domestic and global financial crises, as well as growing public 
sector investment outlays.  
Similar to Zambia and Zimbabwe, in the post-1994 period, the government undertook 
major public debt reforms which varied from institutional reforms and rearrangements 
to the enactment of new public finance and public debt management frameworks. The 
economic and financial reforms intended to reduce and maintain sustainable public 
debt levels and minimise the country’s exposure to external economic and financial 
shocks. Following these reforms, there was a massive broadening of government debt 
instruments, extensions of public debt securities’ maturity periods, increased 
participation of foreign players on government bonds, and intensive integration of cash 
and government debt management roles, among other changes – which is contrary to 
the Zambian and Zimbabwean experiences.  
The chapter further revealed that the weakening terms of trade, especially between 
1981 and 1993, and economic sanctions levied on South Africa by the international 
community in 1986, largely influenced the government debt service reforms, trends 
and public debt service challenges in this country. The major public debt service 
reforms mostly focused on improving the management of contingent liabilities and 
public sector efficiency, including the privatisation and restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises.  
On the economic growth front, the chapter showed that there was a remarkable 
economic rebound from 1994 following the adoption of economic and financial 
policies, which stressed on, among other things, trade liberalisation, removal of 
discriminatory labour policies and practices, restructuring and privatisation of some 
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state-owned businesses, private sector growth driven initiatives, and real exchange 
rate stabilisation. Among the instituted economic policies were the RDP of 1994; 
GEAR policy of 1996; the ASGISA of 2006; the NGP of 2010; the National 


















PUBLIC DEBT, PUBLIC DEBT SERVICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical and empirical literature review on the 
relationship between public debt, public debt service and economic growth and 
consists of four sections. Section 5.2 reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the 
public debt-economic growth nexus. Section 5.3 examines the empirical literature on 
the impact of public debt, public debt service on economic growth and causality 
between the variables. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Public debt and economic growth: A conceptual framework 
The impact of government interventions on the economic growth process through 
public debt, taxation and public expenditures remain a significant economic policy 
issue in world economies since the 18th Century. Until now, there is no generally 
accepted position among policymakers and economists on fundamental questions 
regarding public debt, as outlined by Fetter:  
. . . the parliamentary debate on the power of the purse was never ending: 
how much money should be extracted from the public, and of that how much 
should be borrowed and how much taken by taxation; what type of taxes 
should be used; for what purposes should the government spend money. 
Such issues have been at the heart of government since the beginning of 
organised society  
(Fetter, 1980: 111). 
Public debt refers to the financial commitments of the central government that arise 
mainly from debt securities, contracted loans, guaranteed loans and other contingent 
liabilities (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999). The IMF (2013) defined public debt as all the 
financial agreements by the national government to pay back to the creditors at a later 
date, comprised of both the initial amount and accumulated interests. Public debt 
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consists of domestic and foreign public debt. The distinction between domestic and 
foreign public debt depends particularly on the residence of debt holders, currency of 
the debt and whether issued on the international debt market or domestic debt market 
(Panizza, 2008). In this study, foreign (domestic) public debt is government debt owed 
to non-residents (residents) and regulated under the jurisdiction of the international 
(national) laws.  
Similarly, the theoretical literature on economic growth has evolved from the 18th 
Century, developing from the simplest schematic models to sophisticated economic 
models and modelling techniques. The different schools of economic thought imposed 
their rationale towards either the free market or state-oriented economy; and differed 
in the variables of emphasis in the mechanisms of transmission to economic growth. 
There are three distinct economic growth theories identified, that is, classical, 
exogenous and endogenous.  
The Classical economic growth theory originated from the work of Adam Smith in the 
18th Century and Harrod-Domar in the 20th Century. According to Harrod (1939) and 
Smith (1776), savings are an important factor for economic growth and critical for 
capital formation, leading to higher labour productivity. Central to the Classical model 
is the perception that an economy’s growth rate is dependent on the rate of capital 
accumulation, which is also reliant on the levels of saving and productivity of physical 
capital (Bell, 1992).  
Unlike Smith (1776), Solow (1956), who pioneered the exogenous growth theory from 
the Cobb-Douglas production functions, emphasised the role played by capital and 
labour productivity in the economic growth process and treated technological progress 
as an endogenous variable (Solow, 1956). The dominant notion of Solow’s theorem is 
that extensive capital build-up is required to keep the capital-labour relation constant 
(Solow, 1956). Lucas (1988) supported the neoclassical model by stressing the 
importance of human capital to growth.  
There is yet another economic growth theory, the endogenous economic growth 
theory, which argues that long-run economic growth is inevitable when economies 
acquire extra capital through technical progress that continually enhances the 
marginal product of capital (Romer, 1986). According to the endogenous growth 
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theory, public debt can stimulate economic growth if the debt revenues are channelled 
towards appropriate high-return investments, such as human capital development, 
technical progress, research and development, among others (Romer, 1990). Romer 
(1990) added that the misuse of public revenues leads to severe negative impact on 
a nation’s future economic growth process. 
Theoretical views on the public debt-economic growth nexus are divided between 
those that maintain that there exist a negative, positive or nonlinear relationship 
between public debt, public debt service and economic growth, and those that support 
the neutrality hypothesis (no impact).  
5.2.1 Theoretical literature consistent with the impact of public debt on 
economic growth 
There are three theoretical views on the impact of public debt on economic growth, 
namely, negative, positive and nonlinear. The negative impact of public debt on 
economic growth is explained fundamentally by the debt overhang hypothesis. The 
debt overhang theory, as first postulated by Myers (1977), argues that accumulation 
of public debt, due to fiscal deterioration, distorts the possibilities for the private sector 
to make optimal future investment decisions. This theory is supported by some 
traditional growth models, predominantly in a neoclassical and endogenous setting, 
which argue that public borrowing reduces the financial discipline of the budget 
process, and increases future tax burden (Bowen et al., 1960; Diamond, 1965; 
Modigliani, 1961; Buchanan, 1958; Meade, 1958).  
Within the debt overhang hypothesis, there are three channels whereby public debt 
negatively affects economic growth – the rational expectation theory, crowding out 
theory and fiscal illusion hypothesis. The first channel is the rational expectation 
theory. It argues that the negative impact of public debt on economic growth springs 
from uncertain reaction to macroeconomic stabilisation policies by economic agents – 
following incessant budget deficits and government borrowings (Kremers, 1989). High 
public debt increases future policy uncertainty or leads to prospects of confiscation, 
possibly through inflation and financial repression (Plosser, 1982). 
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The second channel negatively relates to economic growth in terms of public debt is 
via the standard crowding out effect theory. One such avenue for crowding out is the 
Ricardian Equivalence. According to Seater (1993) and Barro (1989), increased 
private savings in anticipation of future taxes may completely crowd out current private 
sector consumption. Furthermore, government borrowing, arising from fiscal 
deterioration, reduces the lending capacity of the economy, leading to substantial rises 
in real interest rates with the effect of thwarting private sector investment, resulting in 
economic decline (Feldstein, 1988; 1982). 
The second avenue in the crowding out theory through which public debt can be 
particularly deleterious to the economy is when market players have restricted access 
to credit (Feldstein, 1982). The crowding out effect of public debt on private investment 
can be either through prices (interest rate) or quantities (credit rationing) (Domar, 
1944; Feldstein, 1982). Furthermore, this hypothesis argues that public debt, financed 
by either distortionary taxes or debt issuance, amplifies public policy uncertainty, which 
distorts decision making by private economic entities, prompting disinvestment 
(Hamilton and Flavin, 1986). According to Barro (1981), most investments in an 
uncertain economic environment are short-term, low risk, and with a quick return, with 
an overall effect of depressed long-run stable economic growth rates.  
The third avenue in crowding out theory occurs within an investment/saving–liquidity 
market framework when the economy is below the full employment level, as in a 
Keynesian setting. In this context, current large deficits and expectation of large future 
deficits result in higher interest rates, and crowding out of borrowers for mortgages, 
corporate investment, and consumer spending in the credit market (Evans, 1985). The 
high interest rates make domestic government securities more attractive to foreign 
investors, pushing interest rates higher as the demand rises for domestic currency 
from abroad to buy local government securities (Evans, 1985). Accordingly, interest-
sensitive components of private spending are crowded out by the fiscal expansion 
(Evans, 1985).  
The final channel through which public debt and economic growth correlate negatively 
is the fiscal illusion theorem. According to Patinkin (1965), fiscal illusion arises when 
ill-advised taxpayers fail to realise the full weight of future taxes implied by the 
substitution of government debt for tax finance. Consequentially, Burbridge (1983) 
142 
 
argues that these economic agents erroneously perceive such a swap as increasing 
their net worth, thus, increase their current consumption at the expense of savings and 
investment, and hence, leading to depressed long-run economic growth rates. 
Apart from the dominant negative relationships between public debt and economic 
growth, there is also specific theoretical literature supporting a positive relationship 
between public debt and economic growth. This theoretical view places the importance 
of public debt in the economic growth process of a country and is supported primarily 
by Wagner’s hypothesis of “law of increasing state activity” and the Keynesian’s fiscal 
multiplier effect. Wagner (1893) hypothesised that the increased relative size of the 
public sector leads to high public expenditures, mostly debt-financed, which then 
stimulate the level of economic development. Thus, in a restructuring state, the 
economic activities and functions of the government increase to meet the social, 
political, and cultural needs of the people (Bird, 1971).  
Wagner (1911) further hypothesised that both the industrialisation and urbanisation 
processes tend to lead to greater demand for complex and expensive infrastructure 
development and social control. In other words, as societies move towards 
modernisation and urbanisation, there is a progressively greater quantity and 
multiplicity of public goods and services provided by the government (Wagner, 1911). 
Under these theoretical frameworks, government securities (public debt) function as 
liquid assets, and as they increase, effectively promote economic growth – through 
the liquidity supply effect (Wagner, 1911). 
However, the Keynesian view proposes that the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth is positive. The theory asserts that rising public debt induces high 
levels of productive public spending, which then act as automatic stabilisers in the 
economy (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999). The Keynesian argument is that increased 
public sector spending (public debt) can stimulate domestic economic activity and 
crowds in private investment; this occurs if the public debt results from a steep 
decrease in capital tax rates or a substantial rise in public sector capital investments 
– both raise the net return to capital (Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999). Furthermore, Delong 
and Summers (1991) state that deficit-financed government spending has a more 
positive multiplier effect on the economy than tax-financed government spending.  
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Outside the theories discussed above, there is another theory that validates the 
existence of a nonlinear relationship between public debt and economic growth. 
According to the nonlinear or threshold effect theory, the contribution of public debt to 
economic growth is theorised as positive at lower levels and negative at higher levels 
of public debt (Sachs, 1989; Krugman, 1988). Krugman (1988) maintains that when 
public debt is below a certain threshold, the crowding in effect of government 
dominates the crowding out effect, such that increases in public debt promote 
economic growth.  
Krugman (1988) further submits that economic growth only occurs when rising 
productive public spending replaces the reduction in private spending. However, he 
contends that beyond a specific threshold, the crowding out effect occurs because 
government borrowings to finance fiscal deficit reduces available loanable funds to the 
private sector, resulting in gross national investment decline. 
Similarly, Sachs (1989) maintains that lower levels of public debt stimulate economic 
growth, but beyond a certain limit, high levels of government debt increase economic 
uncertainties through expected future tax increases. He argues that the resultant 
economic uncertainties cause retarded investment and consumption, less 
employment, and lower output growth rates – the crowding out effect. This nonlinear 
relationship between public debt and economic growth is represented by the following 
diagram (Figure 5.1), which was initially formulated by Krugman (1988): 





5.2.2 Theoretical literature consistent with the neutrality (no impact) of public 
debt on economic growth  
David Ricardo (1817) first introduced the concept of public debt neutrality, stating that 
the real economy is independent of the government’s choice of raising revenue – 
either through taxes or debt issuance. David Ricardo’s view on public debt and its 
impact on resource allocation and economic growth generally dates back to 1820 and 
1877 in his writings entitled the “Funding System” and “On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation”, respectively. Barro, in 1974, highlighted Ricardo’s 
supposition in his article “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?”, and Buchanan in 
1976, in his article “Is the public debt equivalent to taxation?”, sparking animated 
debates in economic policy circles on the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth. In 1976, Buchanan dubbed Ricardo’s theorem of the 19th Century 
and Barro’s proposition regarding the equivalence between taxes and government 
debt as the “Ricardian Equivalence” (Buchanan, 1976), referred to in some literature 
as the Barro-Ricardo Equivalence Hypothesis. 
The Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) supports the nonexistence of any 
economic relationship between public debt − domestic and foreign − and economic 
growth (Barro, 1989). That is, as long as solvency is not an issue, government debt 
simply explains the movement of financial resources among economic agents, with no 
alterations on real macroeconomic variables (Barro, 1989). Further, the REH assumes 
that public debt only has a direct impact on private consumption and savings 
decisions, without leading to a net economic growth prospect (Churchman, 2001). 
The theoretical foundations of the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis are that:  
(1) capital markets are perfect − thus, the credit environment allows economic 
agents to borrow  without restriction against future incomes;  
(2) population growth (taxpayers) is constant;  
(3) economic agents are rational and have perfect foresight of the future − that is, 




(4) there is an infinite time horizon with intergenerational transfers − altruistic 
agents regard their heirs as extensions of themselves, that is, the theorem 
assumes infinitely lived agents (overlapping generations);  
(5) the future tax burden to service government debt is fully borne by those who 
benefit from the initial tax cut;  
(6) there is behaviour optimisation; and that  
(7) there are non-distortionary taxes (Barro, 1989; 1974; Buchanan & Roback, 
1987).  
If the above assumptions hold, then shifts in both taxes and fiscal deficits today is met 
by an equal adjustment in private savings to neutralise movements in public savings 
(Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999). A decrease in government savings due to higher budget 
deficits (which are debt-financed) is wholly offsetted by an increase in private savings 
(Barro, 1989). Consequentially, the decrease in public savings does not result in a 
lower gross investment. In other words, in a perfectly competitive setting, both tax and 
government debt obligations are a function of the agents’ motive to borrow and their 
ability to repay the debts, with public debt being purely indeterminate (Barro, 1989; 
1979).  
5.3 Public debt and economic growth: Empirical literature review  
To discuss the relationship between public debt, public debt service and economic 
growth, this section consists of two subsections, namely; subsection 5.3.1 which 
examines the empirical literature consistent with the impact of public debt, public debt 
service on economic growth; and subsection 5.3.2 which focuses on the empirical 
literature consistent with the causality between public debt, public debt service and 
economic growth.  
5.3.1 Studies consistent with the impact of public debt, public debt service on 
economic growth  
There is a substantial body of empirical studies that supports the hypothesis that public 
debt negatively affects economic growth. These studies include, among others, 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018), Akram (2016), and Woo and Kumar (2015). 
146 
 
Mhlaba and Phiri (2019) examined the impact of public debt on economic growth in 
South Africa using two data samples, that is, 2002-2016, and 2007-2016. Employing 
the ARDL model, the evidence supported a negative relationship between public debt 
and economic growth, irrespective of whether the analysis was in the short or long run.  
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018) investigated the impact of public debt on 
economic growth in 11 countries drawn from both central and peripheral countries of 
the European area covering the period 1961 to 2013. The analyses were based on a 
log-linearised Cobb-Douglas production function augmented with the ARDL testing 
approach to cointegration. Using annual time-series data, the authors found evidence 
consistent with the negative impact of public debt on economic growth in the long run 
in studied European countries.  
In 2016, Akram examined the impact of public debt (domestic and foreign) on 
economic growth and poverty in four selected South Asian countries, that is, 
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, covering the period 1975 to 2010. Akram’s 
(2016) work using the standard panel data estimation methodology, revealed that 
public debt and economic growth relates negatively to these economies. However, the 
comparable impact of domestic and foreign public debt on economic growth differed 
across the study countries. Overall, his results showed that domestic public debt had 
a positive impact on economic growth, while the foreign public debt had either a 
negative or no impact on economic growth in studied economies. 
Focusing on both developing and developed countries, Ahlborn and Schweickert 
(2016) tested the public debt-economic growth relationship taking into cognisance 
differences in economic systems. Using a sample of 111 OECD and developing 
countries for eight 5-year periods from 1970 to 2010, they concluded that the link 
between public debt and economic growth varies considerably across countries due 
to the degree of fiscal uncertainty brought about by each economic system. After 
employing varying methodologies, including fixed-time effects, random effects, pooled 
ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares, Ahlborn and Schweickert (2016) 
stated that public debt has a stronger negative impact on growth in continental 
countries than in liberal countries; and the debt-growth relationship is neutral or 
positive in nomadic countries. 
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Egert (2015) analysed the relationship between public debt and economic growth in 
20 advanced economies from 1946 to 2009 using the traditional linear model with 
thresholds at 30%, 60%, and 90%. Egert’s (2015) linear estimation results reported a 
negative relationship between public debt and economic growth but did not establish 
any evidence supporting the threshold effect. More specifically, Egert (2015) found 
that a 10% increase in government debt causes a decline of between 0.1% to 0.2% in 
economic growth in these economies.  
Woo and Kumar (2015) investigated the impact of aggregate public debt on annual 
growth of real GDP per capita in a panel of 78 countries (38 advanced and emerging 
economies, and 41 developing economies) for the period 1970 – 2008. The control 
variables in the models were human capital, government size, trade openness, 
financial depth, fiscal deficit, inflation and terms of trade. By employing several 
econometric techniques, that is, pooled OLS, robust regression, between estimator, 
fixed effects panel regression and system GMM dynamic panel regression, the authors 
found evidence that strongly suggests a negative relationship between aggregate 
public debt and economic growth. Explicitly, a 10% point increase in the initial debt-to-
GDP ratio was associated with a decline in real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2% 
points per annum, with the impact being slightly smaller in advanced economies (Woo 
& Kumar, 2015). 
Greiner (2014) examined the relationship between public debt and economic growth 
in industrialised countries and found that high levels of public debt lower the steady 
economic growth rate. Furthermore, in cases of permanent fiscal deficits that 
government debt grows at the same rate as other economic variables; therefore, the 
association between public debt and economic growth becomes complex (Greiner, 
2012).  
Panizza and Presbitero (2014) studied the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth in a sample of OECD countries  between 1980 and 2005. They used 
an instrumental variable approach, and the results were consistent with a negative 
correlation between public debt and economic growth. However, their research 
concluded that the relationship between public debt and economic growth vanishes 
when public debt is instrumented with another variable that captures valuation effects 
due to the interaction between foreign currency debt and exchange rate volatility. 
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Szabo (2013) investigated the impact of public debt on economic growth in developed 
countries by using 27 European Union countries. Szabo (2013) applied panel 
regression models for the period 2008 to 2014 and revealed that public debt and 
economic growth are negatively related. He established a 1% rise in public debt to 
reduce the annual economic growth rate by 0.027% in studied economies.   
Reinhart et al. (2012) analysed the relationship between exceptionally high public debt 
(defined by gross public debt to nominal GDP ratio exceeding 90% for five years or 
more) and economic growth in advanced economies since the early 1800s through 
2011. The authors identified 26 public debt overhang episodes in 22 advanced 
economies. Reinhart et al. (2012) observed that public debt overhang episodes are 
associated with lower economic growth than during other periods. Furthermore, the 
authors found that in the countries that have at least one episode of public debt 
overhang, real GDP growth averages 3.5% over the full period for which debt/GDP is 
less than 90%.  
In yet another empirical study, Cochrane (2011a, 2011b) examined the relationship 
between public debt, inflation, monetary and fiscal policies in the great recession of 
2008 and 2009. The results supported the negative impact of public debt on economic 
growth, adding that the negative effect could be more significant, even in the short run, 
if high public debt increases uncertainty or causes expectations of future 
sequestration, possibly through inflation, distortionary taxation or financial repression.  
Cochrane (2011b) concluded that inflation comes well before fiscal deficits or 
monetarisation and that: (1) central banks have no control over deflation or inflation; 
and (2) monetary inflation and increases in government debt usually accompany 
stagflation. In a related and yet different study, Hausmann and Panizza (2011) argued 
that foreign currency debt increases a country’s volatility by reducing the government’s 
ability to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies and thus reduce 
economic growth. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a; 2010b) examined the relationship between public debt 
and economic growth using sample data drawn from 20 advanced economies over the 
period 1946 to 2009 and concluded that excessive public debt levels correlate 
negatively with economic growth. However, the authors established no relationship 
between public debt and growth when public debt is below 90% of GDP in studied 
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countries. The authors also tested the impact of foreign debt, including debt owed by 
private entities, on economic growth. For emerging market economies, they found that 
there exists a statistically significant and negative relationship between gross foreign 
debt (public and private) and economic growth (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010a). The results 
of a negative relationship between public debt and economic growth are supported by 
the findings of Abbas et al. (2011) who discussed the evolution of public debt, both 
domestic and foreign, in both advanced and less developed countries using an 
unbalanced panel of 174 countries from 1791 to 2009. 
In 2010, Kumar and Woo studied the relationship between public debt and real per 
capital GDP growth using a sample of 30 advanced and emerging market economies 
from 1970 to 2007. Using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach, they 
argued that it allows them to address endogeneity. Their findings suggest that a 10% 
increase in public debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 20% decline in annual growth 
of real GDP per capita.  
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2010) tested the impact of public debt on annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita using a sample of 12 European countries over a period 
of 40 years starting in 1970. Their research established that an increase in government 
debt placed upward pressure on real interest rates, thus, reducing investment and 
economic growth in the studied European countries. The authors concluded that the 
channels through which public debt negatively impact on annual growth rate of GDP 
per capita are; (1) private saving; (2) public investment; (3) total factor productivity and 
(4) sovereign long-term nominal and real interest rates. 
Apart from the leading empirical studies discussed above that focus predominantly on 
aggregate public debt, there is another group of studies that examined the impact of 
foreign and domestic public debt on economic growth. These studies include Al 
Kharusi and Ada (2018), Akram (2015), IMF (2005e), Schclarek (2004) and Clements 
et al. (2003).  
Al Kharusi and Ada (2018) investigated the relationship between foreign public debt 
and economic growth in Oman using time-series data for the period 1990 to 2015. The 
study employed the ARDL to cointegration approach and reported findings consistent 




Akram (2015) examined the impact of public debt (domestic and foreign) on economic 
growth and investment in the Philippines during 1975-2010, using an ARDL technique. 
The main findings were that foreign public debt and economic growth are negatively 
related, while domestic public debt and economic growth are positively related.  
The IMF (2005e) examined the impact of domestic public debt on private sector credit 
in the context of 40 low-income countries from 1993 to 2002. The study findings 
revealed that high levels of domestic public debt correlate with low levels of corporate 
lending and crowding out may occur through channels other than interest rates, such 
as credit rationing. The IMF (2005e) concluded by arguing against a rapid build-up in 
domestic public debt, especially in the context of the availability of concessionary 
foreign financing.  
Schclarek (2004) examined the relationship between foreign public debt and annual 
growth in real GDP per capita in a panel of 59 developing countries between 1970 and 
2002, with data averaged into 5-year periods. His research established a negative 
impact of high foreign public debt on real GDP per capita, with no evidence of threshold 
effects. Clements et al. (2003) also investigated the relationship between foreign 
public debt and economic growth using a panel of 55 low-income countries for a period 
1970 to 1999 and found that a negative relationship existed between foreign public 
debt and economic growth.  
Besides the empirical studies that found a negative relationship between public debt 
and economic growth, other studies also confirmed a negative relationship between 
public debt service and economic growth. These studies include, for instance, Hansen 
(2002), Serieux and Samy (2001) and Weeks (2000). 
In 2002, Hansen explored the influence of public debt service payments and aid flows 
on economic growth and investment using a sample of 50 developing countries, both 
HIPC and non-HIPC countries. His cross-country study revealed that investment and 
economic growth are negatively affected by public debt service payments.  
Serieux and Samy (2001) analysed the impact of public debt service, investment, 
human development on economic growth in 53 low- and lower-middle-income 
economies for the period 1970 to 1999 using panel datasets. Public debt service was 
found to have a significant negative impact on economic growth through its effect on 
human capital development.  
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Using 18 Latin American countries and 4 high-performing Asian countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand), Weeks (2000) studied the relationship between 
foreign public debt service and the rate of economic growth in two groups of 
economies from 1960 to 1994. Applying the ordinary least square estimation 
technique, Weeks (2000) found that the public debt service variable was significant 
even at less than 1% and established that a 1% increase in public debt service reduced 
the rate of economic growth by 1.6% in the Latin American countries. However, Weeks 
(2000) suggested an insignificant relationship between public debt service and 
economic growth in Asian countries. 
Also applying the ordinary least square method, Cohen (1993) examined the 
correlation between public debt service and investment in 81 least developed 
countries for the period 1965 to 1987. By dividing the study period into three-time 
periods, that is, 1965-1973, 1974-1981 and 1982-1987, the empirical results of Cohen 
(1993) found evidence consistent with the crowding out hypothesis, showing that 1% 
of GDP paid abroad reduced domestic investment by 0.3% of GDP.  
Cunningham (1993) carried out a study on the link between foreign public debt service 
and economic growth in heavily indebted countries from 1971 to 1986, using standard 
production functions. Cunningham (1993) classified debt service as a primary factor 
of production, just like capital and labour. Cunningham (1993) indicates that between 
1971 and 1979, public debt service harmed economic growth, but from 1980 to 1986, 
there was no significant relationship confirmed between the two. 
Savvides (1992) analysed the link between public debt service and economic growth 
by applying cross-sectional time-series data in 43 developing countries between 1980 
and 1986. Applying a two-stage limited dependent variable model, debt service 
similarly reduced economic growth to a high marginal tax rate.  
Apart from past studies supporting a negative relationship between public debt, public 
debt service and economic growth, some studies established a positive correlation 
between the variables. This empirical literature generally assumes that public debt is 
prudently used to finance profitable investments. These studies include Gómez-Puig 
and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018), Owusu-Nantwi and Erickson (2016), Sánchez-Juárez and 
García-Almada (2016), Greiner (2013; 2011), Spilioti and Vamvoukas (2015), and 
Abbas and Christensen (2010). 
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Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018) investigated the impact of public debt on 
economic growth in both central and peripheral countries of the Euro area from 1961 
to 2013. Utilising the ARDL bounds testing approach on annual time-series data, they 
found that a rise in public debt positively impacted economic growth in the short run. 
The positive impact between the two variables emanates from an increase in the 
economy’s productive capacity and improved industrial efficiency (Gómez-Puig & 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 2018).  
Owusu-Nantwi and Erickson (2016) assessed the impact of public debt on economic 
growth in Ghana using both the Johansen cointegration and Vector Error Correction 
models for the period 1970 to 2012. The research established a statistically significant 
positive long-run association between government debt and economic growth in 
Ghana.  
Sánchez-Juárez and García-Almada (2016) tested whether the rising government 
stocks promoted increased public investment in Mexico. Using panel data models and 
the GMM technique with information from 32 states, and data from 1993 to 2012, they 
established that public debt is positively related to public investment and economic 
growth in Mexico.  
Spilioti and Vamvoukas (2015) explored the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth in Greece for the period 1970 to 2010 and found a strong positive 
impact between public debt and GDP growth in Greece. The estimated growth 
equation by Spilioti and Vamvoukas (2015) included other variables such as the fiscal 
policy indicators affecting economic growth, indicators of trade openness and external 
competitiveness, and other control variables related to the demographic 
characteristics of the economy. 
Greiner (2011) analysed the relationship between public debt, economic growth and 
welfare in a sample of developed countries using endogenous growth models. Greiner 
(2011) found that in an economy where the government runs a balanced budget or 
issues debt such that the public debt-to-GDP ratio asymptotically converges to zero, 
public debt leads to positive economic growth rates. Greiner (2013) added that 
governments’ primary surplus rises as public debt rises, and that an increase in tax 
rates, such as government expenditure and public debt increase, can lead to 
increased gross investment and hence, economic growth. Earlier on, Greiner and 
153 
 
Fincke (2009) found evidence consistent with a positive association between public 
debt and economic growth in sampled European countries.  
Another group of empirical studies stresses that domestic public debt positively 
impacts economic growth. These studies include, among others, Bua et al. (2014), 
Abbas and Christensen (2010), and Panizza (2008) and argue that domestic 
borrowing brings benefits but only in the presence of a sound institutional and 
macroeconomic framework. The studies also emphasised the significance of a 
balanced investor base to minimise the cost of government debt and buoyance of 
market yield (Bua et al., 2014; Abbas and Christensen, 2010).  
Bua et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between domestic public debt and 
economic growth in 36 low-income countries from 1971-2011. Using panel data, Bua 
et al. (2014) revealed that domestic public debt has a positive impact on economic 
growth in low-income countries. They concluded that an increase in the share of long-
term instruments over time, as well as a lengthening maturity period of securities, 
decreases government borrowing costs. However, they stressed that the composition 
of the investor base, primarily composed of commercial banks, may suppress lending 
to the private sector. 
Abbas and Christensen (2010) analysed the relationship between domestic public 
debt and economic growth in 93 low-income countries and emerging economies from 
1975 to 2004 using the modified system of GMM estimation technique. Their reported 
results show that moderate levels of noninflationary domestic public debt as a 
proportion of GDP exert a significant positive impact on economic growth through an 
increase in investment efficiency. The authors stated that the growth contribution of 
domestic public debt is higher if (1) it is marketable; (2) bears favourable real interest 
rates, and (3) is outside the banking system.  
Apart from studies that have found either a negative or positive impact of public debt, 
the issue of public debt service and its impact on economic growth is a growing body 
of empirical literature that supports the notion that public debt is nonlinearly related to 
economic growth. These studies attempt to estimate the threshold limit of public debt 
share to GDP. The empirical work linked to this hypothesis includes Pescatori et al. 
(2014), Baum et al. (2013), and Minea and Parent (2012), among others. 
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Pescatori et al. (2014) investigated the nonlinear relationship between public debt and 
economic growth using 34 advanced economies drawn from the IMF membership 
database. By employing the instrument variable approach to data dating back to 1875, 
there was no evidence of any particular debt threshold for debt ratios above which 
economic growth prospects are severely undermined. The findings of Pescatori et al. 
(2014) further suggest that the association between public debt and economic growth 
is partially influenced by the trajectory of debt, where countries with high but declining 
levels of debt multiplied relative to those countries with high but rising debt levels.  
Focusing on European countries, Baum et al. (2013) analysed the relationship 
between public debt and economic growth using the dynamic threshold panel 
methodology from 1990 to 2010. The results suggest that the short-run impact of 
government debt on GDP growth is positive. However, Baum et al. (2013) discovered 
that as the public debt-to-GDP ratio approaches 67%, the relationship decreases to 
around zero and subsequently varnishes. For public debt-to-GDP ratios above 95%, 
public debt negatively related to economic growth in the studied economies.  
Using a panel of countries drawn from the IMF membership database, Minea and 
Parent (2012) studied the relationship between public debt and economic growth using 
the Panel Smooth Threshold Regression (PSTR) model. Their findings revealed that 
public debt negatively related to economic growth when the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio is between 90% and 115%. However, the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth becomes positive when government debt-GDP ratio surpasses 
115%, and there is no statistically significant relationship between the two variables 
when the public debt to GDP ratio is below 90%. 
Cecchetti et al. (2011) investigated the effect of public debt on economic growth for a 
sample of 18 OECD countries for the period 1980 to 2008. In their panel growth model 
regression with specific fixed effects estimations, the authors specified threshold 
levels, thus producing a nonlinear relationship between public debt and economic 
growth. The results of Cecchetti et al. (2011) found a threshold value of 85% for GDP 
and concluded that an increase of 10% in the public debt-to-GDP ratio leads to a 
decrease of 0.13% points in the per capita GDP growth rate. 
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In 2010, Checherita-Westphal and Rother studied the relationship between public debt 
and annual growth rate of GDP per capita across 12 European countries for the period 
1970 to 2010. Using a quadratic specification estimated by fixed effects, system GMM, 
and two-stages least squares, they found a nonlinear (bell-shaped) relationship 
between public debt and economic growth. According to these results, there is a 
positive relationship between public debt and economic growth for a public debt-to-
GDP ratio of below 90%, with the marginal effect of public debt turning negative when 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio is between 90% and 105%.  
Using a sample of 44 countries, 20 advanced economies and 24 emerging economies, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a) examined the relationship between public debt, 
economic growth and inflation. The historical data sets in the two samples spanned 
from 1946 to 2009 for advanced countries and from 1946 to 2009 and 1900 to 2009 
for emerging countries. They found that high public debt relative to GDP of above 90% 
is associated with lower economic growth rates in both advanced and emerging 
countries. The results also indicated that lower levels of public debt relative to GDP, 
of less than 60%, are associated with adverse economic growth rates in emerging 
economies.  
Using a different setting, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b) also analysed the relationship 
between government debt and economic growth in 44 countries over 200 years. They 
found that public debt and economic growth have a weak relationship for public 
debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90% of GDP, above which the relationship turns 
negative. 
Presbitero (2010) investigated the impact of public debt on economic growth and found 
that public debt has a positive, negative and irrelevant impact on GDP growth for debt 
ratio below 10%, between 10% and 90%, and above 90% thresholds, respectively. 
Presbitero’s (2010) findings were from a panel of 92 low- and middle-income countries 
from 1990 to 2007 using endogenous growth models.  
Among the studies that tested the nonlinear relationship between foreign public debt 
and economic growth was that of Pattillo et al. (2002). The authors applied several 
econometric methodologies, including the ordinary least squares, instrumental 
variables approach, fixed effects and GMM method to 93 developing countries for the 
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period 1969-1998. The results showed that the impact of foreign public debt on 
economic growth becomes negative for debt levels above 160-170%. 
Although limited, some empirical studies support the hypothesis that public debt, 
public debt service and economic growth are not related. Studies in this category 
include, among others, Akram (2016; 2015), Tchereni et al. (2013), Kourtellos et al. 
(2013) and Jalles (2011).  
Akram (2016) examined the impact of public debt service on economic growth and 
poverty in selected South Asian countries, that is, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, for the period 1975 to 2010. Akram (2016) used the standard panel data 
estimation methodology and found that public debt service and economic growth do 
not relate in these economies.  
In 2015, Akram had examined the impact of foreign public debt and public debt service 
on economic growth and investment in the Philippines for the period 1975 to 2010. 
Applying the ARDL technique, the author found that: (1) foreign public debt has a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with both real GDP growth and 
investment; and (2) public debt service has a statistically insignificant relationship with 
both real GDP growth and investment – Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis.  
Tchereni et al. (2013) analysed the impact of foreign public debt on economic growth 
in Malawi using time-series data for the period 1975-2003. The dependent variable 
was economic growth explained by the level of foreign public debt, inflation rate, 
exchange rate, the prime lending rate, private and public investment. The reported 
results show that foreign public debt and economic growth are not related. 
Kourtellos et al. (2013) examined the relationship between public debt and economic 
growth by employing a balanced 10-year period panel dataset covering 82 advanced 
economies for the period 1980 to 2009 – employing a combination of structural 
threshold methodology and pooled panel linear regressions.  According to Kourtellos 
et al. (2013), the use of the structural threshold regression model allowed for the 
control of parameter heterogeneity, uncertainty and endogeneity. Their study revealed 
that if a country’s institutions are of sufficiently high quality, then, public debt is growth 
neutral and that the connection between public debt and economic growth could be 
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influenced by other exogenous variables like trade openness and/or institutional 
quality, and the structure and composition of public debt.  
Panizza and Presbitero (2012) analysed the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth using a sample of OECD countries. The results from applying the 
instrument variable approach failed to reject the null hypothesis that public debt has 
no impact on economic growth in the studied economies. Panizza and Presbitero 
(2012: 18) added that “in the presence of multiple equilibria, a fully solvent government 
with a high level of debt may decide to put in place restrictive fiscal policies to reduce 
the probability that a sudden change in investors’ sentiments would push the country 
towards the bad equilibrium”. They concluded that the neutrality of public debt on 
economic growth in the studied developed economies could probably be because all 
OECD countries used their central banks as lenders of last resort, and the economies 
were still below the country-specific thresholds at which public debt imposes a 
negative effect on economic growth. 
Jalles (2011) examined the impact of government debt service on economic growth 
using a sample of 72 developing countries for the period 1970 to 2005. By applying a 
combination of the fixed effects and GMM estimation techniques, the results indicated 
no relationship between public debt service and economic growth.  
Schclarek (2004) examined the relationship between public debt and annual growth 
rate of GDP per capita in a panel of 24 industrial countries and 59 developing 
countries, from 1970 to 2002, with data averaged into 5-year periods. He found no 
statistical evidence linking foreign public debt and factor productivity growth in 
developing countries.  
Pattillo et al. (2002) analysed the relationship between foreign public service and 
economic growth using panel data of 93 developing countries for the period 1969 to 
1998. After using four different econometric methodologies, that is instrumental 
variables with lagged values, Least Square Method, GMM (with and without dummies) 
and fixed effects. They concluded that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between foreign public debt service and economic growth in developing countries.  
Pattillo et al. (2002) argued that as long as countries use the borrowed funds for 
productive investment and are not affected by macroeconomic instabilities arising from 
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policy uncertainties or sizable adverse shocks, economic growth should increase and 
allow for timely debt repayment. However, Pattillo et al. (2002) concluded that if public 
debt becomes larger than the country’s repayment ability, then, public debt service 
costs would (1) discourage further domestic and foreign investment; and (2) lower 
efficiency of investment, thus harm economic growth.  
Table 5.1 gives a summary of the empirical studies that support a negative impact, a 
positive impact, a nonlinear impact and debt neutrality (no impact) of public debt, 




Table 5.1: A summary of empirical studies on the impact of public debt, public debt service on economic growth 
Author(s) Country/Region Methodology Dependent variable(s) Findings  
Studies consistent with the negative impact of public debt, public debt service on economic growth 
Mhlaba & Phiri, 2019 South Africa 
➢ Autoregressive distributed lag  
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact 
Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-
Rivero, 2018 
11 Euro area 
countries 
➢ Autoregressive distributed lag  
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact  
Al Kharusi & Ada, 2018 Oman 
➢ Autoregressive distributed lag  
➢ Annual time-series data 




and Sri Lanka 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Fixed effects  
➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact 
Ahlborn & Schweickert, 
2016 
111 OECD and 
developing 
countries 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ Random effects  
➢ Pooled ordinary least squares 
➢ 2-stage least squares 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
 
 
Negative impact  
 
 
Akram, 2015 Philippines 
➢ Autoregressive distributed lag  
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Foreign public debt 
 
Negative impact  
 
Egert, 2015 OECD countries 
➢ Ordinary least squares 
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact 
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Woo & Kumar, 2015 
79 countries (38 
advanced and 
emerging, and 41 
developing 
countries) 
➢ Between estimator 
➢ Pooled ordinary least squares 
➢ System generalised method of moments  
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth per 
capita  
Negative impact  
Panizza & Presbitero, 
2014 




➢ Panel data analysis ➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact 
Abbas et al., 2011 174 countries ➢ Unbalanced panel data analysis ➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2010a 
44 countries ➢ Instrumental variable approach ➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact  
Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2010b 
44 countries ➢ Instrumental variable approach ➢ Aggregate public debt Negative impact  
Kumar and Woo, 2010 




➢ Between estimator 
➢ Pooled ordinary least squares 
➢ System generalised method of moments  
➢ Fixed effects 




➢ Generalised methods of moments ➢ Foreign public debt Negative impact  
Clements et al., 2003 
55 developing 
countries 
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ System Generalised methods of moments 
➢ Foreign public debt Negative impact 
Hansen, 2002 
50 HIPC and 
Non-HIPC 
countries 
➢ Cross-country regressions 
➢ Generalised methods of moments 





Serieux & Samy, 2001 
53 low- and 
lower-middle-
income countries 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Fixed effects 




countries and 4 
Asian countries 
➢ Ordinary least squares 
➢ Annual time-series data 







➢ Ordinary least squares 
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Total public debt service Negative impact 
Studies consistent with the positive impact of public debt, public debt service on economic growth 
Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-
Rivero, 2018 
11 Euro area 
countries 
➢ Autoregressive distributed lag  
➢ Annual time-series data 




➢ Johansen cointegration analysis 
➢ Vector error correction  




➢ Panel data analysis  
➢ Generalised methods of moments 
➢ Aggregate public debt Positive impact  
Spilioti & Vamvoukas, 
2015 
Greece 
➢ Unrestricted VAR 
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Aggregate public debt Positive impact 
Bua et al., 2014 
36 low-income 
countries 




➢ Endogenous growth model  ➢ Aggregate public debt Positive impact 
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➢ Fixed effects  
➢ Ordinary least squares 
➢ Random effects  
➢ System GMM 
➢ Domestic public debt Positive impact 
Adams & Bevan, 2005 
45 developing 
countries. 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ Domestic public debt Positive impact 
Studies consistent with the nonlinear impact of public debt, public debt service on economic growth 
Pescatori et al., 2014 
34 advanced 
economies 
➢ Instrument variable approach ➢ Aggregate public debt Nonlinear impact 
Baum et al., 2013 
European 
countries 
➢ Dynamic threshold panel analysis ➢ Aggregate public debt Nonlinear impact 
Minea & Parent, 2012 IMF database ➢ PSTR ➢ Aggregate public debt Nonlinear impact 
Cecchetti et al., 2011 
18 OECD 
countries 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Fixed effects 





➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
Nonlinear impact 
 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2010a 





➢ Panel data analysis  
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ Aggregate public debt Nonlinear impact 
Pattillo et al., 2002 
93 developing 
countries 
➢ Ordinary least squares 
➢ Instrumental variables 
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ System Generalised methods of moments 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢  Foreign public debt Nonlinear impact  
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and Sri Lanka 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Total public debt service 
➢ Foreign public debt 
➢ Domestic public debt 
No impact 
Akram, 2015 Philippines 
➢ Autoregressive distributed lag bounds 
approach 
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Total public debt service 
➢ Foreign public debt 
➢ Domestic public debt 
No impact 
Tchereni et al., 2013 Malawi 
➢ Ordinary least squares method 
➢ Annual time-series data 
➢ Foreign public debt No impact 
Kourtellos et al., 2013 
82 advanced 
economies 
➢ Structural threshold methodology  
➢ Pooled panel linear regressions 
➢ Aggregate public debt No impact 
Panizza & Presbitero, 
2012 
OECD countries  ➢ Instrument variable approach ➢ Aggregate public debt No impact 
Adams & Bevan, 2005 
45 developing 
countries. 
➢ Panel data  
➢ Fixed effects 
➢ Aggregate public debt 





➢ Generalised methods of moments 
➢ Aggregate public debt  





➢ Generalised methods of moments 
➢ Aggregate public debt  
 
No impact  
Pattillo et al., 2002 
93 developing 
countries 
➢ Instrumental variables  
➢ Ordinary least squares method 
➢ System Generalised methods of moments 
➢ Fixed effects 







➢ Cross-country regressions 
➢ Generalised methods of moments 





5.3.2 Causal relationship between public debt, public debt service and economic 
growth: Empirical literature review  
The empirical literature on the causality between public debt, public debt service and 
economic growth is still scarce, and results are mixed. The available empirical results 
indicate variations arising from both cross-country heterogeneity and time variations. 
Some studies found unidirectional causality from public debt, public debt service to 
economic growth while others established bidirectional causality between the 
variables. Some studies found no causality between public debt, public debt service 
and economic growth. 
Studies that found a unidirectional causality between public debt, public debt service 
and economic growth include Donayre and Taivan (2017), Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-
Rivero (2015), Kobayashi (2015) and Afxentiou (1993). Donayre and Taivan (2017) 
carried out a causality study between public debt and economic growth in a sample of 
20 OECD countries from 1970 to 2010. Applying both Granger-causality tests and 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR)-based tests, the authors found that the causal link of 
public debt to real economic growth is intrinsic to each country. The findings of 
Donayre and Taivan (2017) suggested that in highly market-driven economies, the 
direction of causality is from low economic growth to public debt; while in more socialist 
states, with large governments, it runs either from low economic growth to public debt 
accumulation or is bidirectional. 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2015) tested the causal relationship between public 
debt and economic growth in 11 central and peripheral countries of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union using time-series data from 1980 to 2013. The 
empirical evidence was mixed. The results for Germany, Greece, Italy, Belgium and 
Spain provided evidence that causality flows from public debt to economic growth. For 
Finland and Ireland, the authors found that causality runs from economic growth to 
public debt, while there was no causality registered in Austria and Portugal.  
Kobayashi (2015) examined the causality between public debt and economic growth 
in Japan and found evidence consistent with a unidirectional causal flow from low 
economic growth to public debt in this country.  
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Afxentiou (1993) carried out a causality study in 20 middle-income countries from 1971 
to 1988. Employing the Granger-causality framework, he established a unidirectional 
causality running from public debt service to economic growth in studied countries. 
Apart from studies that found a unidirectional causality between public debt, public 
debt service and economic growth, some identified a bidirectional causality. Among 
these were Owusu-Nantwi and Erickson (2016), Egbetunde (2012), Ferreira (2009) 
and Amoateng and Amoako-Adu (1996). 
Owusu-Nantwi and Erickson (2016) used the Johansen cointegration and the Vector 
Error Correction model to examine the causal relationship between public debt and 
economic growth in Ghana for the period 1970 to 2012. They found bidirectional 
causality between public debt and economic growth in Ghana.  
In 2012, Egbetunde studied the causal relationship between public debt and economic 
growth in Nigeria from 1970 to 2010 using a VAR model and established  bidirectional 
causality. Similarly, by applying the VAR methodology and Granger-causality test, 
Ferreira (2009) examined the causal-effect relationship between public debt and 
economic growth in 20 OECD countries between 1988 and 2001 and found 
bidirectional causality between the growth rate of GDP per capita and public debt.  
Using panel data regressions in a Granger-causality framework, Abbas and 
Christensen (2010) tested the existence of causality between public debt and 
economic growth, covering 93 low-income countries and emerging markets from 1975 
to 2004. The results supported bidirectional causality in the studied countries. 
Furthermore, the authors argued that the relationship between the two variables can 
be enhanced by improving monetary policy, promoting financial market development, 
developing public sector financial accountability, among other factors.  
Amoateng and Amoako-Adu (1996) evaluated the causal relationship between foreign 
public debt service, exports and economic growth in 35 African countries using 
Granger causality framework. The authors found feedback causality between public 
debt service, exports and GDP growth in the studied countries.  
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Some studies found no causality between public debt, public debt service and 
economic growth, including those by Panizza and Presbitero (2014), Jalles (2011) and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a). 
Using an instrumental variable approach, Panizza and Presbitero (2014) studied the 
direction of causality between public debt and economic growth in a sample of OECD 
countries and found no real evidence that public debt Granger-causes economic 
growth. They argued that the causal relationship between government debt and 
economic growth vanishes once correction for endogeneity take place.  
Jalles (2011) tested the existence of a causal relationship between public debt service 
and economic growth in 72 developing countries from 1970 to 2005. After employing 
the Granger-causality estimation technique, his results were consistent with the debt 
service-economic growth neutrality hypothesis.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a) analysed the direction of causality between public debt 
and economic growth using a sample of 20 industrialised economies from 1949 to 
2009 and found no evidence of a causal relationship between the two variables. 
Ahmed et al. (2000) investigated the causality between foreign public debt service and 
economic growth in Asian countries for the period 1970 to 1997. Employing the 
trivariate Granger-causality framework, they found no evidence of a causal link 
between foreign public debt service and economic growth. 
 
Table 5.2 gives a summary of the empirical studies on causality between public debt, 
public debt service and economic growth. 
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Table 5.2: A summary of empirical studies on causality between public debt, public debt service and economic growth 
Author(s) Country/Region Methodology Dependent variables Direction of causality 




➢ VAR  
➢ Granger-causality  framework 
 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth 
  
Debt ← growth 
(capitalist economies) 
  
Kobayashi, 2015 Japan 
➢ Simulations 
➢ Granger causality  framework 
➢ Time-series data 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth 
Debt ← growth 
Woo & Kumar, 2015 
24 OECD 
countries 
➢ Granger causality  framework   
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth per capita  









➢ Granger-causality  framework   
➢ Time-series data 
 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth 
 
Debt ← growth 
(Finland and Ireland) 
Debt → growth 
(Germany, Greece, Italy, 




➢ Johansen cointegration 
analysis 
➢ Granger causality  framework   
➢ Public debt service 
➢ Real GDP growth 
 
Debt service → growth 
 





➢ Granger-causality  framework 
➢ Time-series data 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth 
➢  
Debt ↔ growth  




➢ Time-series data 
➢ Johansen cointegration 
analysis 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth 
 
Debt ↔ growth 
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Egbetunde, 2012 Nigeria 
➢ Time-series 
➢ VAR 
➢ Granger causality  framework 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth 
 




➢ Granger causality  framework 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth 
 




➢ Granger causality test 
➢ Panel data analysis 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth  





➢ Granger causality framework 
➢ Public debt service 
➢ Real GDP growth 
Debt service ↔ growth 




and the U.K. 
➢ VAR  
➢ Granger-causality  framework 
➢ Aggregate public debt 









➢ Granger-causality framework   
 
➢ Aggregate public debt 
➢ Real GDP growth  
No causality 





➢ Endogenous growth model 
➢ Instrumental variable approach 
➢ Aggregate public debt 





➢ Panel Granger causality 
➢ Public debt service 
➢ Real GDP growth  
No causality 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2010a 
44 countries 
➢ Endogenous growth model 
➢ Instrumental variable approach 
➢ Aggregate public debt 






Overall, the review of the literature on the relationship between public debt, public debt 
service and economic growth established heterogeneity on the impact of public debt 
(domestic and foreign) on economic growth, with the public debt-economic growth 
nexus varying across countries, depending partly on the timeframe considered, data 
and methodology. However, in the main, there is overwhelming evidence of the 
negative impact of both public debt and public debt service on economic growth 
(Huang et al., 2018; Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2018; Ncanywa & Masoga, 2018; 
Akram, 2016; 2015; among others).   
The study also found that the empirical studies that tested the relative impact of 
domestic and foreign public debt on economic growth are insufficient, and the 
evidence is mixed (Akram, 2016; 2015). The analysis further revealed that foreign 
public debt enjoyed more coverage than its domestic counterpart as proven by more 
studies on the impact of foreign debt compared to domestic public debt on economic 
growth (Akram, 2015; Clements et al., 2003; Pattillo et al., 2002; among others).  
While substantial empirical work in developed economies explored the relationship 
between public debt (domestic and foreign) and economic growth (Egert, 2015; 
Panizza & Presbitero, 2014; Baum et al., 2013; Checherita-Westphal & Rother, 2010; 
Kumar & Woo, 2010; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010a, 2010b; Ferreira, 2009), few studies 
examined this relationship in the context of emerging and developing countries in 
contemporary periods, except for Owusu-Nantwi (2016), Egbetunde (2012), Abbas 
and Christensen (2010). These exceptions mostly used panel data techniques and did 
not extricate between individual countries or, in some instances, between short- and 
long-run effects.  
From the causality front, although the empirical studies are still scant, especially in 
emerging and developing economies, the dominant causal flow established during this 
literature review is bidirectional.  
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the study focuses on reviewing the theoretical underpinnings and 
empirical literature on the public debt-economic growth nexus. The reviewed literature 
on the impact of public debt (domestic and foreign) on economic growth shows that 
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the debate is ongoing and inconclusive. The chapter also provided a brief discussion 
of economic growth models.  
The reviewed literature on the impact of public debt, public debt service on economic 
growth was in four categories, namely, negative impact, positive impact, nonlinear and 
no impact. On balance, the chapter revealed that the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature largely supports the negative impact of public debt on economic growth.  
From the causality front, existing literature on the causality between aggregate public 
debt and economic growth, and between public debt service and economic growth, 
are still inadequate, and the results are mixed. Whereas the dominant causal flow 
between aggregate public debt and economic growth was bidirectional, in the case of 
public debt service and economic growth, no leading causal flow was confirmed. 
This literature review revealed that the impact of public debt on economic growth and 
that the causality between public debt and economic growth is not a given and varies 
depending on a set of heterogeneous factors, including the level of development of 
the sample countries, datasets, research methodology, and the selected control 
variables, among other factors. The study, therefore, concludes that similar to the 
impact of public debt (domestic and foreign) on economic growth, and public debt 
service on economic growth; the causality between aggregate public debt and 
economic growth, and between public debt service and economic growth, is not clear-
cut. The notion that public debt (domestic or foreign) or public debt service is bad for 













EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the specification of the empirical model, as well as the estimation 
techniques used in the study. Section 6.2 discusses the model’s specification – both 
dynamic impact and causal relationships, and also presents the justification of the 
variables included in the models. Section 6.3 details the estimation techniques 
employed in the study. Section 6.4 discusses the data sources and the definitions of 
variables used in the study and Section 6.5 presents the concluding remarks. 
6.2 Empirical model specification 
6.2.1 General empirical model specification – Dynamic impact  
6.2.1.1 Empirical specification of Model 1  
Model 1 investigates the impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth. The 
general empirical model adopted in this study has its foundations in the earlier studies 
by Dombi and Dedák (2019), Dedák and Dombi (2018), and Adam and Bevan (2005) 
that employed similar annual time-series methodology. In essence, this approach is 
motivated by the available  consistent and reliable time-series data for all the variables 
of interest in the study countries, as well as the selected dynamic autoregressive 
model. The general model is specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 𝑡 … … … … . (6.1) 
Where: 
y  = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth);  
PD  = the stock of public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt);  




L  = share of the economically active population aged between 15 and 64 years 
in the total working-age population (a proxy for labour);  
FB  = fiscal balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for fiscal balance);  
TOP  = the sum of exports and imports as a ratio of GDP (a proxy for trade 
openness); 
S  = share of savings in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic savings);  
TOT  = trade balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for terms of trade); 
𝛼0  = the intercept;  
𝛼1 − 𝛼7 = the respective regression coefficients;  
1  = the white-noise error term; and 
t  = the period in years.  
The specified empirical Model 1 (equation 6.1) applies to each of the three study 
countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
6.2.1.2 Empirical specification of Model 2 
Model 2 tests the relative impact of domestic and foreign public debt on economic 
growth. Like Model 1, the dependent variable in Model 2 is economic growth, proxied 
by the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Public debt comprises of two parts, 
public and publicly guaranteed domestic and foreign debt. Domestic public debt refers 
to all financial commitments denominated in local currency owed by the central 
government to the residency of that country (Panizza, 2008: 4). Foreign public debt 
refers to all financial commitments denominated in foreign currency owed by the 
central government to the non-residents of that country, and under the jurisdiction of 
a foreign court (Panizza, 2008: 4).  
Model 2, therefore, splits aggregate public debt into domestic and foreign components, 
and then each component enters into the model separately as a regressor. The 
general empirical model adopted in this study to examine the relative impact of the 
disaggregated public debt on economic growth is a variant of the previous works of 
Akram (2016; 2015), Yakita (2008) and Adams and Bevan (2005) that applied similar 
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annual time-series methodology. Specifically, the methodology in this study is 
motivated by the available consistent and reliable time-series data for the dependent 
and independent variables in the study countries, as well as the selected dynamic 
autoregressive model. The general model is specified as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝜆2𝐹𝑃𝐷𝑡 + 𝜆3𝐼𝑡 + 𝜆4𝐿𝑡 + 𝜆5𝐹𝐵𝑡 + 𝜆6𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡 + 𝜆7𝑆𝑡 + 𝜆8𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡 + 2𝑡 
             … … … … … … … … . . … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . (6.2) 
Where: 
DPD  = the stock of domestic public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for domestic 
public debt);  
FPD  = the stock of foreign public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for foreign public 
debt);  
𝜆0  = the intercept;  
𝜆1 − 𝜆8  = the respective regression coefficients; and 
2  = the white-noise error term. 
All other variables are as defined in Model 1. 
The specified empirical Model 2 (equation 6.2) applies to each of the three study 
countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
6.2.1.3 Empirical specification of Model 3 
Model 3 tests the impact of public debt service on economic growth. Just as in Models 
1 and 2, in this model (Model 3), the dependent variable is economic growth, which is 
proxied by the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Following Clements et al. 
(2003) and Metwally and Tamaschke (1994), the general empirical model adopted in 
this study to examine the impact of public debt service on economic growth is an 
extension of Cunningham’s (1993) model. The study methodology is consistent with 
the available reliable time-series data for the regression variables and the chosen 
dynamic autoregressive models in the study. The general model is specified as 
follows: 




PDS  = the stock of public debt service as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt 
service);  
𝛽0  = the intercept;  
𝛽1 − 𝛽7  = the respective regression coefficients; and 
3  = the white-noise error term. 
All other variables are as defined in Model 1. 
 
The specified empirical Model 3 (equation 6.3) applies to each of the three study 
countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
6.2.2 General empirical model specification – Granger-causality (Model 4) 
Model 4 tests the Granger-causality between aggregate public debt and economic 
growth, and between public debt service and economic growth. The dynamic causal 
relationships in this study are tested using a multivariate Granger-causality framework 
– which is based on the ARDL bounds testing techniques, as developed by Pesaran 
and Shin (1999), and later improved by Pesaran et al. (2001).  
Although cointegration, as given by the ARDL procedure, provides evidence of the 
presence of causality, at least in one direction, it does not establish the direction of 
causality between variables (Odhiambo, 2004; Masih & Masih, 1998). The direction of 
causality can only be demonstrated through the VECM-Granger-causality model 
derived from the long-run cointegrating vectors (Odhiambo, 2008). Apart from 
specifying the direction of causality amongst variables, the VECM-Granger-causality 
model makes it possible to differentiate between short- and long-run causality (Masih 
& Masih, 1998). One of the strengths of the selected ARDL approach is that it produces 
unbiased estimates in small or finite data sample sizes, even when some of the 
regressors are endogenous (Narayan, 2004; Pesaran et al., 2001) (see also Section 
6.3.2). 
Model 4 divides into two – 4a and 4b – where Model 4a tests the Granger-causality 
between public debt (PD) and economic growth (y) and Model 4b tests the Granger-
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causality between public debt service (PDS) and economic growth (y). Fiscal balance 
(FB) and savings (S) are the intermittent variables in the multivariate Granger-causality 
models (Model 4a and Model 4b), such that the multivariate Model 4a consists of PD, 
y, FB, and S. In contrast, the multivariate Model 4b consists of PDS, y, FB, and S. The 
general multivariate Granger-causality models are specified in Equations 6.4 (a-d) and 
6.5 (a-d). 
Model 4a: The empirical model on the causality between public debt and 
economic growth   
y = f(PD, FB, S) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.4a) 
PD = f(y, FB, S) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.4b) 
FB = f(y, PD, S) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.4c) 
S = f(y, PD, FB) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.4d) 
Model 4b: The empirical model on the causality between public debt service and 
economic growth   
y = f(PDS, FB, S) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (6.5a) 
PDS = f(y, FB, S) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (6.5b) 
FB = f(y, PDS, S) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (6.5c) 
S = f(y, PDS, FB) … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (6.5d) 
Where: 
y  = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth);  
PD  = the stock of public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt);  
PDS  = the stock of public debt service as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt 
service);  
FB  = fiscal balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for fiscal balance); and  
S  = savings as a share of GDP (a proxy for gross domestic savings). 
The specified empirical Model 4 (equations 6.4a-d and 6.5a-d) is applied for each of 
the three study countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
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The concept of Granger-causality in econometrics can be tracked back to Wiener 
(1956) who argues that if the prediction of one time-series improves by including 
information of a second time-series, then the latter is said to have a causal stimulus 
on the former. Weiner’s (1956) idea was later formalised by Granger (1988; 1969) 
using linear parametric autoregressive models of time-series. Granger (1988; 1969) 
attempted to answer two economic problems, that is, does correlation imply causation; 
and the effect of ignored common factors in explaining the relationship between two 
variables of interest. In the latter case, the causal relationship among variables might 
disappear after factoring in the formerly disregarded common causes (Lin, 2008).  
According to Granger (1969)’s notion, a variable X Granger causes another variable 
Y if the prediction of Y is improved when X is included in the prediction model for Y. In 
a multivariate or complex time-series setting, additional observed variables are 
included in the two-vector autoregressive (VAR) models for Y. The model, including 
X, is called unrestricted or U-model, whereas the one excluding X is called restricted 
or R-model (Lin, 2008). Suppose that we have three stationary time-series 𝑋 =
{𝑋(𝑡)}𝑡𝜖𝑆; 𝑌 = {𝑌(𝑡)}𝑡𝜖𝑆; and 𝑍 = {𝑍(𝑡)}𝑡𝜖𝑆, then, if 𝐹𝑌→𝑋 𝑍⁄
> 0 in some suitable 
statistical setting, it implies that the inclusion of Y results in improved prediction of X, 
signifying that Y→X has a direct effect. In contrast, if 𝐹𝑌→𝑋 𝑍⁄
= 0, the influence Y→X 
is said to be wholly mediated by Z. Conditional measures such as 𝐹𝑌→𝑋 𝑋⁄
 and 
𝐹𝑌→𝑍 𝑌⁄
 can be likewise defined. In principle, the autoregressive Granger-causality 
regression models are based on the belief that the past can cause the future, but the 
future cannot cause the past. 
According to Lin (2008: 4-5), there are four possible causal directions between public 
debt (PD) and economic growth (y), and between public debt service (PDS) and 
economic growth (y). The first possibilities are that PD and y are independent (𝑃𝐷 ⊥
𝑦), and that PDS and y are independent (𝑃𝐷𝑆 ⊥ 𝑦). The second possibility, according 
to Lin (2008), is that public debt levels influence the level of economic growth (𝑃𝐷 ⇒
𝑦). In the third possibility, public debt stocks are driven by the rate of economic growth 
(𝑃𝐷 ⇐ 𝑦). Then there is the fourth possibility of bidirectional causality, which assigns 
mutual causation between public debt and economic growth, and between public debt 
service and economic growth, (𝑃𝐷 ⟺ 𝑦) and (𝑃𝐷𝑆 ⟺ 𝑦). 
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Unlike the standard bivariate Granger-causality frameworks which are known to suffer 
from omitted-variable-bias (Pradhan, 2011; Odhiambo, 2009), the multivariate 
Granger-causality framework eliminates spurious correlations and increases the 
general validity of the causation test (Lutkepohl, 1982). The inclusion of two 
intermittent variables, that is fiscal balance and savings, improves the inference levels 
between the variables (Odhiambo, 2008).  
The choice of fiscal balance as the intermittent variable is mostly influenced by (1) the 
theoretical controversies in literature on the links between fiscal balance and economic 
growth, between fiscal balance and public debt, and between fiscal balance and public 
debt service payment ability; and (2) the influence of fiscal balance (a flow variable) 
on the growth of public debt (a stock variable). While the neoclassical view supports a 
negative relationship between fiscal deficit and economic growth, the Keynesian 
thought purports that the relationship is positive (Fischer, 1993; 1991).  
However, the justification of savings as the other intermittent variable in the 
multivariate Granger-causality framework is influenced theoretically by the growth 
models. In the classical, endogenous and exogenous growth theories, economic 
growth is achieved through increased savings, which then lead to capital accumulation 
(Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986; Solow, 1956). Empirically, the findings of Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2012), Panizza and Presbitero (2013) and Cecchetti et al., 
(2011) suggest that a decrease in gross domestic savings necessitates government 
borrowing to foster resources required for investment.  
6.2.3 Justification of variables in the models 
The justification of the variables incorporated in Models 1-3 is based on theoretical 
and empirical literature. The dependent variable in the dynamic impact models 
(Models 1-3) is the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, a proxy for economic 
growth rate. In the literature, various proxies for economic growth have been used, the 
most common being: (1) nominal GDP (see, for example, Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-
Rivero, 2018); (2) annual growth rate of nominal GDP (see, instance, Spilioti & 
Vamvoukas, 2015; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010a; (3) annual growth rate of real GDP (see, 
for example, Owusu-Nantwi & Erickson, 2016); (4) annual growth rate of real GDP per 
capita (see, among others, IMF, 2020; Eberhardt, 2019; Woo & Kumar, 2015; and (5) 
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annual growth rate of real GNP per capita (see, for example, Adam & Bevan, 2005). 
This study used the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita as an indicator for 
economic growth because it:  
(1) summarises numerous critical country-specific economic and population 
information; 
(2) is comparable across countries;  
(3) reduces outliers; and  
(4) is suitable for the selected methodology.  
The annual growth rate of real GDP per capita is calculated as the ratio of real GDP 
to the average population of a specific year (World Bank, 2018a). A rise in real per 
capita GDP symbolises an increase in productivity, which signals growth in the 
economy and welfare (Mankiw, 2013).  
In Model 1, public debt, expressed as a proportion of GDP, is the independent variable 
of interest. The variable is a measure of the level of the government’s gross domestic 
and foreign indebtedness. Therefore, public sector debt is one measure of the 
government’s ability to manage public finances and defined as the sum of government 
financial liabilities, mostly debt securities and loans (Kumhof & Tanner, 2005). In 
general, public debt can be measured in either gross or net terms. Gross public debt 
measures the stock of outstanding government debt, and net public debt is the 
difference between gross public debt and the financial assets held by the government 
(Panizza & Presbitero, 2013: 14). While net public debt may appear to be the best 
proxy for government indebtedness, calculating net government debt requires a 
comprehensive evaluation of the government’s assets and liabilities, an exercise 
which is practically difficult (Pescatori et al., 2014: 6; Panizza & Presbitero, 2013). As 
a consequence, this study uses gross public debt, a measure which is reasonably 
homogenous across countries. The study expects the relationship between aggregate 
public debt and economic growth to be negative and statistically significant, especially 
given the nature of the countries under study which are classified as either developing 
or emerging. 
In Model 2, domestic and foreign public debt, expressed as a proportion of GDP, is 
the primary independent variables. The relative impact of domestic and foreign public 
debt on economic growth has received little coverage in the literature (Akram, 2016; 
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2015; Adams & Bevan, 2005). However, current findings indicate that most developing 
countries trade currency mismatch risk for maturity mismatch risk (Bua et al., 2014; 
Panizza, 2008). Typically, most studies support a negative relationship between 
domestic and foreign public debt and economic growth in developing countries 
(Ahlborn & Schweickert, 2016; Egert, 2015; Clements et al., 2003). Based on the 
reviewed empirical literature, this study expects domestic public debt and foreign 
public debt to negatively impact economic growth, given that the study countries are 
considered as developing or emerging economies. 
In Model 3, public debt service, expressed as a proportion of GDP, is the prime 
independent variable. While the theoretical literature on the relationship between 
public debt service and economic growth is largely negative, the empirical evidence is 
inconclusive. The debt overhang theories argue that public debt service crowds out 
economic growth by depressing private savings and private investment, as well as 
deterring potential foreign investors (Krugman, 1988; Modigliani, 1961).  
Empirically, the majority of the reviewed studies have found a negative relationship 
between public debt service and economic growth (Hansen, 2002; Serieux & Samy, 
2001; Cohen, 1993). However, a few others maintain that the impact of public debt 
service on economic growth is statistically insignificant (Akram, 2016; 2015; Jalles, 
2011). None of the reviewed studies found evidence supporting a positive impact of 
public debt service on economic growth. Based on the theoretical arguments 
presented above, and the existing empirical evidence, the impact of public debt service 
on economic growth is expected to be negative in this study.   
In order to fully specify the empirical models (Models 1-3), six control variables were 
added, namely, investment (I), labour (L), fiscal balance (FB), trade openness (TOP), 
gross domestic savings (S), and terms of trade (TOT).  
The first control variable is investment proxied by gross fixed capital formation as a 
share of GDP. The choice of  this variable is based on the arguments presented in the 
neoclassical (Jorgenson, 1967), exogenous (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) and 
endogenous (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988) growth models. These traditional growth 
models purport that investment is a prime determinant of economic growth, as in the 
standard production function; 𝑌𝑡 = f (𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡) = A𝐾
𝛼𝐿1−𝛼. Empirical studies by Mhlaba 
and Phiri (2019), Al Kharusi and Ada (2018) and Chirwa and Odhiambo (2016), among 
180 
 
others, argued that investment is the primary variable with a stronger positive 
correlation to economic growth, irrespective of variations in country-specific 
characteristics. Accordingly, based on the theoretical and empirical economic growth 
literature, investment is expected to affect the rate of economic growth positively. 
The second control variable is labour, which is proxied by the labour force participation 
rate. Labour force participation rate is the proportion of the economically active 
population aged between 15 and 64 years to total working-age population (World 
Bank, 2018a). The significance of labour to economic growth is well-documented in 
the literature in standard growth accounting models (Solow, 1956; Lucas, 1988). In 
these growth accounting models, labour productivity positively influences the 
production process and reduces production costs (Solow, 1956). A priori expectation 
is that labour is positively related to economic growth. 
Fiscal balance as a share of GDP, which is a proxy for government policies – mainly 
revenue and spending are also included as the third control variable. The impact of 
fiscal deficit on economic growth interconnects to financial and economic crises and 
is a critical determinant to government’s financing decisions, and hence public debt 
structures and compositions (Sasmal & Sasmal, 2018; Taylor et al., 2012; Lupu, 
2010). The neoclassical school asserts that fiscal deficits reduce economic growth by 
exerting upward pressure on money supply, price levels and domestic interest rates, 
which then crowds out private investment (Feltenstein & Shigeru, 2002). The 
Keynesian school of thought, however, postulates that fiscal expansion has a crowding 
in effect through stimulating aggregate demand, which then leads to an increase in 
both domestic production and gross investment (World Bank, 2007; Mankiw et al., 
1992). Thus, the fiscal balance may be growth-enhancing if financed by limited 
seigniorage; and growth-inhibiting if financed by both domestic public debt and non-
concessionary foreign loans (Taylor et al., 2012; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010a; 2010b; 
Ferreira & Hamilton, 2008). Following the discussion above, the fiscal balance is 
expected to relate to economic growth positively. 
Another control variable included in the dynamic impact models is trade openness, 
calculated by summing imports and exports as a share of GDP (Nyasha, 2014: 223). 
As asserted by Rodrik (2010) and the World Bank (2010), an economy’s susceptibility 
to exogenous economic shocks is principally influenced by its degree of exposure to 
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the global economy, which is measured by the level of economic openness. 
Accordingly, the transmission channels by which economic openness influence 
economic vulnerability can be import- or export-related. Further, the ability to repay 
foreign loans is also largely influenced by the country’s volume of international trade 
(Elmendorf & Mankiw, 1999). Thus, trade openness promotes the movement of both 
financial resources and capital goods across borders, in addition to increasing 
industrial efficiency and fostering technological transfers – all of which positively affect 
economic growth (Stigler, 1956; Boldrin & Levine, 2008). This study, therefore, 
expects trade openness to significantly influence economic growth positively.  
The fifth control variable is gross domestic savings, calculated as gross domestic 
savings as a share of GDP (S). The choice of this variable as an additional 
independent variable is mostly influenced by the theoretical connection between 
savings and economic growth and between savings and public debt (Lucas, 1988; 
Romer, 1986; Solow, 1956). Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986) argue that increased 
savings lead to a rise in capital accumulation and a permanent increase in economic 
growth. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012: 6) added that the transmission of 
public debt to economic growth is through private savings, public investment, total 
factor productivity, and interest rates. Thus, according to economic growth literature, 
gross domestic savings are supposed to lead to economic growth – hence its 
coefficient is expected to be positive.  
The sixth control variable, included in the impact Models 1-3, is the terms of trade 
obtained by dividing a country’s export price by its import prices – proxied in this study 
by trade balance (exports less imports) as a share of GDP. Terms of trade have a 
substantial impact on countries which are mostly dependent on commodity exports, in 
particular, their greater susceptibility to trade, current account imbalances and 
government indebtedness (Ajayi & Khan, 2002). Besides enhancing economies’ 
access to trade opportunities, terms of trade stimulate competition resulting in efficient 
resource allocation and improved access to modern technology through positive 
externalities (Grossman & Helpman, 1991). More so, in empirical research undertaken 
by Checherita-Westphal (2010), Kumar and Woo (2010) and Clements et al. (2003), 
among others, terms of trade are considered a key determinant of the level of 
economic progress, public sector indebtedness, and ability to settle contracted 
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financial obligations. Hence, this study expects an improvement in terms of trade to 
accelerate the rate of economic growth. 
6.3 Estimation techniques 
The ARDL bounds testing approach is in this study utilised for cointegration testing, 
impact analysis and Granger-causality testing. This methodology, which is based on 
the Error Correction Model (ECM) framework, establishes the short- and long-run 
impacts of public debt and public debt service on economic growth. The study 
proceeds by performing unit root testing on the variables to ascertain the order of 
integration.  
6.3.1 Unit root tests 
One of the critical tasks in econometric modelling, both in univariate and multivariate 
econometric models, is to determine the order of integration of analysed time-series 
through unit root tests. Although the pre-testing for unit roots of analysed time-series 
is not a critical requirement in the ARDL approach, this technique only uses series 
integrated of order zero [I(0)] or order one [I(1)] or both. Therefore, to establish the 
order of integration in the analysed series, the study uses three tests, namely, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Square (DF-GLS), the Phillips-Perron 
(PP) and the Perron (PPURoot) unit root tests.  
In each unit root test, the null hypothesis is that the time-series under consideration 
has a unit root; that is, it is nonstationary, while the alternative hypothesis is that the 
time-series is stationary (Gujarati, 2004: 815). On one hand, if the computed absolute 
value of the statistic exceeds the critical values, then the null hypothesis that there is 
a unit root is rejected, in which case the time-series is stationary (Gujarati, 2004: 816). 
On the other hand, if the computed absolute value of the statistic does not exceed the 
critical values, then the null hypothesis that there is a unit root is not rejected, in which 
case the time-series is nonstationary (Gujarati, 2004: 816). 
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6.3.1.1 Dickey-Fuller generalised least square (DF-GLS) 
Dickey (1976) and Fuller (1976) undertook the pioneering work for testing for a unit 
root in time-series based on the first-order autoregressive model and the associated 
DF test statistic: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = (∅1 − 1)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑡                                      𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑇          … … … … … … … … … . (6.6)    
Where ∅1 is the autoregression parameter, 𝑡 is a white noise non-systematic 
component of the model. The null hypothesis of Equation 6.6 is that the process 
contains a unit root (∅1 = 1), against the alternative that it is stationary (|∅1| < 1). 
However, the conventional DF test statistic was inefficient when a non-systematic 
component in DF models was autocorrelated, so the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test was constructed by Dickey and Fuller (1981) to clean up any serial correlation in 
∆𝑦𝑡 and defined as: 




The major advantage of Equation 6.7 formulation is that it can accommodate higher-
order autoregressive processes in 𝑡. However, according to Arltova and Fedorova 
(2016), the challenge with the ADF test is in the choice of lags, ; for if  is too small, 
the test will be affected by autocorrelation and if  is too large, the power of the test 
will be lower. Thus, Elliot et al. (1996) modified the ADF test statistic using a 
generalised least squares (GLS) test to create the ADF-GLS test. The ADF-GLS test 
has substantially the best overall performance in terms of small sample size and 
power, especially in the presence of an unknown mean or trend (Elliot et al., 1996). 
Similar to the ADF test, the ADF-GLS test may be run with or without a trend; that is, 
there are two types of ADF-GLS – GLS detrending and GLS demeaning. In the former 
case, the series to be tested are detrended before running the ADF test regression, 
while in the latter, the series to be tested are demeaned before running the ADF test.  
According to Stock (1994), if , the following ADF-GLS equation for 
detrending variables is regressed: 
𝑦𝑡









[𝑦1, (1 − 𝛼𝐿)𝑦2, … … … … . . , (1 − 𝛼𝐿)𝑦𝑇] … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (6.9) 
 
Where ,  is the local alternative, T is the number of observations, and L 
is the standard lag operator. The values of , according to Stock (1994) are selected 
so that the test statistic achieves the most invariant powerful envelope against 
stationary alternatives at 50% power. Consequently, the series  is regressed using 
the following ADF equation to test the null hypothesis that   = 0: 
∆𝑦𝑡
𝑑 =∝ +𝛾𝑡 + ∅𝑦𝑡−1




𝑑 + 𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . (6.10) 
Where n is the maximum lag length.  
6.3.1.2 Phillips-Perron (PP) 
The PP test by Phillips and Perron (1988), corrects for any serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity in the error term nonparametrically by modifying the DF test 
statistics. Contrary to the ADF test, in the PP test, a generating model for the time-
series does need not to be specified. More so, in the PP test, there is no need for the 
researcher to (1) specify a lag length for the test regression, and (2) assume that the 
error term is white noise (Phillips & Perron, 1988). Perron (1989) proposed a modified 
DF test defined by the following deterministic trend (DT) function: 
𝐷𝑇𝑡 =∝ +𝛽𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑡 + 𝛿1𝐷𝑇𝑡
∗ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.11) 
Where  is the intercept, DU is the structural change in the intercept, t is the linear 
trend, and DT* is the structural change in the linear trend. According to Perron (1989), 
there are three alternatives for the DT function, which are: (1) a model which allows 
for a structural change to be reflected in the intercept only; (2) a model which allows 
for a structural change to be reflected in the slope only; and (3) a model which allows 
for a structural change to be reflected in both the intercept and slope. The strategy 
adopted by Perron (1989) first de-trends the series and then analyse the behaviour of 










ante. Thus, Perron (1989) suggested that there is a two-step procedure involved in 
unit root testing. In the first step, a series  is regressed on the constant and dummy 
variable: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∅𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . … … … … … … … … … … … . . (6.12) 
Where  is the intercept and 𝐷𝑈𝑡 is the structural break dummy, such that 𝐷𝑈𝑡 = 1 if 
t > TB and 0 otherwise, and TB  is the time of the break. In the second step, the residuals 
in Equation 6.11 are analysed by testing the null hypothesis  against the 
alternative hypothesis that  through running an equation of the form: 






Where 𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 is a one-time break dummy such that 𝐷(𝑇𝐵)𝑡 = 1 if 𝑡 = 𝑇𝐵 + 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the series  in Equation 6.12 is stationary 
using the appropriate critical values. 
6.3.1.3 Perron (1997) unit root test (PPURoot) 
The Perron (1997) unit root test is a modified DF test that includes dummy variables 
to cater to exogenous structural breaks in the deterministic components. Therefore, 
the PPURoot test is used in this study for the following reasons: (1) it is efficient in 
data sets with possibilities of structural breaks in both the intercept and slope; and (2) 
it has been used in most recent studies. According to Perron (1997), the breakpoint in 
the data set is endogenously determined. 
Perron and Vogelsang (1992) proposed two diverse forms of structural breaks; the 
Additive Outlier (OA model) and the Innovative Outlier (IO model). The OA model is 
more relevant for series exhibiting an abrupt change in the mean, while the IO model 
captures changes in a more gradual manner through time. Since this study is macro 
in scope, it is, therefore, prudent to use the IO model, since public finance policy-










Based on Perron (1997), the IO model for testing stationarity, which allows for the 
simultaneous effects of time change in both the level and the slope of the series can 
be presented as: 




Where the intercept dummy DUt depicts a change in the level, such that DUt = 1 if t > 
TB and 0 otherwise; DTt (also DT*) is the slope dummy representing a change in the 
slope of the trend function; DT* = t – TB (or DT* = t if t > TB) and 0 otherwise; the 
crash dummy (DTB) = 1 if t = TB +1, and 0 otherwise; and TB is the break date. The 
null hypothesis of Equation 6.14 is that there is a unit root with a break, as the dummy 
variables are incorporated in the regression under the null, against the alternative 
hypothesis that there is a broken trend stationary process. 
In summary, the choice of using three different approaches in unit root testing is based 
on the unique properties inherent in each technique as follows:  
(1) the ADF-GLS test may be run with or without a trend and an unknown mean 
(Elliott et al., 1996);  
(2) the PP test corrects for heteroscedasticity and serial-correlation in the error 
term non-parametrically (Phillip & Perron, 1988); and  
(3) the PPURoot test is efficient in data sets with possibilities of structural breaks 
in both the intercept and slope – which is the case with the current study 
(Perron, 1997).  
Thus, the application of these three unit root tests also provides useful descriptive 
statistics for each variable in the models. 
6.3.2 Autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to the 
cointegration analysis 
Following the determination of the order of integration of the variables, which must be 
at most one, the next step is to test the cointegrating relationship of the variables. 
There are numerous methods for testing cointegration among variables. The most 
commonly used classical cointegration techniques are the residual-based approach 
by Engle and Granger (1987) test, and the Full-Maximum Likelihood (FML) test by 
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Johansen (1991; 1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990) (Majid, 2008). These 
conventional cointegration techniques have been criticised for their low testing power, 
among other shortfalls (Odhiambo, 2008).  
This study employs one of the recent and advanced technique, the ARDL bounds 
testing approach, to investigate whether there exists or not a long-run relationship 
between public debt and economic growth, and between public debt service and 
economic growth in the selected Southern African economies. The adoption of the 
ARDL bounds testing approach in this study over the conventional multivariate 
cointegration techniques is based on the following merits: 
First, the ARDL bounds testing procedure is simple, it allows the cointegration 
relationships to be estimated by ordinary least squares once the lag order of the model 
is identified (Pesaran et al., 2001). Further, according to Laurenceson and Chai 
(2003), the ARDL bounds approach is flexible and can allow the general-to-specific 
modelling framework by continuously varying the number of lags. Second, unlike in 
traditional cointegration testing methods, which use a system of equations, the ARDL 
methodology is parsimonious as it employs only a single reduced form equation 
(Pesaran & Shin, 1999).  
Third, unlike with other conventional cointegration tests that have a restrictive 
assumption on the order of integration of variables, the ARDL approach can use 
variables with a mixture of order of integration up to a maximum of one (Narayan, 
2004). That is, the ARDL method can produce meaningful and reliable parameters as 
long as the regressors are purely integrated of order zero [I(0)] or one [I(1)] or mutually 
cointegrated (Pesaran et al., 2001: 290). Fourth, contrary to the conventional 
cointegration approaches, the ARDL testing procedure provides robust results even in 
small or finite data sample sizes as the case with this study (Solarin & Shahbaz, 2013). 
Fifth, the short- and long-run parameters in the ARDL approach are estimated 
simultaneously, and the parameters are consistent and unbiased, with valid t-statistics 
even when some of the regressors are endogenous (Odhiambo, 2009).  
Given the strengths of the ARDL bounds testing approach, and its increased usage in 
contemporary empirical studies (Odhiambo, 2009; Solarin & Shahbaz, 2013), this 
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procedure is considered the most appropriate and efficient for the analysis of the 
underlying relationships in this study.  
6.3.2.1 Cointegration test 
Following Pesaran et al. (2001), the ARDL representation of Model 1 (equation 6.1) is 
shown in equation 6.15 as follows: 
ARDL representation of Model 1: Impact of aggregate public debt on economic 
growth 

























                 +  𝜎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜎2𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜎3𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜎4𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝜎5𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜎6𝑇𝑂𝑃 + 𝜎7𝑆𝑡−1 
 
             +  𝜎8𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.15) 
                  
Where: 
y  = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth);  
PD  = the stock of public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt);  
I  = share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic 
investment);  
L  = share of the economically active population aged between 15 and 64 years 
in total working-age population (a proxy for labour);  
FB  = fiscal balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for fiscal balance);  
TOP  = the sum of exports and imports as a ratio of GDP (a proxy for trade 
openness); 
S  = share of savings in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic savings);  
TOT  = trade balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for terms of trade); 
𝛼0  = the intercept;  
𝛼1 − 𝛼8 = the short-run regression coefficients;  
𝜎1 −  𝜎8 = the long-run regression coefficients; 
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Δ = the difference operator; 
n = the maximum lag length;  
μ1  = the white-noise error term;  
t  = the period in years.  
The ARDL model (equation 6.15) is estimated for Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. 
The initial stage in the ARDL bounds testing methodology is to run Equation 6.15 using 
ordinary least squares, where the null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested against 
the alternative hypothesis of cointegration.  
𝐻0:  𝜎1 = 𝜎2 = 𝜎3 = 𝜎4 = 𝜎5 = 𝜎6 = 𝜎7 = 𝜎8 → no cointegration; 
𝐻1:  𝜎1 ≠ 𝜎2 ≠ 𝜎3 ≠ 𝜎4 ≠ 𝜎5 ≠ 𝜎6 ≠ 𝜎7 ≠ 𝜎8 → cointegration. 
The second step involves the use of the joint F-statistic, based on two asymptotic 
critical values; a lower value which assumes that the regressors are integrated of order 
zero [I(0)] and an upper value which assumes that regressors are purely integrated of 
order one [I(1)] (Pesaran et al., 2001; Pesaran & Pesaran, 1997). If the computed F-
statistic is above the upper critical value, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected, irrespective of the orders of integration; while the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration cannot be rejected if the F-statistic falls below the lower bounds critical 
value. Finally, if the F-statistic falls between the lower and upper bounds, then the 
cointegration result becomes inconclusive (Pesaran et al., 2001; Narayan & Smyth, 
2008). 
6.3.2.2 Coefficient estimation 
After the verification of the cointegration relationship, the second step is the estimation 
of long-run coefficients and setting up of the error correction model to ascertain the 
adjustment coefficient. The study prefers the model that has fewest parameter to 
estimate, provided that each one of the candidate models is correctly specified, that 
is, the most parsimonious model of the set. Two information criteria for robustness 
check, that is, Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), were applied to determine the optimal lag length (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2004: 
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676; Akaike, 1973; Schwarz, 1978). The ARDL procedure computes (𝜌 + 1)𝑘 number 
of estimations so as to get the best lags for each variable, where 𝜌  is the highest lag 
length used and k is the number of variables in the equation (Pesaran et al., 2001). 
According to Cheung and Lai (1993), both the AIC and BIC methods perform well in 
finite samples provided that the true error structure has a finite and autoregressive 
representation.  
In the ARDL framework, the most diagnostic and model stability tests are performed 
using the cumulative sum of recursive residual (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of 
squares of recursive residual (CUSUMQ). The purpose of carrying out these 
diagnostic tests, as well as stability tests, is to ensure that the estimated models are 
statistically robust. 
The CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests require that the observations to which they are 
applied possess a natural ordering index (Brown et al., 1975). According to Brown et 
al. (1975), the null hypothesis in both tests is that the regression coefficients are 
constant over the natural order, against the alternative hypothesis that they are not, 
implying that the parameter(s) is (are) not constant.  
In order to detect parameter changes (structural breaks), the analyses are performed 
with the recursive residuals (Brown et al., 1975). When the null hypothesis of 
parameter constancy is correct, then the recursive residuals have an expected value 
of zero (Brown et al., 1975). To check for deviations from the expected value of zero, 
the CUSUM and CUSUMQ of recursive residuals are plotted against the order 
variable. Symmetric confidence lines above and below the zero value allow definitions 
of a confidence band beyond which the CUSUM and CUSUMQ plots should not pass, 
for a selected significance level, if the regression parameters are stable (Brown et al., 
1975). The Microfit 5.01 package applied in the study selects the 5% significance level 
by default. Finally, in both the CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests, the points at which the 
plots cross the confidence lines give some indication of value(s) of the ordering 
variable associated with parameter change (Brown et al., 1975). 




ECM for Model 1: Impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth 
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              +  𝜔1𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.16) 
Where: 
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 = the error term lagged once; and 
𝜔1  = the coefficient of the error term.  
 
All other variables and parameters are as defined in equation 6.15. 
Theoretically, the coefficient of the error term, 𝜔1, is expected to be statistically 
significant, lying between -1 and 0. The error correction model of Model 1 (equation 
6.16) runs for each of the three study countries with an established cointegration 
relationship. The same procedure for the estimation of Model 1 is applied to the 
dynamic impact Models 2 and 3. As such, the ARDL presentation of Model 2 and 
Model 3, and their respective error correction models are as follows: 
ARDL representation of Model 2: Relative impact of domestic and foreign public 
on economic growth 
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𝜌1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜌2𝐷𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜌3𝐹𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜌4𝐼𝑡−1 
+𝜌5𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝜌6𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜌7𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜌8𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜌9𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡 
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… … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.17) 
ECM for Model 2: Relative impact of domestic and foreign public on economic 
growth 
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𝑛
𝑖=0
𝜔2𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . (6.18) 
Where:  
DPD = the stock of domestic public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for domestic 
public debt);  
FPD  = the stock of foreign public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for foreign public 
debt);  
𝜆0  = the intercept;  
𝜆1 − 𝜆9  = the short-run regression coefficients;  
𝜌1 −  𝜌9 = the long-run regression coefficients; 
Δ = the difference operator; 
n = the maximum lag length;  
μ2  = the white-noise error term;  
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 = the error term lagged once; 
𝜔2  = the coefficient of the error term; and  
t  = the period in years.  
All other variables are as defined in equation 6.15. 
 
ARDL representation of Model 3: Impact of public debt service on economic 
growth 


























                 + ∅1𝑦𝑡−1 + ∅2𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + ∅3𝐼𝑡−1 + ∅4𝐿𝑡−1 + ∅5𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + ∅6𝑇𝑂𝑃 + ∅7𝑆𝑡−1 
 
             + ∅8𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.19) 
 
ECM for Model 3: Impact of public debt service on economic growth 
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              +  𝜔3𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.20) 
Where:  
PDS = the stock of public debt service as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt 
service);  
𝜆0  = the intercept;  
𝛽1 − 𝛽8  = the short-run regression coefficients;  
𝜙1 −  𝜙8 = the long-run regression coefficients; 
Δ = the difference operator; 
n = the maximum lag length;  
μ2  = the white-noise error term;  
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 = the error term lagged once; 
𝜔3  = the coefficient of the error term; and 
t  = the period in years.  
All other variables are as defined in equation 6.15. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the error terms, 𝜔2 and 𝜔3, are expected to be statistically 
significant, lying between -1 and 0. The error correction models for Model 1, Model 2 
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and Model 3, are run for each of the three study countries with an established 
cointegration relationship. 
6.3.3 Model 4: Multivariate Granger-causality test 
Before estimating the Granger-causality models, the study tests the cointegration 
among the variable in the causality models. The presence of cointegration between 
public debt and economic growth, and between public debt service and economic 
growth signifies the existence of Granger-causality at least in one direction. However, 
cointegration does not specify the direction of causality between the variables. Tests 
are required to establish the direction of causality between public debt and economic 
growth, and between public debt service and economic growth. The short-run causality 
is examined using the joint significance F-statistic of the lagged explanatory variables 
while the long-run Granger-causality is tested using the t-statistic on the lagged error 
term which must be negative and statistically significant (Shahbaz et al., 2011; 
Narayan & Smyth, 2009; Odhiambo, 2009).  
Model 4a: ECM-based cointegration model: Public debt and economic growth 
A system of cointegration equations associated with the multivariate Granger-causality 
models for Model 4a are in equations 6.21 to 6.24: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 +   ∑ 𝛼1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛼2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0







              +  𝛼5𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝛼6𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … (6.21) 
∆𝑃𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 +   ∑ 𝛽1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝛽2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







              +  𝛽5𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝛽6𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝟕𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜇2𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.22) 
∆𝐹𝐵𝑡 = 𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝛿1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝛿2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0







               +  𝛿5𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝛿6𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛿7𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛿8𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.23) 
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∆𝑆𝑡 = 𝜌0 +   ∑ 𝜌1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜌2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0







               +  𝜌5𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝜌6𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜌7𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜌8𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜇4𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … (6.24) 
Where: 
y  = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth);  
PD  = the stock of public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt);  
FB  = fiscal balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for fiscal balance);  
S  = the share of savings in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic savings); 
 𝛼0, 𝛽0, 𝛿0,  𝜌0 = the intercepts; 
𝛼1 −  𝛼4, 𝛽1 − 𝛽4, 𝛿1 − 𝛿4, 𝜌1 − 𝜌4 = the short-run regression coefficients; 
 𝛼5 −  𝛼8, 𝛽5 − 𝛽8, 𝛿5 − 𝛿8,  𝜌5 − 𝜌8 = the long-run regression coefficients; 
𝜇1 −  𝜇4 = the mutually independent white-noise residuals; 
Δ = the difference operator; 
n = the maximum lag length; and  
t  = the period in years.  
The ECM-ARDL cointegration models, Model 4a (equations 6.21 – 6.24), are run on 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
ECM-based Granger-causality model: Public debt and economic growth (Model 
4a) 
Following the work of Donayre and Taivan (2017), Kumar and Woo (2010) and Afonso 
(1993), the ECM-based multivariate Granger-causality models in this study are 
presented in equations 6.25 to 6.28: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 +   ∑ 𝛼1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛼2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          
                   + 𝛼9𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇1𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.25) 
 
∆𝑃𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 +   ∑ 𝛽1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          




∆𝐹𝐵𝑡 = 𝛿0 +  ∑ 𝛿1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛿2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          
                   + 𝛿9𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇3𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.27) 
 
∆𝑆𝑡 = 𝜌0 +   ∑ 𝜌1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜌2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          
                   + 𝜌9𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜇4𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.28) 
 
Where: 
y  = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth);  
PD  = the stock of public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt);  
FB  = fiscal balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for fiscal balance);  
S  = share of savings in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic savings); 
 𝛼0, 𝛽0, 𝛿0,  𝜌0 = the intercepts; 
𝛼1 −  𝛼4, 𝛽1 − 𝛽4, 𝛿1 − 𝛿4, 𝜌1 − 𝜌4 = the short-run regression coefficients; 
𝛼9, 𝛽9, 𝛿9, 𝜌9  = the coefficients of 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1; 
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 = the error correction term lagged once; 
𝜇1 −  𝜇4 = the mutually independent white-noise residuals; 
Δ = the difference operator; 
n = the maximum lag length; and  
t  = the period in years.  
The ECM-based Granger-causality models (equations 6.25 to 6.28) are run on 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
6.3.3.2: Model 4b: ECM-based cointegration model: Public debt service and 
economic growth 
A system of cointegration equations associated with the multivariate Granger-causality 
models for Model 4b are expressed in equations 6.29 to 6.32: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝜙0 +  ∑ 𝜙1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜙2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0







              +  𝜙5𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝜙6𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜙7𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜙8𝑆𝑡−1 + 1𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … . (6.29) 
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∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝜓0 +  ∑ 𝜓1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜓2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







              +  𝜓5𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝜓6𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝟕𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜓8𝑆𝑡−1 + 2𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … (6.30) 
∆𝐹𝐵𝑡 = 𝜐0 +   ∑ 𝜐1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜐2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0







               +  𝜐5𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝜐6𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜐7𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜐8𝑆𝑡−1 + 3𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … … (6.31) 
∆𝑆𝑡 = 𝜂0 +   ∑ 𝜂1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜂2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0







               +  𝜂5𝑦𝑡−1 +   𝜂6𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝜂7𝐹𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜂8𝑆𝑡−1 + 4𝑡 … … … … … … … … … … . . (6.32) 
 
Where: 
y  = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth);  
PDS  = the stock of public debt service as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt 
service);  
FB  = fiscal balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for fiscal balance);  
S  = share of savings in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic savings); 
 𝜙0, 𝜓0, 𝜐0, 𝜂0  = the intercepts; 
𝜙1 −  𝜙4, 𝜓1 − 𝜓4, 𝜐1 − 𝜐4,  𝜂1 − 𝜂4  = the short-run regression coefficients; 
 𝜙5 −  𝜙8, 𝜓5 − 𝜓8, 𝜐5 − 𝜐8, 𝜂5 − 𝜂8 = the long-run regression coefficients; 
1 −  4  = the mutually independent white-noise residuals; 
Δ = the difference operator; 
n = the maximum lag length; and  
t  = the period in years.  
The ECM-ARDL cointegration models, Model 4b (equations 6.29 to 6.32), are run on 





ECM-based Granger-causality model: Public debt service and economic growth 
(Model 4b) 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝜙0 +  ∑ 𝜙1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜙2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          
                   + 𝜙9𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 1𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (6.33) 
 
∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡 = 𝜓0 +  ∑ 𝜓1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜓2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          
                   + 𝜓9𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 2𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.34) 
∆𝐹𝐵𝑡 = 𝜐0 +   ∑ 𝜐1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜐2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          
                   + 𝜐9𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 3𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … (6.35) 
 
∆𝑆𝑡 = 𝜂0 +   ∑ 𝜂1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜂2𝑖∆𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1







          
                   + 𝜂9𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 + 4𝑡  … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . (6.36) 
 
Where: 
y  = annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth);  
PD  = the stock of public debt as a share of GDP (a proxy for public debt);  
FB  = fiscal balance as a share of GDP (a proxy for fiscal balance);  
S  = the share of savings in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic savings); 
 𝜙0, 𝜓0, 𝜐0,   𝜂0   = the intercepts; 
𝜙1 −  𝜙4, 𝜓1 − 𝜓4, 𝜐1 − 𝜐4, 𝜂1 − 𝜂4  = the short-run regression coefficients; 
𝜙9, 𝜓9, 𝜐9,   𝜂9    = the coefficients of 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1; 
𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 = the error correction term lagged once; 
1 −  4  = the mutually independent white-noise residuals; 
Δ = the difference operator; 
n = the maximum lag length; and  
t  = the period in years.  
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The ECM-based Granger-causality models are run on Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa. 
6.4 Data source and definition of variables  
6.4.1 Data source 
This study takes a quantitative research approach, and it uses annual time-series data 
to develop all analytical models. The study period stretches from 1970 to 2017. The 
primary source of data for all the three Southern African study countries was the World 
Bank Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2018a). The data sources for 
domestic and foreign public debt were the central bank for each respective study 
country. 
6.4.2 Definition of variables  
The annual growth rate of real GDP per capita is a proxy for economic growth (y) in 
this study. The annual growth rate of real GDP per capita is dynamic and extensively 
used by contemporary researchers across the world. This variable is an indicator of 
how an economy is performing in terms of productivity, consumption and investment. 
Consequently, it defines the government’s borrowing requirements and its ability to 
pay back debts and invest in industrial sectors. Thus, the annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita summarises numerous critical country-specific economic and welfare 
information. Several previous studies, such as IMF (2020), Eberhardt (2019), 
Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015), and Kourtellos et al. (2013) used the annual growth 
rate of real GDP per capita as a measure of economic growth. 
Public debt (PD) in this study measures the level of the government’s gross domestic 
and foreign indebtedness. This variable is an indicator of both the flow and usage of 
public finances. Following Kumhof and Tanner (2005), public debt is a summation of 
government financial contingency liabilities (domestic and foreign), largely debt 
securities and loans. Domestic public debt (DPD) includes government financial 
contingency liabilities denominated in the local currency, while foreign public debt 
(FPD) denotes government financial contingency liabilities denominated in foreign 
currency. Public debt service (PDS) defines all financial expenditures made by the 
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government towards contracted monetary contingency obligations (IMF, 2003c). Both 
public debt stocks and public debt service payments have been used in empirical 
studies to assess the economy’s macroeconomic and financial stability (Presbitero, 
2012a; 2012b; IMF, 2010b).  
In addition to the public debt (PD), domestic public debt (DPD), foreign public debt 
(FPD), public debt service (PDS), and an annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(y) variables, six control variables were added in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3. 
These additional variables are gross domestic investment (I), labour force participation 
rate (L), fiscal balance (FB) and trade openness (TOP), gross domestic savings (S), 
and terms of trade (TOT). Finally, in Model 4a, and Model 4b, besides the annual 
growth rate of real GDP per capita (y), public debt (PD) and public debt service (PDS), 
two mediating variables were added, fiscal balance (FB) and gross domestic savings 
(S). The description of the variables used in Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 
is presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Summary of variables used in the study 
Notation Variable description 
y Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita (a proxy for economic growth) 
PD Share of public debt in GDP (a proxy for public debt) 
DPD Share of domestic public debt in GDP (a proxy for domestic public debt) 
FPD Share of foreign public debt in GDP (a proxy for foreign public debt) 
I Share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP (a proxy for gross domestic 
investment) 
L 
Share of economically active population aged between 15 and 64 years in 
total working-age population (a proxy for labour) 
FB Share of fiscal balance in GDP (a proxy of fiscal balance) 
TOP Sum of imports and exports as a ratio of GDP (a proxy for trade openness) 
PDS Share of public debt service payments in GDP (a proxy for public debt service) 
S Share of gross domestic savings in GDP (a proxy for savings)  




This chapter discussed the methodological framework employed in this study to 
examine the impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth; the relative impact 
of domestic and foreign public debt on economic growth; the impact of public debt 
service on economic growth; the causal relationship between public debt and 
economic growth; and the causal relationship between public debt service and 
economic growth. The chapter also reflected on the estimation techniques used in the 
study. The theoretical and empirical model specifications and those underpinning each 
model were presented in the second section of this chapter. The estimation techniques 
used were discussed in the third section, while data sources and definitions of 




ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the econometric analysis and the empirical findings from the 
three selected Southern African countries, that is, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, based on the specified estimation techniques and empirical models discussed 
in Chapter Six. The study utilises the ARDL bounds testing approach to examine the 
dynamic impact of both aggregate public debt and public debt service on economic 
growth, as well as the relative impact of domestic and foreign public debt on economic 
growth. The study also employs the ECM-based Granger-causality model to examine 
the causality between aggregate public debt and economic growth, and between 
public debt service and economic growth in the three study countries – Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa.  
 
In this respect, the research uses four empirical models – Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 
and Model 4. Model 1 examines the impact of aggregate public debt (PD) on economic 
growth (y). Model 2 investigates the relative impact of domestic public debt (DPD) and 
foreign public debt (FPD) on economic growth (y). Model 3 explores the effect of public 
debt service (PDS) on economic growth (y). In the three models, Model 1, Model 2, 
and Model 3, six control variables were added, namely, investment (I), labour (L), fiscal 
balance (FB), trade openness (TOP), savings (S), and terms of trade (TOT).  
Finally, Model 4 has two sections. Model 4a tests the Granger-causality between 
aggregate public debt and economic growth and Model 4b examines the Granger-
causality between public debt service and economic growth within a multivariate 
setting, with FB and S as the intermittent variables. To this end, the multivariate 
Granger-causality models (Model 4a and Model 4b) are such that multivariate Model 
4a consists of PD, y, FB, and S; while the multivariate Model 4b consists of PDS, y, 
FB and S. 
Chapter 7 has five major sections. Section 7.2 analyses unit root tests for all variables 
in Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. Section 7.3 covers the econometric analysis and empirical 
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findings from the dynamic impact models – Models 1, 2 and 3. The section is sub-
divided into four subsections for the three study countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa: 
 
▪ 7.3.1 presents the econometric analysis and empirical findings of Model 1; 
▪ 7.3.2 presents the econometric analysis and empirical findings of Model 2;  
▪ 7.3.3 presents the econometric analysis and empirical findings of Model 3; and 
▪ 7.3.4 gives a summary of the econometric analysis and empirical findings of the 
dynamic impact models.  
Section 7.4 gives the econometric analysis and the empirical findings from the 
dynamic Granger-causality model – Model 4 – for the three study countries, starting 
with Zambia, followed by Zimbabwe, lastly South Africa. Section 7.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
7.2. Unit root results for variables in Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 (all study countries)  
Before undertaking the empirical analysis, it is important to establish the order of 
integration in the analysed series to ensure that no variable is integrated of order two 
or higher. Accordingly, the study uses three different unit root tests, namely, the 
Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Square (DF-GLS), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Perron, 
1997 (PPURoot). In the three unit root tests, the null hypothesis is that the time-series 
contains a unit root, that is, it is nonstationary, and the alternative hypothesis is that it 
is stationary (Gujarati, 2004: 815). The computed absolute value of the statistic is 
compared with 1%, 5% and 10% critical values (Gujarati, 2004: 816). The decision 
rule is that if the computed absolute value of the statistic is more (less) than the critical 
values, then the time-series is stationary (not stationary) (Gujarati, 2004: 816). The 
summarised results of stationarity tests for all the analysed series are presented in 





Table 7.1(a): DF-GLS stationarity results of all variables – Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa  







ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE SOUTH AFRICA 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all variables 
in first difference 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all 
variables in first 
difference 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all 




With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend 
y -3.295*** -6.219*** - - -3.656*** -4.201*** - - -4.928*** -4.946*** - - 
PD -1.890* -2.616 - -6.131*** -0.377 -2.614 -6.309*** -6.511*** -1.692* -1.921 - -5.444*** 
PDS -1.757 -3.739 -8.682*** -8.744*** -1.681* -1.809 - -7.316*** -1.336 -2.279 -5.131*** -6.500*** 
DPD -0.357 -1.402 -6.029*** -6.620*** -3.132** -3.668** - - -1.008 -2.273 -2.680*** -6.793*** 
FPD -1.318 -1.383 -5.424*** -5.538*** -1.451 -2.350 -7.031*** -7.198*** -1.779 -2.626 -4.203*** -4.573*** 
I -1.078 -1.394 -6.476*** -6.771*** -2.480** -2.605 - -5.933*** -0.815 -1.702 -5.370*** -4.793*** 
L -1.615 -2.039 -1.866* -2.900* -0.120 -3.187** -4.390*** - -1.447 -3.294** -4.977*** - 
FB -3.267*** -5.167*** - - -2.626*** -2.127 - -5.482*** -2.648*** -2.794 - -6.537*** 
TOP -2.045** -2.874 - -6.307*** -1.244 -2.205 -7.291*** -8.327*** -1.964** -2.315 - -7.251*** 
S -1.538 -1.982 -5.953*** -7.935*** -0.879 -1.996 -9.737*** -9.954*** -1.279 -1.765 -4.932*** -5.566*** 
TOT -1.513 -3.263** -4.570*** - -1.244 -2.062 -6.563*** -6.648*** -1.665* -2.618 - -6.643*** 














Phillips-Perron (PP) Test 
ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE SOUTH AFRICA 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all variables 
in first difference 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all 
variables in first 
difference 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all 




With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend 
y -5.592*** -6.116*** - - -4.444*** -4.378*** - - -4.739*** -4.683*** - - 
PD -1.857 -2.689 -7.378*** -7.442*** -1.077 -2.720 -6.577*** -6.516*** -1.457 -1.533 -5.152*** -5.316*** 
PDS -1.752 -3.673** -13.435*** - -1.735 -1.937 -7.166*** -7.264*** -2.930* -2.878 - -7.056*** 
DPD -1.096 -1.367 -6.748*** -6.711*** -3.098** -3.814** - - -1.964 -2.363 -7.459*** -7.392*** 
FPD -1.521 -1.451 -5.239*** -5.860*** -1.826 -2.241 -7.687*** -8.146*** -1.394 -2.195 -4.464*** -4.389*** 
I -1.065 -1.436 -6.576*** -6.819*** -2.454 -2.606 -5.865*** -5.777*** -1.477 -1.477 -5.923*** -5.859*** 
L -1.702 -0.164 -5.930*** -7.617*** -1.033 -2.157 -4.300*** -4.274*** -2.641* -3.247* - - 
FB -3.302** -5.204*** - - -2.150 -2.126 -5.396*** -5.297*** -2.772* -2.754 - -6.703*** 
TOP -2.888** -2.999 - -10.254*** -1.466 -2.034 -8.780*** -8.868*** -2.028 -2.207 -7.651*** -7.552*** 
S -2.714* -2.862 - -10.161*** -1.301 -2.973 -10.096*** -9.980*** -1.396 -2.075 -5.842*** -5.771*** 
TOT -3.532** -3.272* - - -2.258 -2.290 -6.617*** -6.573*** -1.924 -2.404 -6.670*** -7.652*** 















Perron, 1997 (PPURoot) Test 
ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE SOUTH AFRICA 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all variables 
in first difference 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all variables 
in first difference 
Stationarity of all 
variables in levels 
Stationarity of all 




With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend Without 
trend 
With trend 
y -6.831*** -6.917*** - - -6.169*** -6.429*** - - -5.578** -5.588** - - 
PD -4.194 -4.157 -8.257*** -8.169*** -4.555 -5.034 -7.629*** -7.938*** -2.319 -2.781 -6.072*** -6.006*** 
PDS -4.590 -4.614 -6.444*** -6.368*** -4.532 -4.515 -8.187*** -8.575*** -3.902 -3.769 -7.688*** -7.636*** 
DPD -4.183 -4.045 -9.735*** -9.748*** -5.499** -5.388* - - -3.478 -2.879 -5.470** -6.157** 
FPD -3.335 -4.748 -8.244*** -8.345*** -7.040*** -5.551* - - -4.646 -4.488 -5.879** -5.798** 
I -6.979*** -6.865*** - - -3.516 -3.517 -5.660** -5.408* -3.425 -3.419 -6.346*** -6.423*** 
L -3.860 -3.668 -5.361* -5.480* -3.586 -3.691 -5.163* -5.448* -4.057 -4.306 -6.910*** -8.300*** 
FB -5.802** -8.534*** - - -4.259 -3.515 -6.327*** -6.725*** -3.340 -3.274 -7.596*** -7.253*** 
TOP -3.084 -3.292 -6.812*** -6.787*** -3.781 -4.000 -9.393*** -9.558*** -3.584 -3.754 -7.766*** -7.780*** 
S -4.864 -5.109 -8.906*** -9.087*** -5.217* -4.889 - -10.555*** -3.310 -3.491 -7.049*** -7.508*** 
TOT -6.897*** -7.717*** - - -3.451 -3.225 -7.608*** -7.525*** -4.208 -4.197 -7.286*** -7.941*** 




Tables 7.1(a) to 7.1(c) shows that the stationarity of the series varies across the three 
study countries depending on the stationarity testing method used, that is, the DF-GLS 
(Table 7.1(a)), PP (Table 7.1(b)) and PPURoot (Table 7.1(c)), and whether a trend is 
incorporated or not. The lag lengths in DF-GLS, PP and PPURoot were automatically 
selected by SIC, Newey-West bandwidth and PPU Root test truncation lag techniques, 
respectively.  
Overall, however, in Tables 7.1(a) to 7.1(c), all the variables are stationary in levels 
[I(0)] or in first difference [I(1)]. These stationarity results validate the appropriateness 
of the ARDL bounds estimation technique to test for cointegration among all 
regression variables in the ARDL models using ordinary least squares estimation. The 
study uses the bounds F-statistic test to check for an existing long-run relationship 
between economic growth and its determinants in the three study countries. The long-
run relationship of all the study series is ascertained when lagged variables in levels 
are statistically significant. The study, therefore, proceeds to test whether the variables 
are cointegrated or not. If cointegrated, the estimation of long- and short-run 
regression coefficients of each ARDL model will follow. 
7.3 Econometric analysis and empirical results for impact models – ARDL 
bounds test 
7.3.1 Econometric analysis for Model 1: Impact of aggregate public debt on 
economic growth  
7.3.1.1 Cointegration test for Model 1  
Since the stationarity results of all the variables in Model 1 for the three study countries 
are integrated of order 0 [I(0)] or 1 [I(1)], the study tests the possibility of cointegration 
among the variables used using the ARDL bounds test. The results of the ARDL 
























Asymptotic critical values (unrestricted intercept and no trend) 
Pesaran et al. (2001: 300) 
critical values 
[Table CI(iii) Case III] 
10% 5% 1% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
2.03 3.13 2.32 3.50 2.96 4.26 
Note: ** and *** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
In Table 7.2, the calculated F-statistics in the three study countries is 4.614, 5.291 and 
3.641 for Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively. These F-statistic values 
were compared with the Pesaran et al. (2001: 300) asymptotic critical values. The 
calculated F-statistics results in the three study countries are above the Pesaran et 
al.’s (2001) upper bound critical values at 1%, 1% and 5% significance levels, 
respectively. Based on these results, the study rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration in all the study countries. That is, the results establish that a long-run 
level relationship exists between economic growth conditioned on public debt, 
investment, labour, fiscal balance, trade openness, savings and terms of trade.  
7.3.1.2 Coefficient estimation for Model 1 
The study uses the ARDL approach by Pesaran et al. (2001) to estimate the short- 
and long-run regression coefficients of variables in Model 1 in the three study countries 
– Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This study selected the optimal lag lengths for 
each variable in the estimated models using either the BIC or AIC. According to 
Cheung and Lai (1993), the model with the lowest standard error of regression, the 
lowest residual sum of squares and the lowest mean of the dependent variable is 
selected. Accordingly, based on the robustness of the results, the study selected for 
Model 1: AIC-based ARDL (2, 1, 2, 0, 3, 0, 3, 2) for Zambia; BIC-based ARDL (2, 1, 
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0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1) for Zimbabwe; and AIC-based ARDL (3, 3, 1, 3, 3, 1, 3, 3) for South 
Africa. Table 7.3 presents the empirical long- and short-run coefficients of the selected 





























Table 7.3: Estimation of long-run and short-run coefficients for Model 1 (all the study countries) 
Panel A: Long-run coefficients (Dependent variable is y)  
 Zambia Zimbabwe South Africa 
Regressors Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] 
C -12.090*** -2.932    [0.008] -56.458** -2.680     [0.011]      86.627** 2.724     [0.014] 
PD 0.019* 1.755     [0.091]     -0.203* -1.742     [0.091] -0.301* -1.809    [0.083] 
I 0.249* 1.888     [0.071] 0.477** 2.227      [0.033] 0.194* 1.791     [0.094] 
L 0.089* 1.725     [0.095] 0.579* 1.997      [0.054] -0.294** -2.448    [0.026] 
FB -0.446* -1.707    [0.099] -0.007* -1.845     [0.087] -0.072** -2.613    [0.018] 
TOP -0.334** -2.534    [0.018] 0.160 1.285      [0.208] 0.160* 2.064     [0.055] 
S 0.537* 1.924     [0.066] 0.245 1.193      [0.241] 0.177* 1.988     [0.056] 








Panel B: Short-run coefficients (Dependent variable is ∆y) 
 
Zambia Zimbabwe South Africa 
Regressors Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] 
∆y(1) 0.216* 1.770    [0.087]    0.112** 2.501     [0.026] 0.243* 1.912     [0.069] 
∆y(2) - - - - 0.264 1.377     [0.181] 
∆PD 0.042* 2.015    [0.053] -0.596*** -4.669    [0.000] -0.049 -0.984    [0.339] 
∆PD(1) - - - - 0.090 0.614     [0.545] 
∆PD(2) - - - - -0.224* -1.900    [0.070] 
∆I 0.273* 1.787    [0.086] 0.439* 1.966     [0.057] 0.567** 2.114     [0.045] 
∆I(1) 0.223* 1.855    [0.078]  - - - - 
∆L 0.823 1.614    [0.117] -0.526 -0.758    [0.454] -0.183 -0.326    [0.747] 
∆L(1) - - - - 0.535 0.951     [0.351] 
∆L(2) - - - - 0.873 1.570     [0.130] 
∆FB -0.076 -0.743    [0.463] -0.006*** -3.966    [0.000] 0.068 0.305     [0.763] 
∆FB(1) 0.182 1.337     [0.191] - - -0.073*** -3.005    [0.006] 
∆FB(2) -0.181** -2.050    [0.049] - - -0.561** -2.442    [0.022] 
∆TOP -0.322** -2.513    [0.018] 0.147 1.223     [0.229] -0.091 -0.920    [0.367] 
∆S 0.190 1.237     [0.226] 0.225 1.277     [0.210] 0.330 1.578     [0.128] 
∆S(1) -0.054 -0.353    [0.727] - - 0.318* 1.803     [0.084] 
∆S(2) 0.200* 1.808     [0.081] - - 0.419** 2.565     [0.017] 
∆TOT 0.382 0.842     [0.406] 0.075 0.255     [0.800] 0.138 0.773     [0.447] 
∆TOT(1) -0.883* -1.955    [0.060] - - 0.364 1.460     [0.157] 
∆TOT(2) - - - - 0.052 0.338     [0.738] 
ECM(-1) -0.263*** -5.481    [0.000] -0.519*** -6.471    [0.000] -0.341*** -4.126    [0.000] 
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SE of Regression 
Residual Sum of Squares 
Akaike Info. Criterion 
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion 
0.872 
0.713 






























Empirical results of Model 1 for Zambia 
The long-run empirical results of Model 1 for Zambia reported in Table 7.3 Panel A, 
indicate that aggregate public debt (PD) is positive and statistically significant. This 
implies that an increase in total public debt leads to a rise in economic growth (y) in 
Zambia, in the long run. The finding suggests that public debt in Zambia has, on 
average, largely been used to expand the tradable sector. In other words, the results 
suggest that a considerable amount of public debt funded productive expenditure, 
hence impacting positively on economic activity.  
The adoption of stringent expenditure, financial, economic and debt reforms since the 
late 1990s might have helped to reduce and, in some instances, maintain sustainable 
public debt levels and channel new debt into productive sectors (IMF, 2017a; MOF, 
2014a; GRZ, 2007; World Bank, 2001a). For instance, in 2004, the country 
implemented several private investment growth initiatives under the Private Sector 
Development Reform Program (PSDRP), while newly contracted government debt 
was committed to productive expenditures, such as energy sector expansion and 
transport sector development (GRZ, 2017a; 2006b; 2006c). This finding, although 
contrary to the study expectations, is not unique to Zambia, and compares favourably 
with other previous studies on the subject, such as Teles and Mussolini (2014); Dreger 
and Reimers (2013), and DeLong and Summers (2012), among others.   
The long-run results of other variables for Model 1 presented in Table 7.3 Panel A 
reveal that the coefficients of investment (I), labour (L) and savings are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that these three variables positively impact 
economic growth in Zambia, in the long run. Contrary to the study expectations, the 
coefficients of fiscal balance (FB) and trade openness (TOP) are negative and 
statistically significant, implying that fiscal balance and trade openness negatively 
impact economic growth in Zambia, in the long run. The incessant budgetary deficits 
since the 1980s and increased inflows of finished products might have contributed to 
the noticeable negative impact on long-run economic growth in Zambia (GRZ, 2015b). 
Finally, the coefficient of terms of trade (TOT) is statistically insignificant. 
The short-run results reported in Table 7.3 Panel B show that the coefficient of public 
debt (∆PD) is positive and statistically significant. This implies that a rise in public debt 
in Zambia in the current period can lead to an increase in economic growth (y) in the 
short run. This finding, although contrary to the study expectations, is not unique to 
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Zambia, as some research also confirms a positive impact of aggregate public debt 
on economic growth in the short run (Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2018).  
The short-run results for other variables indicate that the coefficient of economic 
growth (Δy(1)) is positive and statistically significant, implying that economic growth 
lagged one period can positively influence current economic growth in Zambia. Also, 
the coefficients of investment [∆I and ∆I(1)] and savings (∆S(2)) are positive as 
expected and statistically significant. This finding entails that changes in investment in 
the current and one past period, as well as changes in savings lagged two periods, 
can lead to an increase in economic growth in Zambia in the short run. Further, the 
short-run results reveal that a change in labour (∆L) has no significant immediate effect 
on economic growth in Zambia. 
Also, the short-run results of Model 1 show that the coefficients of fiscal balance 
(∆FB(2)) and terms of trade (∆TOT(1)) are unexpectedly negative and statistically 
significant. This suggests that changes in fiscal balance and terms of trade in the past 
periods negatively impact economic growth in Zambia, in the short run. The result 
implies that the adverse global economic developments during the study period could 
have eroded the central government revenues, particularly from mineral taxation and 
commodity exports (see also McCulloch et al., 2000a). It is also possible that the swift 
rise in both fiscal deficits and debt-financed recurrent government spending could 
have a possible crowding out effect on productive expenditures and private sector 
investment, as suggested in UNCTAD (2014). Furthermore, the short-run coefficient 
of trade openness (∆TOP) is negative and statistically significant, implying that an 
increase in trade openness in the current period negatively impact economic growth 
in Zambia, in the short run. Finally, as expected, the error correction term ECM(-1) is 
found to be negative and statistically significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a 
shock to the Zambian economy, economic growth adjusts to equilibrium at a rate of 
26.3% per annum.  
Empirical analysis of Model 1 for Zimbabwe 
The long-run results of Model 1 [Panel A] show that the coefficient of public debt (PD) 
is negative and statistically significant, implying that an increase in public debt in 
Zimbabwe can lead to a decrease in economic growth rate (y), in the long run. This 
finding can partly suggest that public debt in Zimbabwe could have caused credit 
rationing and high interest rates in the economy, resulting in a long-term crowding out 
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effect on private sector investments (RBZ, 2014: 40; GoZ, 2018b; IMF, 2017b). Also, 
the high stocks of debt in this country may have contributed to the subdued 
entrepreneurial activities due to greater economic uncertainties, arising primarily from 
unpredictable fiscal and monetary policy interventions (IMF, 2014e).  
Other long-run results of Model 1 for Zimbabwe reported in Table 7.3 [Panel A] indicate 
that the coefficients of investment (I) and labour (L) are positive and statistically 
significant as expected. This implies that these investment and labour have a positive 
impact on economic growth in Zimbabwe, in the long run. However, the coefficients of 
fiscal balance (FB) and terms of trade (TOT) are negative and statistically significant, 
implying that a rise in any of these two variables depresses economic growth in 
Zimbabwe, in the long run. The uncontrolled increase in domestic interest rates and 
numerous tax policy revisions and reversals during the period 1980-2017, may be 
attributed to the financing of these fiscal deficits, which were funded predominantly 
through public borrowing and money printing (Jones, 2011). In addition, the 
coefficients of trade openness (TOP) and savings (S) were statistically insignificant. 
The short-run results of Model 1 for Zimbabwe reveal that the coefficient of public debt 
(∆PD) is negative and statistically significant as expected. This implies that an increase 
in aggregate public debt in Zimbabwe leads to a reduction in economic growth rate, in 
the short run. Other short-run results show that economic growth (Δy(1)) and 
investment (∆I) have a positive relationship with economic growth. The results further 
reveal that the coefficient of fiscal balance (∆FB) is unexpectedly negative and 
statistically significant. This implies that changes in fiscal balance in the current period 
impeded economic growth in Zimbabwe, in the short run. This outcome may suggest 
that either the central government expenditures are not used in high-return productive 
activities, or the debt proceeds are funding consumptive expenses (Mupunga & Le 
Roux, 2014). 
In addition, the results from other variables show that the coefficients of labour (∆L), 
trade openness (∆TOP), savings (∆S), and terms of trade (∆TOT) are statistically 
insignificant. Finally, as expected, the error correction term ECM(-1) is negative and 
statistically significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a shock to the Zimbabwean 






Empirical analysis of Model 1 for South Africa 
The long-run empirical results of Model 1 for South Africa reported in Panel A of Table 
7.3 show that the coefficient of public debt (PD) is negative as expected and 
statistically significant albeit at 10% level. This implies that in South Africa public debt 
negatively impacts economic growth (y) in the long run.  
Other long-run results of Model 1 for South Africa show that investment (I), trade 
openness (TOP) and savings (S) have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
economic growth in South Africa. Consistent with economic growth theory, an increase 
in any one of these three variables lead to increased economic growth in South Africa, 
in the long run. The findings of a negative relationship between labour (L), and fiscal 
balance (FB) is contradictory to study expectations. The negative coefficient of labour 
may be due to the proxy for labour used, that is, the share of the economically active 
population aged between 15 and 64 years in the total working-age population. 
Moreover, the negative impact of fiscal balance suggests that part of the public debt 
in South Africa was used in low returning investments or consumptive outlays. The 
coefficient of terms of trade (TOT) was statistically insignificant. 
The short-run empirical results for Model 1 for South Africa indicate that although 
public debt in the current period (∆PD) has an insignificant impact on economic growth 
(y), public debt lagged two periods (∆PD(2)) negatively influence economic growth. 
This suggests that public debt lagged two periods negatively impact economic growth 
in South Africa, in the short run.  
The short-run results of other variables in Model 1 for South Africa reveal that 
economic growth in one past period (Δy(1)), investment (ΔI) and savings [ΔS(1)) and 
ΔS(2)] have a statistically significant positive effect on economic growth, in the short 
run. However, the coefficients of fiscal balance in the prior periods [ΔFB(1) and 
ΔFB(2)] were negative and statistically significant. This implies changes in fiscal 
balance in the past period leads to a decrease in economic growth in South Africa in 
the short run. In addition, labour (ΔL), fiscal balance (ΔFB), savings (ΔS) and terms of 
trade (ΔTOT) in the current period have no statistically significant impact on economic 
growth, in the short run. Further, the coefficient on lagged error correction term ECM(-
1) is negative and statistically significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a shock 
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to the South African economy, economic growth adjusts to equilibrium at a rate of 
34.1% per annum.  
Based on the empirical results of Model 1 reported for Zambia, aggregate public debt 
tends to contribute significantly to economic growth. This result applies irrespective of 
whether the impact is estimated in the short or long run. In Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
aggregate public debt negatively impacts economic growth, regardless of whether the 
impact analysis was in the short or long run. 
The study plotted CUSUM and CUSUMQ to check for Model 1 stability, and the results 

















Figure 7.1: Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ for Model 1 
 
An inspection of the CUSUM and CUSUMQ plots from the recursive estimation of the 
model presented in Figure 7.1 provides evidence of stability in the relationship 
between aggregate public debt and economic growth in the study countries. That is, 
the CUSUM and CUSUMQ plots of Model 1 are within the confidence band at 5% 
significance level across the study countries. Accordingly, Model 1 passed the stability 
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test in the study countries, meaning that there is no systematic change in the reported 
long-run coefficients of the explanatory variables at the 5% level of significance. This 
result signifies that the estimated coefficients are consistently reliable. 
7.3.2 Econometric analysis for Model 2: Impact of disaggregated public debt on 
economic growth  
7.3.2.1 Cointegration test for Model 2 
The bounds F-statistics for Model 2 given in Table 7.4 are 4.161, 3.631 and 3.177 for 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively. The calculated F-statistic values in 
Model 2 are all greater than the upper bound critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, correspondingly, also reported in Table 7.4. Although the level of 
significance varies from one country to the other, the study rejects the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration in all the study countries.  








Zambia y F(y|DPD,FPD,I,L,FB,TOP,S,TOT) 4.161*** Cointegrated 
Zimbabwe y F(y|DPD,FPD,I,L,FB,TOP,S,TOT) 3.631** Cointegrated 
South Africa y F(y|DPD,FPD,I,L,FB,TOP,S,TOT) 3.177* Cointegrated 
                            Asymptotic critical values (unrestricted intercept and no trend) 
Pesaran et al. (2001: 300) 
critical values 
[Table CI(iii) Case III] 
10% 5% 1% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
1.95 3.06 2.22 3.39 2.79 4.10 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Following confirmation of cointegration in the economic growth Model 2 in Zambia, 







7.3.2.2 Coefficient estimation for Model 2 
The optimal lag length for the ARDL models for Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa 
was selected based on the appropriate equation as determined by either the AIC or 
BIC techniques. Based on the model’s explanatory predictive power, the study 
selected for Model 2: AIC-based ARDL (3, 3, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 3, 1) for Zambia; BIC-based 
ARDL (2, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 1) for Zimbabwe; and AIC-based ARDL (3, 3, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 
1, 1) for South Africa. The long- and short-run regression coefficients of the selected 





















Table 7.5: Estimation of long-run and short-run coefficients for Model 2 (all the study countries)  
Panel A: Long-run coefficients (Dependent variable is y)  
 Zambia Zimbabwe South Africa 
Regressors Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] 
C -41.300*** -3.105     [0.008] -26.927* -1.705     [0.098] 62.052** 2.305      [0.034] 
DPD -0.047*** -3.037     [0.009] -0.309*** -3.121     [0.004] -0.073 -1.312     [0.207] 
FPD 0.022** 2.709      [0.017] -0.285*** -4.702     [0.000] -0.094** -2.573     [0.020] 
I 0.439* 1.771      [0.088] 0.138 0.622      [0.538] 0.187* 1.835      [0.084] 
L 0.315 1.668      [0.118] 0.459* 1.909      [0.065] 0.092* 1.915      [0.073] 
FB 0.235 1.378      [0.180] -0.096** -2.153     [0.048] -0.435** -2.514     [0.022] 
TOP -0.317** -2.948     [0.010] 0.163 1.504      [0.142] -0.113** -2.232     [0.039] 
S 0.285* 1.891      [0.069] 0.187 0.996      [0.327] 0.290** 2.384      [0.029] 
TOT -0.592** -2.496     [0.026] -0.214 -0.890     [0.380] -0.060 -0.629     [0.538] 
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Panel B: Short-run coefficients (Dependent variable is ∆y)  
 Zambia Zimbabwe South Africa 
Regressors Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] 
∆y(1) 0.193** 2.675      [0.014] 0.127** 2.7242    [0.013] 0.545** 2.302      [0.030] 
∆y(2) 0.160 1.037      [0.311] - - 0.226 1.342      [0.192] 
∆DPD -0.134 -0.329     [0.745] -0.296*** -3.504     [0.001] 0.036 0.383      [0.705] 
∆DPD(1) -0.089** -2.512     [0.020] - - 0.228** 2.227      [0.035] 
∆DPD(2) -0.157*** -2.986     [0.007] - - 0.068 0.878      [0.388] 
∆FPD -0.001 -0.036     [0.971] -0.274*** -4.564     [0.000] 0.078 1.160      [0.257] 
∆FPD(1) 0.083*** 3.839      [0.001] - - - - 
∆I 0.571*** 3.341      [0.003] 0.132 0.612      [0.545] 0.101 0.318      [0.753] 
∆I(1) 0.036 0.198      [0.845] - - - - 
∆I(2) 0.266* 1.752      [0.091] - - - - 
∆L 0.232*** 3.365      [0.003] 0.880 1.287      [0.207] -0.181 -0.303     [0.764] 
∆L(1) -0.574 -1.141     [0.266] 0.387* 1.873      [0.070] 0.371* 1.715      [0.099] 
∆L(2) 0.344 1.489      [0.151] - - 0.448 1.301      [0.205] 
∆FB 0.026 0.202      [0.841] -0.092* -1.978     [0.055] -0.424* -1.835     [0.078] 
∆FB(1) -0.305*** -3.086     [0.003] - - -0.344 -1.325     [0.197] 
∆FB(2) - - - - -0.381 -1.629     [0.116] 
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∆TOP -0.226** -2.615     [0.016] 0.156 1.469      [0.151] 0.066 0.741      [0.466] 
∆TOP(1) -0.119 -1.081     [0.291] - - 0.160* 1.888      [0.071] 
∆TOP(2) - - - - 0.119 1.667      [0.108] 
∆S 0.402*** 3.467      [0.002] 0.180 1.030      [0.311] 0.284 1.641      [0.113] 
∆S(1) 0.130*** 2.959      [0.009] - - - - 
∆S(2) -0.315 -1.668     [0.110] - - - - 
∆TOT -0.300*** -3.105     [0.005] -0.564* -2.007     [0.053] -0.072 -0.651     [0.521] 
ECM(-1) -0.485*** -4.931     [0.000] -0.360*** -7.471     [0.000] -0.522*** -4.039     [0.000] 





SE of Regression 
Residual Sum of Squares 
Akaike Info. Criterion 
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion 
0.907 
0.707 
           4.545 [0.000] 
1.731 
2.446 


























Empirical analysis of Model 2 for Zambia 
The long-run results of Model 2 for Zambia, reported in Table 7.5 Panel A, revealed 
that the coefficients of domestic public debt (DPD) and foreign public debt (FPD) are 
negative and positive, respectively, and are statistically significant. The results indicate 
that the long-run relative impact of public debt on economic growth (y) in Zambia is 
dependent on the type of public debt under consideration, that is, whether it is 
domestic or foreign public debt. Whereas domestic public debt negatively affects long-
run economic growth, foreign public debt positively impacts economic growth in 
Zambia, in the long run.  
The negative impact of domestic public debt on economic growth could be due to the 
crowding out effect of government borrowing in the domestic capital markets – further 
suggesting that the financial markets of Zambia are still underdeveloped and illiquid 
(McCulloch et al., 2000a). According to Dahou et al. (2009), in insubstantial financial 
markets, a rise in domestic public debt limits access to long-term financing for private 
borrowers, leading to reduced capital accumulation, economic growth and welfare 
(Atique & Malik, 2012).  
In contrast, the positive long-run impact of foreign debt on economic growth in Zambia 
could have started after 2006 when the country embarked on long-term foreign 
borrowing mainly for productive purposes (GRZ, 2015b, 2011; 2006b). Although the 
positive impact of foreign public debt on economic growth in Zambia is unexpected in 
this study, the result is in line with the finding in Schclarek (2004).  
The long-run results of other variables in Model 2 show that the coefficients of 
investment (I) and savings (S) are positive as expected and statistically significant. 
The results also reveal that the coefficients of trade openness (TOP) and terms of 
trade (TOT) are negative and statistically significant. These findings are contrary to 
the expectations of the current study but are consistent with the results from previous 
studies such as Zahonogo (2017) and Krugman (1994). This could be the result of the 
economic hardship period from the mid-1970s to 2005, characterised by: 
 
(1) severe deterioration in international commodity prices, mainly raw copper and 
agricultural output prices;  
(2) stern global oil price shocks; and  
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(3) increased importation of finished consumptive output (see also World Bank, 
2006). 
Furthermore, the long-run regression coefficients of labour (L) and fiscal balance (FB) 
are statistically insignificant. 
The short-run results of Model 2 for Zambia reported in Table 7.5 Panel B show that 
a change in either domestic public debt (ΔDPD) or foreign public debt (ΔFPD) in the 
current period has no significant impact on economic growth. This finding is confirmed 
by the coefficients of domestic public debt (ΔDPD) and foreign public debt (ΔFPD) 
which are both statistically insignificant. 
However, the coefficient of domestic public debt in previous periods [∆DPD(1) and 
∆DPD(2)] are negative and statistically significant. This suggests that a rise in 
domestic public debt in the previous period in Zambia can lead to economic decline in 
the short run. The negative and statistically significant impact of domestic public debt 
in the previous periods on economic growth further suggests that public borrowing on 
domestic capital markets crowded out private sector investment – further signifying 
that the financial markets of Zambia are still underdeveloped and illiquid (see also 
McCulloch et al., 2000a). Contrary, the short-run coefficient of foreign public debt 
lagged once (∆FPD(1)) is positive and statistically significant, implying that increased 
foreign public debt in the past period can lead to economic growth in Zambia, in the 
short run.  
The short-run results of other variables in Model 2 reveal further that the coefficients 
of investment [(∆I) and (∆I(2)], labour (∆L), and savings [(∆S) and (∆S(1)] are positive 
and statistically significant. This finding suggests that changes in investment, labour 
and savings are positively related to economic growth, in the short run. Furthermore, 
economic growth in the past period (∆y(1)) positively affects economic growth in 
Zambia, in the short run. The short-run results for Zambia also reveal that fiscal 
balance (∆FB(1)) in the preceding periods negatively affects economic growth in the 
short run. In addition, the impact of trade openness (∆TOP) on economic growth in the 
current period is unexpectedly negative and statistically significant. Though these 
results are unexpected for Zambia, they are similar to those found by Zahonogo (2017) 
and Adhikary (2011). Finally, the lagged error correction term ECM(-1) was negative 
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and statistically significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a shock to the Zambian 
economy, economic growth adjusts to equilibrium at a rate of 48.5% per annum.  
 
Empirical analysis of Model 2 for Zimbabwe 
In Table 7.5, Panels A and B, the results for Model 2 indicate that the impact of public 
debt on economic growth in Zimbabwe is negative and statistically significant. This is 
irrespective of the type of debt – that is, whether it is domestic or foreign public debt, 
and the timeframe – short or long run. The results suggest that a rise in domestic or 
foreign public debt leads to a decrease in economic growth rate in Zimbabwe, in the 
short and long run.  
The financing of budget imbalances in Zimbabwe during 1970-1997 was 
predominantly through foreign debt, while after 1998, it was a mixture of both domestic 
and foreign debt (World Bank, 2019, GoZ, 2018b; 2010). The bulk of domestic public 
debt in Zimbabwe is in treasury bills and held by the financial sector (GoZ, 2018a: 33). 
According to Hauner (2006), commercial bank holdings of domestic government debt 
associates with lower financial system efficiency and excessive crowding out, 
compared to when the non-banking sector holds government debt (Gulde et al., 2006; 
Christensen, 2004). Thus, apart from deterrent interest rates, domestic debt holder 
composition in Zimbabwe may contribute to depressed economic performance in this 
country. 
The negative impact of foreign public debt on economic growth in Zimbabwe may be 
through subdued entrepreneurship activities arising from constricted international lines 
of credit and public policy uncertainty (IMF, 2017b). Zimbabwe has a large proportion 
of foreign public debt and was expelled from concessionary borrowing by most 
creditors due to non-payment of its arrears (World Bank, 2019; GoZ, 2018b; IMF, 
2017b; 2017c). Consequently, most foreign suppliers of industrial inputs to Zimbabwe 
demand to be paid in full or in advance perhaps due to the high economic and financial 
uncertainties in this country – such as repeated currency reforms, high exchange rate 
risks and perpetual political crisis. The implication is the high cost of doing business 
and reduced economic activity (GoZ, 2018b; 2016; 2010).  
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Other long-run results of Model 2 for Zimbabwe show that the coefficient of labour (L) 
is, as expected, positive and statistically significant. However, the coefficient of fiscal 
balance (FB) is negative and significant, implying that an increase in fiscal balance 
can lead to an economic slowdown in Zimbabwe, in the long run. The coefficients of 
investment (I), trade openness (TOP), savings (S) and terms of trade (TOT) were 
statistically insignificant.  
The short-run results of other variables reveal that the coefficients of labour (∆L(1)) 
are positive and statistically significant. This suggests that an increase in labour in the 
past period leads to increased economic growth in Zimbabwe, in the short run. Further, 
the short-run results show that economic growth in the preceding period (∆y(1)) 
positively affects economic growth in Zimbabwe, in the short run. The changes in 
terms of trade (∆TOT) and fiscal balance (∆FB) have an immediate negative impact 
on economic growth in Zimbabwe, in the short run. The coefficients of investment (∆I), 
labour (∆L), trade openness (∆TOP) and savings (∆S) are statistically insignificant. In 
conclusion, as expected, the error correction term ECM(-1) is negative and statistically 
significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a shock to the Zimbabwean economy, 
economic growth adjusts to equilibrium at a rate of 36.0% per annum.  
Empirical analysis of Model 2 for South Africa 
The long-run results of Model 2 for South Africa indicate that the overall impact of 
disaggregated public debt on economic growth varies with the type of debt and the 
timeframe considered. Although the coefficient of foreign public debt (FPD) is negative 
and statistically significant, the coefficient of domestic public debt (DPD) was 
statistically insignificant, in the long run. The results imply that a rise in foreign public 
debt leads to a decrease in economic growth in South Africa, in the long run. The 
outcome of this study is in line with the empirical evidence reported by other past 
empirical studies, such as Akram (2015). 
Further, the coefficients of domestic public debt lagged once (∆DPD(1)) and foreign 
public debt (∆FPD) were positive and insignificant, respectively. The positive impact 
of domestic public debt on economic growth may reflect that the market for 
government securities in South Africa is well developed and diversified (SARB, 2016; 
National Treasury, 2016b; 2016c; 2014b). Changes in domestic public debt in South 
Africa may have led to the crowding in of risky private sector investment, in addition to 
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making the banking system more efficient, leading to improved economic 
performance, in the short run (National Treasury, 2016c).   
Following theoretical literature, the long-run empirical results of other variables show 
that investment (I), labour (L) and savings (S) have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on economic growth, in the long run. Other studies on the subject 
support this finding, such as Pattillo et al. (2002) and Mankiw et al. (1992). Although 
fiscal balance (FB) and trade openness (TOP) have an unexpected sign, it is not 
unique to this study alone. Several other studies have shown evidence of negative 
relationship between fiscal balance and trade openness and economic growth (see 
also Jawaid, 2014; Yanikkaya, 2003). The coefficient of terms of trade (TOT) was 
found to be statistically insignificant in South Africa. 
The short-run results reveal that economic growth (∆y(1)), labour (∆L(1)) and trade 
openness (∆TOP(1)), in one past period, enhances economic performance in South 
Africa, in the short run. The coefficient of fiscal balance (∆FB), is negative, implying 
that an increase in fiscal balance can lead to depressed economic growth in South 
Africa, in the short run. Changes in investment (∆I), labour (∆L), savings (∆S) and 
terms of trade (∆TOT) in the current period had no impact on economic growth, in the 
short run. The result is confirmed by the variable coefficients, which are statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient of the lagged error correction term ECM(-1) is negative 
and statistically significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a shock to the South 
African economy, economic growth adjusts to equilibrium at a rate of 52.2% per 
annum.  
In summary, the main finding that emerged from the disaggregated public debt model 
(Model 2) is that in Zambia domestic public debt and foreign public debt negatively 
and positively affect economic growth, respectively. This is regardless of whether the 
estimations are in the short or long run. In Zimbabwe, disaggregated public debt  
negatively impacts economic growth, irrespective of the timeframe considered. In 
South Africa, whereas domestic public debt positively affects economic growth in the 
short run, foreign public debt crowds out economic growth in the long run.  
To test the null hypothesis of model stability, the study plotted the CUSUM and 
Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals (CUSUMQ) for Model 2, and 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the results.  
229 
 
Figure 7.2: Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ for Model 2 
 
In Figure 7.2, the CUSUM and CUSUMQ plots from the recursive estimation of the 
model reveal evidence of stability in the relationship between disaggregated public 
debt and economic growth in the study countries. That is, the CUSUM and CUSUMQ 
plots of Model 2 are within the confidence band at 5% significance level across the 
study countries. This signifies that the study cannot reject the null hypothesis of model 
stability. The result implies that there is no systematic change in the reported long-run 
coefficients of the explanatory variables at the 5% level of significance. 
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7.3.3 Econometric analysis for Model 3: Impact of public debt service on 
economic growth  
7.3.3.1 Cointegration test for Model 3 
Cointegration results for Model 3 are presented in Table 7.6. The reported bounds F-
statistics for Model 3 are 4.318, 3.284 and 4.423 for Zambia, Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, respectively. The calculated F-statistics results in the three study countries are 
above the Pesaran et al.’s (2001) upper bound critical values at 1%, 10% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. The results confirm the presence of cointegration 
between economic growth conditioned on public debt service, investment, labour, 
fiscal balance, trade openness, savings and terms of trade in the three study countries.  








Zambia y F(y|PDS,I,L,FB,TOP,S,TOT) 4.318*** Cointegrated 
Zimbabwe y F(y|PDS,I,L,FB,TOP,S,TOT)   3.284* Cointegrated 
South Africa y F(y|PDS,I,L,FB,TOP,S,TOT) 4.423*** Cointegrated 
Asymptotic critical values (unrestricted intercept and no trend) 
Pesaran et al. (2001: 300) 
critical values 
[Table CI(iii) Case III] 
10% 5% 1% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
2.03 3.13 2.32 3.50 2.96 4.26 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Following confirmation of cointegration in the economic growth Model 3 in Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, the next step is to estimate the short- and long-run 
coefficients. 
7.3.3.2 Coefficient estimation for Model 3 
Similar to Models 1 and 2, the optimal lag length for the ARDL models for Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa were selected based on either the AIC or BIC techniques. 
Guided by the model’s suitability, the study selected for Model 3: AIC-based ARDL (2, 
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2, 3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 2) for Zambia; BIC-based ARDL (3, 3, 0, 0, 2, 1, 2, 0) for Zimbabwe; 
and AIC-based ARDL (2, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0) for South Africa. Table 7.7 presents the 


















Table 7.7: Estimation of long-run and short-run coefficients for Model 3 (all the study countries)  
Panel A: Long-run coefficients (Dependent variable is y)  
 Zambia Zimbabwe South Africa 
Regressors Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] 
C -11.459 -0.960     [0.251] 60.655* 1.919      [0.065] 24.185 1.059      [0.297] 
PDS -0.200 -1.615     [0.119] 0.694** 2.713      [0.011] 0.165 0.781      [0.441] 
I 0.255* 2.087      [0.051] 0.476** 2.092      [0.046] 0.349** 2.707      [0.011] 
L 0.090* 1.793      [0.085] -0.682* -1.830     [0.078] -0.234 -0.552     [0.585] 
FB 0.018 0.122      [0.904] -0.750** -2.174     [0.038] 0.294** 2.123      [0.041] 
TOP -0.475*** -3.295     [0.004] -0.149 -1.498     [0.145] 0.145** 2.312      [0.027] 
S 0.556** 2.370      [0.024] -0.141** -2.643     [0.013] 0.320** 2.656      [0.012] 
TOT -0.348 -0.631     [0.536] 0.198 0.611      [0.546] -0.186* -1.963     [0.058] 
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Panel B: Short-run coefficients (Dependent variable is ∆y)  
 Zambia Zimbabwe South Africa 
Regressors Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] Coefficient T-ratio[p-value] 
∆y(1) 0.171 1.594      [0.122] 0.071* 1.928      [0.164] 0.034** 2.650      [0.014] 
∆y(2) - - -0.238 -1.449     [0.069] - - 
∆PDS -0.098* -1.733     [0.094] -0.095* -1.779     [0.085] 0.170 0.792      [0.433] 
∆PDS(1) -0.087 -0.713     [0.482] -0.060*** -2.923     [0.006] - - 
∆PDS(2) - - -0.656 -1.073     [0.291] - - 
∆I -0.137 -0.965     [0.344] 0.439* 1.936      [0.062] 0.372 1.600      [0.118] 
∆I(1) -0.300 -1.590     [0.124] - - - - 
∆I(2) 0.113* 1.962      [0.062] - - - - 
∆L 0.088 1.661      [0.109] -0.629* -1.722     [0.095] -0.136 -0.278     [0.783] 
∆FB 0.105 1.011      [0.322] -0.146** -2.451     [0.021] 0.304** 2.038      [0.049] 
∆FB(1) -0.261** -2.780     [0.010] -0.572* -1.985     [0.056] - - 
∆TOP -0.161 -1.236     [0.228] -0.357** -2.595     [0.014] 0.018 0.292      [0.772] 
∆TOP(1) 0.277** 2.700      [0.012] - - - - 
∆TOP(2) 0.236** 2.560      [0.017] - - - - 
∆S -0.021 -0.117     [0.908] 0.023 0.106      [0.916] 0.330*** 2.767      [0.009] 
∆S(1) -0.392* -1.791     [0.085] 0.479* 1.992      [0.055] - - 
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∆S(2) -0.042 -0.234     [0.817] - - - - 
∆TOT 0.707 1.649      [0.112] 0.183 0.600      [0.552] -0.193* -2.022     [0.051] 
∆TOT(1) 0.065 0.104      [0.918] - - - - 
ECM(-1) -0.249*** -4.807     [0.000] -0.622*** -5.657     [0.000] -0.344*** -6.960     [0.000] 





SE of Regression 
Residual Sum of Squares 
Akaike Info. Criterion 
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion 
0.822 
0.584 



























Empirical analysis of Model 3 for Zambia 
The long-run results of Model 3 for Zambia presented in Table 7.7 Panel A reveals 
that the coefficient of public debt service (PDS) is statistically insignificant. This infers 
that public debt service has a neutral impact on the economic growth (y) process of 
Zambia, in the long run. The results fail to confirm the presence of crowding out effect 
between public debt service and economic growth in Zambia, in the long run. There 
are three possible explanations for this result. First, the financial outlays towards 
public debt payments may have been too small (due to inability to repay the loans) to 
create the long-run crowding effect on economic growth in Zambia (IMF, 2017a).  
Second, the debt relief initiatives implicitly reduced the public debt service costs in 
that debt payments could not influence economic growth initiatives in this country. 
Finally, there are possibilities that the borrowed funds were put into productive 
investments, thereby enhancing the country’s capacity to repay the loans without 
depressing economic growth. The argument is, however, that despite the insignificant 
impact of public debt service on economic growth in Zambia, the government debt 
service costs adversely affected social expenditures, such as health, education and 
other welfare programmes (MOF, 2014b). The evidence is the extension of debt relief 
initiatives by the creditor community from 1990 to 2006 to this country in a move to 
alleviate poverty (World Bank, 2018c; 2007; IMF & IDA, 2000). This study finding is 
in line with other previous studies on the subject (Akram, 2016; 2015; Jalles, 2011). 
The long-run results of other variables in Model 3 reported in Table 7.7 Panel A 
indicate that the coefficients of investment (I), labour (L) and savings (S) are positive 
and statistically significant. Although the coefficient of trade openness (TOP) is 
unexpectedly negative and statistically significant, the result is not unique to this study 
alone. Studies by Zahonogo (2017) and Adhikary (2011), among others, indicate a 
negative relationship between trade openness and economic growth. In addition, the 
study results reveal that fiscal balance (FB) and terms of trade (TOT) have no long-
run impact on economic growth in Zambia. 
The short-run results presented in Table 7.7 Panel B show that the coefficient of 
public debt service (∆PDS) is negative and statistically significant. This implies that 
an increase in public debt service in Zambia in the current period can lead to an 
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economic decline in the short run. This outcome compares favourably with the 
findings of Hansen (2001) on the same subject.   
Further, the short-run results displayed in Table 7.7 Panel B reveal that the 
coefficients of investment in two prior periods (∆I(2)) and trade openness [∆TOP(1) 
and ∆TOP(2)] are positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that 
investment and trade openness in the past period have a positive impact on economic 
growth in the short run. Furthermore, the short-run coefficients of fiscal balance 
(∆FB(1)) and savings (∆S(1)) lagged one period is negative and statistically 
significant. This result could imply that both fiscal balance and gross domestic savings 
lagged one period are negatively correlated with economic growth in Zambia. The 
unexpected negative sign of fiscal balance suggests that expansionary fiscal 
operations in Zambia may be growth-inhibiting (see also Bigsten & Mugerwa, 2000; 
World Bank, 1993).  Lastly, the error correction term ECM(-1) is negative as expected 
and statistically significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a shock to the Zambian 
economy, economic growth adjusts to equilibrium at a rate of 24.9% per annum.  
Empirical analysis of Model 3 for Zimbabwe 
The long-run empirical results for Model 3 for Zimbabwe presented in Table 7.7 Panel 
A show that the coefficient of public debt service (PDS) is positive and statistically 
significant. This suggests that a rise in public debt service leads to an increase in 
economic growth (y) in Zimbabwe, in the long run. This finding is unexpected in this 
study and contradicts the theoretical and empirical underpinnings on this subject – 
particularly the debt overhang hypothesis (Sachs, 1989; Myers 1977). Though 
contrary to expectation, this could be a result of the country’s failure to honour its 
international financial obligations as highlighted in Mupunga and Le Roux (2014), 
Gono (2008) and  IMF (2001). 
The other long-run results for variables in Model 3 show that the coefficient of 
investment (I) is positive and statistically significant, implying that investment and 
economic growth are positively related, in the long run. Further, the coefficients of 
labour (L), fiscal balance (FB) and savings (S) are unexpectedly negative and 
statistically significant, implying that the variables negatively impact economic growth 
in Zimbabwe, in the long run. Gross domestic savings in Zimbabwe have not only 
been declining since 2000 but were also negative (World Bank, 2019). There are, 
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therefore, possibilities that private sector savings were absorbed by the exponential 
rise in domestic public debt since 2000 and were being used in consumptive activities 
by the government, resulting in depressed economic growth rates (GoZ, 2018b; 
World Bank, 2019). A mixture of high inflation rates and a series of currency reforms 
since 2000 have augmented the decline in gross domestic savings in Zimbabwe, and 
hence net investments (RBZ, 2016c, GoZ, 2018b, 2014). In addition, the coefficients 
of trade openness (TOP) and terms of trade (TOT) were statistically insignificant. 
The short-run results in Table 7.7 Panel B for Zimbabwe show that the coefficients of 
public debt service [ΔPDS and ΔPDS(1)] are negative and statistically significant. 
This implies that an increase in public debt service in Zimbabwe, both in the current 
period and in one past period, leads to a reduction in economic growth rate (y), in the 
short run.  
The short-run results for other variables in Model 3 indicate that economic growth in 
the past period (∆y(1)) positively affects economic growth in Zimbabwe. The 
coefficient of investment (∆I) is positive and statistically significant, implying that an 
increase in investment leads to increased economic growth in Zimbabwe, in the short 
run. Whereas the coefficient of savings (∆S) were insignificant in the current period, 
savings in one past period (∆S(1)) have a positive impact on economic growth in 
Zimbabwe, in the short run. 
The other short-run results reveal that the coefficients of labour (∆L), fiscal balance 
[∆FB, ∆FB(1)] and trade openness (∆TOP) are negative and statistically significant. 
The negative impact of trade openness on economic growth may be related to the 
huge imports of finished consumptive products and limited exports (World Bank, 
2018a). The coefficient of terms of trade (∆TOT) is statistically insignificant. In 
conclusion, the lagged error correction term ECM(-1) is, as expected, found to be 
negative and statistically significant at 1%, implying that in the event of a shock to the 
Zimbabwean economy, economic growth adjusts to equilibrium at a rate of 62.2% per 
annum.  
Empirical analysis of Model 3 for South Africa 
In South Africa, the impact of public debt service on economic growth (Model 3) 
supports the neutrality hypothesis – Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis. The results 
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apply irrespective of whether the estimated impact is in the short- or long run, as 
confirmed by the coefficients of PDS in Table 7.7 Panels A and B, which are 
statistically insignificant. This implies that public debt service has no statistically 
significant crowding effect on economic growth in South Africa, both in the short and 
long run. These study findings, though contrary to expectations, are in line with the 
existing empirical literature on the subject (Akram, 2016; 2015; Jalles, 2011).  
Consistent with study expectations, investment (I), fiscal balance (FB), trade 
openness (TOP) and savings (S) are growth-enhancing, in the long run. Although the 
short-run outcome was consistent for the two former variables (∆FB and ∆S); it was 
inconsistent for the two latter variables (∆TOP and ∆I) that had no significant impact 
on economic growth in the short run. Further, contrary to expectations, terms of trade 
(TOT) is negative and statistically significant in the long- and short run. This outcome 
suggests that although South Africa is one of the top emerging market economies in 
Africa, the economy is not immune to global economic and financial crises that 
directly affect the volume and value of exports (see also UNCTAD, 2017).  The 
coefficient of economic growth (Δy(1)) is positive and statistically significant, implying 
that economic growth lagged one period can positively influence current economic 
growth in South Africa, in the short run. The results in Table 7.7 Panels A and B 
further show that labour has no significant impact on economic growth in South Africa, 
in the short and long run. Finally, the coefficient of the lagged error correction term 
ECM(-1) is negative and statistically significant at 1%, implying that the disequilibrium 
occurring due to a shock is corrected at a rate of 34.4% per annum. 
Based on the results reported in Table 7.7 Panels A and B, the impact of public debt 
service on economic growth in Zambia varies depending on the timeframe 
considered. The effect was negative in the short run and insignificant in the long run. 
In Zimbabwe, the impact of public debt service on economic growth is distinctly 
different depending also on the timeframe considered. The impact was positive in the 
long run and negative in the short run and statistically significant. In South Africa, the 
coefficient of public debt service is statistically insignificant in the long and short run. 
The study checked for the stability of Model 3 in the three study countries by plotting 




Figure 7.3: Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ for Model 3 
 
In Figure 7.3, the CUSUM and CUSUMQ plots for Model 3 provides no indication of 
instability in the relationship between public debt service and economic growth in the 
study countries. That is, the plots of both the CUSUM and CUSUMQ in Figure 7.3 are 










implies that Model 3 is stable and there is no systematic change in the reported long-
run coefficients of the explanatory variables at the 5% level of significance. 
7.3.4 Summary of the dynamic impact models – Models 1, 2 and 3 
In this section, the results of the impact analysis in all the study countries are reported 
in Table 7.8.  
Table 7.8: Summary of impact analysis models - Models 1, 2 and 3 (all three 
study countries) 
Notes: PD = public debt; y = economic growth; PDS = public debt service; DPD = domestic public 
debt; FPD = foreign public debt; and √ indicates presence of a corresponding impact.  
The results for Model 1 reported in Table 7.8 for Zambia reveal that aggregate public 
debt has a positive impact on economic growth, irrespective of whether the analysis 
was in the short or long run. The results for Model 1 further reveal that aggregate 
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regardless of whether the regression analysis was in the short or long run. Therefore, 
based on the study findings, it can be stated that the overall impact of aggregate 
public debt on economic growth varies across the countries, depending on country-
specific factors.  
The empirical findings of Model 2 in Table 7.8 indicate that for Zambia and Zimbabwe 
the impact of domestic public debt on economic growth is negative, irrespective of 
whether the analysis was in the short or long run. However, the effect of foreign public 
debt in Zambia and Zimbabwe was positive and negative, respectively, irrespective 
of the timeframe considered. In the case of South Africa, the results of Model 2 reveal 
in contrast that domestic public debt has a positive impact on economic growth in the 
short run only, foreign public debt is also negatively related to economic growth in the 
long run only.   
The empirical results for Model 3 summarised in Table 7.8 reveal that public debt 
service in Zambia negatively affects economic growth in the short run only. In 
Zimbabwe, the impact of public debt service on economic growth is negative in the 
short run and positive in the long run. Lastly, in South Africa, the findings of Model 3 
show that public debt service and economic growth are not related whatsoever.   
Based on the impact analysis results, the nature of the relationship between 
aggregate public debt and economic growth, the relative impact of domestic and 
foreign public debt on economic growth and the nature of the relationship between 
public debt service and economic growth differs from country to country. The study 
expected aggregate public debt, domestic public debt, foreign public debt and public 
debt service to negatively impact economic growth in the study countries.  
Thus, from the study analysis, it can be concluded that the impact of aggregate public 
debt, disaggregated public debt (domestic and foreign) and public debt service on 
economic performance varies from country to country. The study further establishes 
that economies are unique and country-specific research is indispensable in 
determining the impact of public debt, aggregated and disaggregated, and public debt 
service on economic growth. Hence, the notion that public debt or public debt service 
is bad for economic growth is merely based on prima facie or superficial evidence 




7.4 ECM-based Granger-causality analysis for Model 4 (all study countries)  
7.4.1 Cointegration test for Model 4 
To establish the direction of causality between variables, the study undertook the 
bounds F-statistic test for cointegration to validate the existence or nonexistence of a 
cointegration relationship among variables in the models. The results of the bounds 
F-statistic test for a system of the cointegration equations associated with the 












Table 7.9: Bounds F-statistic results for cointegration of Model 4 (all the study countries) 
ZAMBIA 
Model 4a: Public debt (PD), fiscal balance (FB), savings 
(S) and economic growth (y) 
Model 4b: Public debt service (PDS), fiscal balance (FB), 
savings (S) and economic growth (y) 
Dependent 
variable 




Function F-statistic Cointegration 
status 
y F(y| PD, FB, S) 4.632** Cointegrated y F(y| PDS, FB, S) 6.165*** Cointegrated 
PD F(PD| y, FB, S) 3.865* Cointegrated PDS F(PDS| y, FB, S) 1.761 Not cointegrated 
FB F(FB| y, PD, S) 2.926 Not cointegrated FB F(FB| y, PDS, S) 3.101 Not cointegrated 








Function F-statistic Cointegration 
status 
y F(y| PD, FB, S) 3.927* Cointegrated y F(y| PDS, FB, S) 4.903** Cointegrated 
PD F(PD| y, FB, S) 1.511 Not cointegrated PDS F(PDS| y, FB, S) 1.086 Not cointegrated 
FB F(FB| y, PD, S) 2.231 Not cointegrated FB F(FB| y, PDS, S) 2.266 Not cointegrated 











Function F-statistic Cointegration 
status 
y F(y| PD, FB, S) 4.538** Cointegrated y F(y| PDS, FB, S) 6.200*** Cointegrated 
PD F(PD| y, FB, S) 2.407 Not cointegrated PDS F(PDS| y, FB, S) 3.850* Cointegrated 
FB F(FB| y, PD, S) 1.537 Not cointegrated FB F(FB| y, PDS, S) 2.335 Not cointegrated 
S F(S| y, PD, FB) 3.784 Cointegrated S F(S| y, PDS, FB) 3.112 Not cointegrated 
Asymptotic critical values (unrestricted intercept and no trend) 
Pesaran et al. (2001: 300) 
critical values 
[Table CI(iii) Case III] 
10% 5% 1% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
2.72 3.77 3.23 4.35 4.29 5.61 










The results of the cointegration tests in Table 7.9 (Model 4a) suggest that cointegration 
between public debt, fiscal balance, savings and economic growth vary according to 
the dependent variable. The results of Model 4a for Zambia show the presence of two 
cointegrating vectors; that is, there is cointegration when economic growth and public 
debt are the dependent variables. However, there is only cointegration when economic 
growth (y) is the dependent variable in Model 4b, in Zambia. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
there is only cointegration when economic growth (y) is the dependent variable in 
Models 4a and 4b. Finally, the results reported in Table 7.9 (Model 4a) show that 
cointegration exists in the economic growth and savings functions, and when 
economic growth and public debt service are the dependent variables in Model 4b. 
The corresponding F-statistics have confirmed the cointegration relationships reported 
in Table 7.9 in the respective functions, which are statistically significant.  
7.4.2 ECM-based Granger-causality results  
Table 7.9 confirms cointegration in some functions, and the next step is to examine 
the direction of causality between the variables. The F-statistics on the explanatory 
variables determines the short-run causality, based on the Variable Deletion Test. 
However, to determine the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium, the 
lagged error correction term is incorporated in those equations that cointegration is 
confirmed. The long-run causality is established by both the significance and negative 
sign of the coefficient of the error correction term. If the sign of the coefficient of the 
error correction term is positive and significant, or negative but insignificant, then there 
is no long-run causality from the explanatory variables, meaning that the independent 
variables do not influence the dependent variable (Narayan & Smyth, 2009). The 








Table 7.10: Granger-causality results for Model 4 (all study countries)  
ZAMBIA 
Model 4a: Public debt (PD), fiscal balance (FB), savings (S) and 
economic growth (y) 
Model 4b: Public debt service (PDS), fiscal balance (FB), 
savings (S) and economic growth (y) 
Dependent 
Variable 




F-statistics [probability] 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 
[t-statistics] 
∆𝒚𝒕 ∆𝑷𝑫𝒕 ∆𝑭𝑩𝒕 ∆𝑺𝒕 ∆𝒚𝒕 ∆𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕 ∆𝑭𝑩𝒕 ∆𝑺𝒕  


























































Model 4a: Public debt (PD), fiscal balance (FB), savings (S) and 
economic growth (y) 
Model 4b: Public debt service (PDS), fiscal balance (FB), 
savings (S) and economic growth (y) 
Dependent 
Variable 




F-statistics [probability] 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 
[t-statistics] 
∆𝒚𝒕 ∆𝑷𝑫𝒕 ∆𝑭𝑩𝒕 ∆𝑺𝒕 ∆𝒚𝒕 ∆𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕 ∆𝑭𝑩𝒕 ∆𝑺𝒕  


























































Model 4a: Public debt (PD), fiscal balance (FB), savings (S) and 
economic growth (y) 
Model 4b: Public debt service (PDS), fiscal balance (FB), 
savings (S) and economic growth (y) 
Dependent 
Variable 




F-statistics [probability] 𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 
[t-statistics] 
∆𝒚𝒕 ∆𝑷𝑫𝒕 ∆𝑭𝑩𝒕 ∆𝑺𝒕 ∆𝒚𝒕 ∆𝑷𝑫𝑺𝒕 ∆𝑭𝑩𝒕 ∆𝑺𝒕  


























































Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The square brackets refer to the probability value of the F-statistic, 








Empirical analysis of Model 4 for Zambia 
The empirical results presented in Table 7.10 for Model 4a indicate that there is a 
unidirectional Granger-causality from economic growth (y) to public debt (PD) in 
Zambia, irrespective of the timeframe considered. The short-run causality is confirmed 
by the corresponding F-statistic of economic growth (∆yt) in the public debt (∆PDt) 
function. In contrast, the long-run causality is established by the error correction term 
(ECMt-1), in the same function, which is both negative and statistically significant at 1% 
level of significance. These findings support the hypothesis that the velocity of 
economic growth matters most in determining the level of public sector indebtedness. 
Furthermore, the results, although not expected, compare favourably with other past 
studies (Donayre & Taivan, 2017).  
Other results reported in Model 4a for Zambia indicate that there is:  
(1) distinct unidirectional Granger-causal flow from fiscal balance to economic 
growth, both in the short and long run;  
(2) short- and long-run unidirectional causality from savings to economic growth; 
(3)  short- and long-run unidirectional Granger-causal flow from fiscal balance to 
public debt;  
(4) short-run unidirectional causality flow from fiscal balance to savings; and  
(5) no causality between savings and public debt. 
Furthermore, the empirical results reported in Table 7.10 for Model 4b indicate that 
there is no short- and long-run causality between public debt service (PDS) and 
economic growth in Zambia. Although unexpected, this finding is not unique, as similar 
evidence was reported in some earlier studies (Jalles, 2011). Further results for Model 
4b reveal that there is (1) a distinct short- and long-run unidirectional Granger-causality 
from fiscal balance to economic growth; (2) short-run unidirectional Granger-causal 
flow from fiscal balance to savings, and no long-run causality between the two 
variables; and (3) no causality between economic growth and savings, public debt 





Empirical analysis of Model 4 for Zimbabwe 
The results in Table 7.10 (Model 4a) reveal that in Zimbabwe, there is short-run 
unidirectional Granger-causality from economic growth (y) to public debt (PD). This 
result is confirmed by the corresponding F-statistic of economic growth (∆yt) in the 
public debt (∆PDt) function, which is statistically significant. This established causal 
flow in Zimbabwe is consistent with the view that low economic growth rates compel 
the country to borrow excessively to finance the savings, fiscal and current account 
gaps. The country has an average economic growth rate of -0.1% for the period 1970 
to 2017 (World Bank, 2018a). During the period 2000-2008, the country recorded 
persistently negative economic growth rates, averaging -8.3% (World Bank, 2018a). 
The country’s poor economic performance since 2014 and associated negative 
economic growth rates might have worsened the debt position of the government 
(GoZ, 2018b). This finding is not limited to this study; it agrees with some past studies 
on the subject (Donayre & Taivan, 2017; Gómez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero, 2015). 
Other empirical results of Model 4a for Zimbabwe reveal that there are:  
(1) short- and long-run unidirectional causal flow from savings to economic growth;  
(2) short-run unidirectional causal flow from fiscal balance to public debt;  
(3) short-run unidirectional causal flow from savings to fiscal balance; and  
(4) no causality between fiscal balance and economic growth, and between 
savings and public debt.   
The empirical results in Table 7.10 (Model 4b) for public debt service, fiscal balance, 
savings and economic growth in Zimbabwe, indicate no causal link between public 
debt service and economic growth, irrespective of whether the causality is estimated 
in the short or long run. This finding is confirmed by the F-statistic of ∆PDSt, in the 
economic growth (∆yt) function, and ∆yt in the public debt service (∆PDSt) function, 
which are both statistically insignificant. Though unexpected in this study, the finding 
is in line with the empirical evidence reported by Singh (1999). 
Other results of Zimbabwe reported in Table 7.10 (Model 4b) reveal a: 
(1) short- and long-run unidirectional causal flow from savings to economic growth;  
(2) short-run unidirectional causality from public debt service to fiscal balance; 
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(3) short-run unidirectional causality from savings to fiscal balance;  
(4) short-run unidirectional causality from public debt service to savings; and 
(5) no causality between fiscal balance and economic growth. 
Empirical analysis of Model 4 for South Africa 
The empirical results reported in Table 7.10 (Model 4a) for South Africa indicate that 
there is short-run unidirectional causal flow from economic growth (y) to public debt 
(PD). This result is confirmed by the corresponding F-statistic of economic growth (∆yt) 
in the public debt (∆PDt) function, which is statistically significant. These results are 
not unique to this study as they are consistent with the finding in Donayre and Taivan 
(2017). According to Donayre and Taivan (2017), low levels of economic growth lead 
to a rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio.   
Other results of Model 4a for South Africa reveal that there is: 
  
(1) unidirectional causal flow from fiscal balance to economic growth, irrespective 
of whether the causality is estimated in the short or long run;  
(2) short- and long-run Granger-causality from savings to economic growth; 
(3) short- and long-run causal flow from public debt to savings; and  
(4) no causality between fiscal balance and public debt, and fiscal balance and 
savings. 
Finally, the empirical results in Table 7.10 (Model 4b) for public debt service, fiscal 
balance, savings and economic growth show that in South Africa, there is no short- or 
long-run Granger-causality between public debt service and economic growth. This is  
irrespective of whether the causality is estimated in the short or long run. This is 
confirmed by F-statistics of ΔPDS in the economic growth function (∆yt) and that of ∆yt 
in the public debt service function (∆PDSt), which are both statistically insignificant. 
Although unexpected, this finding is not isolated to this study; it is similar to the 
evidence reported by Jalles (2011).  
Other results reported in Model 4b, for South Africa, reveal that there is:  




(2) short-run bidirectional causality from savings to economic growth;  
(3) long-run unidirectional causality from savings to economic growth;  
(4) distinct short- and long-run unidirectional causality from savings to public debt 
service; and 
(5) no causality between savings and fiscal balance, and public debt service and 
fiscal balance. 
7.4.3 Summary of the ECM-based causality results – Models 4a and 4b  
From the causality front, Table 7.11 summarises the results of the Granger-causality 
tests (Models 4a and 4b). 
Table 7.11: Summary of Granger-causality results for Models 4a and 4b (all three 
study countries) 
 
Model 4a – PD, y, FB, S Model 4b – PDS, y, FB, S 
Study country 
Direction of Causality Direction of Causality 
Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run 
Zambia y ⟼ PD y ⟼ PD No causality No causality 
Zimbabwe y ⟼ PD No causality No causality No causality 
South Africa y ⟼ PD No causality No causality No causality 
Notes: PD = public debt; y = economic growth; FB = fiscal balance; S = savings; PDS = public debt 
service; and ⟼ indicates direction of causality. 
As summarised in Table 7.11, Model 4a illustrates that economic growth Granger-
causes public debt in all the study countries in the short run. In the long run, however, 
the causal relationship was sensitive to the country under investigation. In Zambia, 
causality flowed from public debt to economic growth, while in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, there was no causality in the long run. The results of Model 4b are consistent 
with the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis in which the findings fail to find evidence in 
support of any causal link between public debt service and economic growth in the 




In this chapter, the econometric analysis and the empirical findings from Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa were presented and discussed using four models based 
on:  
(1) the impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth (Model 1);  
(2) the relative impact of disaggregated public debt (domestic and foreign) on 
economic growth (Model 2);  
(3) the impact of public debt service on economic growth (Model 3); and  
(4) the causal linkages between aggregate public debt and economic growth 
(Model 4a), and public debt service and economic growth (Model 4b), from 
1970 to 2017.  
The study employed an ARDL approach. For the impact models, Models 1, 2 and 3, 
the findings varied from country to country. Model 4 tested the Granger-causality 
between aggregate public debt and economic growth (Model 4a), and public debt 
service and economic growth (Model 4b) within a multivariate setting. Two control 
variables, that is, fiscal balance and gross domestic savings, were added as 
intermittent variables in the two models to minimise the problem of omission-of-
variable bias. Therefore, Model 4a consisted of aggregate public debt, economic 
growth, fiscal balance and savings, while Model 4b comprised of public debt service, 
economic growth, fiscal balance and savings. 
Based on Model 1’s results, aggregate public debt was found to have a positive impact 
on economic growth in Zambia, irrespective of whether the analysis was in the short 
or long run. In Zimbabwe and South Africa, aggregate public debt and economic 
growth were negatively related, both in the short- and long run. Thus, based on Model 
1 results, aggregate public debt is growth-enhancing in Zambia and is growth-inhibiting 
in Zimbabwe and South Africa, and this outcome applies both in the short and long 
run.  
The empirical findings for Model 2 revealed that the impact of the disaggregated public 
debt on the study countries differs depending on the type of debt – domestic or foreign 
– and the period considered. In Zambia, while domestic public debt negatively 
impacted economic growth, its foreign counterpart had a positive impact, both in the 
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short and long run. In the case of Zimbabwe, domestic and foreign public debt harms 
economic growth, irrespective of the period of analysis. Finally, in South Africa, 
domestic public debt has a positive impact on economic growth in the short run only, 
while foreign public debt lowers economic growth, in the long run only. In view of Model 
2’s results in the study countries, the variations in the composition of public debt 
(domestic or foreign) have a strong bearing on each country’s economic performance.  
The results for Model 3 have been mixed across the study countries and were largely 
time-variant. In Zambia, public debt service negatively impacted economic growth in 
the short run only. In the case of Zimbabwe, the impact of public debt service on 
economic growth was negative in the short run and positive in the long run. In line with 
the public debt-economic growth neutrality hypothesis, public debt service had no 
significant impact on economic growth in South Africa, and the result applies both in 
the short and long run.   
Finally, the Granger-causality results for Model 4a indicate that the direction of 
causality is from economic growth to public debt in the study countries, in the short 
run. While economic growth Granger-causes public debt in Zambia, in Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, public debt and economic growth are not causally related, in the long 
run. The results of Model 4b were consistent with the Ricardian Equivalence 
hypothesis, in which there is no causality between public debt service and economic 
















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the study and provides conclusions and recommendations 
based on the results presented and discussed in Chapter 7 and is structured as 
follows: Section 8.2 gives an overview of the entire study; Section 8.3 briefly outlines 
the main findings of the study; Section 8.4 presents the study conclusions and policy 
recommendations. Finally, section 8.5 presents highlights of the possible limitations of 
the study and suggests areas for further empirical exploration. 
8.2 Overview of the study 
This study investigated the public debt, public debt service and economic growth 
nexus in Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This research discussed the trends, 
reforms and challenges that shaped the evolution of public debt, public debt service 
and economic growth and reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
subject. 
In each of the three selected study countries, it examines five specific objectives:  
(1) the impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth;  
(2) the relative impact of disaggregated public debt (domestic and foreign) on 
economic growth;  
(3) the impact of public debt service on economic growth;  
(4) the causality between aggregate public debt and economic; and  
(5) the causality between public debt service and economic growth.  
This study tested five hypotheses, which are:  
(1) aggregate public debt negatively impacts economic growth in the selected three 
Southern African countries;  
(2) domestic and foreign public debt negatively impacts economic growth in these 
Southern African countries;  
(3) public debt service negatively impacts economic growth in these countries;  
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(4) there is a unidirectional causal flow from aggregate public debt to economic 
growth in the study countries; and  
(5) there is a unidirectional causal flow from public debt service to economic growth 
in these countries. 
 
The study applied an individual case studies approach, and the three selected 
countries in this study were Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The choice of the 
countries was motivated primarily by the differences and similarities in their 
approaches regarding the adoption of public debt, public debt service and economic 
growth reforms, and hence the sizes and structures of their debt and economies. 
Firstly, South Africa is in the upper-middle-income category, while Zambia and 
Zimbabwe are in the lower-middle-income and low-income categories, respectively. 
Secondly, South Africa mostly depends on domestic public debt rather than foreign 
public debt, which is in direct contrast to the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Lastly, 
the chosen three countries are among the few Southern African countries with 
adequate and reliable time-series data to undertake the investigations.  
In the empirical examination, the study utilised four models [three impact models – 
Models 1, 2 and 3; and one causality model – Model 4]. Model 1 explores the impact 
of aggregate public debt on economic growth in Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
Furthermore, in Model 1, the regressand economic growth (y) is explained by seven 
explanatory variables, namely, public debt (PD), investment (I), labour (L), fiscal 
balance (FB), trade openness (TOP), savings (S) and terms of trade (TOT).  
Model 2 tests the relative impact of domestic and foreign public debt on economic 
growth in the selected countries. In this model, Model 2, the regressand economic 
growth (y) is explained by domestic public debt (DPD) and foreign public debt (FPD), 
and six other control variables, which are investment (I), labour (L), fiscal balance (FB), 
trade openness (TOP), savings (S) and terms of trade (TOT).  
Model 3 investigates the impact of public debt service on economic growth. In this 
model, the dependent variable (economic growth (y)) is explained by public debt 
service (PDS), investment (I), labour (L), fiscal balance (FB), trade openness (TOP), 
savings (S) and terms of trade (TOT).  
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Finally, in Model 4, the Granger-causality between aggregate public debt and 
economic growth (Model 4a), and between public debt service and economic growth 
(Model 4b) is tested within a multivariate setting. Model 4 uses fiscal balance (FB) and 
savings (S) as the intermittent variables such that the multivariate Model 4a consists 
of public debt (PD), economic growth (y), fiscal balance (FB), and savings (S), while 
the multivariate Model 4b consists of public debt service (PDS), economic growth (y), 
fiscal balance (FB), and savings (S).  
The ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration determines the cointegration for 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4. The study used this approach due to its superior characteristics 
over alternative conventional cointegration methods. It used three stationarity tests, 
namely, the DF-GLS, PP and PPURoot, to determine the order of integration of all the 
variables in the specified models. Models 1, 2 and 3 used the ECM-based ARDL model 
to examine the impact of public debt and public debt service and economic growth. 
Finally, Model 4 employs the ECM-based Granger-causality test to observe the 
dynamic causality between aggregate public debt and economic growth (Model 4a), 
and between public debt service and economic growth (Model 4b).  
8.3 Summary of the empirical findings 
The overall empirical findings of the four models used in this study can be summarised 
as follows:  
(1) The impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth (Model 1) varies 
significantly  depending on the timeframe and study country.  
The results of Model 1 for Zambia reveal that aggregate public debt has a positive 
impact on economic growth, irrespective of whether the impact is estimated in the 
short or long run. This finding, although contrary to the study expectations, 
compares favourably with other previous studies on the topic, such as Spilioti and 
Vamvoukas (2015) in Greece and DeLong and Summers (2012) in the United 
States of America.   
 
In Zimbabwe and South Africa, aggregate public debt negatively impacts 
economic growth, both in the short and long run. This result is in line with empirical 
evidence from Mhlaba and Phiri (2019) for South Africa, Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-
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Rivero (2018) for 11 European countries, and Huang et al. (2018) for 70 advanced 
and emerging countries. 
 
(2) The empirical results for Model 2 in the study countries also vary considerably 
depending on the type of government debt  (domestic or foreign) and whether the 
analysis is in the short or long run.  
 
In Zambia, the results show that while foreign public debt positively impacts 
economic growth, domestic public debt has a negative impact. The negative 
impact of domestic public debt on economic growth is not unique in Zambia and 
consistent with the finding in Akhtar and Hassan (2012) for Bangladesh. Although 
the results for foreign public debt in Zambia are contrary to the study expectations, 
the findings in Akram (2011) for Pakistan support this outcome.  
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the relative impact of domestic and foreign public debt 
on economic growth is negative, and the result applies irrespective of whether the 
impact is in the short or long run. This finding suggests: (1) domestic credit markets 
in Zimbabwe remain underdeveloped so that government borrowing could be 
crowding out private investment through credit rationing and high cost of capital, 
leading to depressed, physical capital build-up in this country; and (2) foreign 
public debt cannot be invested in highly tradable and productive sectors with high 
returns in the country.  
 
Lastly, in South Africa, domestic public debt was positively related to economic 
growth but only in the short run. These results are contrary to expectation, but 
consistent with findings reported in studies such as Akram (2016) for four South 
Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), Akram (2015) for 
Pakistan, Bua et al. (2014) for 36 low-income countries and Adams and Bevan 
(2005) for 45 developing countries. However, in the long run, the impact of foreign 
public debt on economic growth was negative. The empirical results could suggest 
that the domestic capital markets in South Africa are relatively well developed and 
foreign public debt  is proportionally lower than domestic public debt, compared to 




(3) The results of Model 3 in the study countries are mixed. Model 3 provides evidence 
of negative, positive and no relationship between public debt service and 
economic growth.  
 
In Zambia, the negative impact of public debt service on economic growth is 
confirmed in the short run only, in the long run, the impact is insignificant. The 
short-run negative relationship is consistent with Weeks (2000) and Savvides 
(1992), while the long-run neutrality is anchored by Akram (2016; 2015) and Jalles 
(2011).  
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, although the impact of public debt service on economic 
growth is negative in the short run, in the long run, it was positive. The confirmed 
positive relationship between public debt service and economic growth in 
Zimbabwe is not only uncommon and unexpected in this study, but also 
contradicts the theoretical underpinnings on this subject – particularly the public 
debt overhang. This finding in Zimbabwe suggests a net outflow of financial 
resources in the short run. However, in the long run, the clearance of protracted 
public debt arrears and principal amounts could have the following positives: (1) 
an increase in the country’s international creditworthiness – which increases both 
the public and private sectors’ access to cheap lines of credit; and (2) an increase 
in financial grants of the country from IFIs, or new loans on concessional terms.  
 
Finally, in South Africa, the study found that public debt service had no relationship  
on  economic growth whatsoever. The results for South Africa are consistent with 
those obtained by Akram (2016). 
 
(4) The empirical results regarding the direction of causality between aggregate public 
debt and economic growth (Model 4a) indicate that it is economic growth that 
Granger-causes public debt. However, in the long run, economic growth prevailed 
in the case of Zambia only where economic growth Granger-causes public debt. 
In contrast, in Zimbabwe and South Africa, no causality was confirmed. The results 
of the Granger-causality test between public debt service and economic growth 
(Model 4b) in the study countries support the neutrality of public debt service on 
economic growth. This shows that there is no causality between public debt 
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service and economic growth, irrespective of whether the causality test is in the 
short or long run.  
8.4 Conclusion and policy recommendations 
In line with the findings from this study, the following conclusions and policy 
recommendations are suggested:  
(1) This study reveals that the impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth is 
not the same in all the study countries – Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
While the impact of aggregate public debt on economic growth is positive in 
Zambia, in Zimbabwe and South Africa, it is negative and statistically significant, 
irrespective of whether the analysis is in the short or long run. Given these findings, 
the study recommends that policymakers in Zambia should continue utilising 
borrowed public funds to expand the country’s production base, diversifying the 
economy and growing the export sector. In Zimbabwe, the study recommends the 
need for deep structural changes in public debt management. This is likely to 
reduce the country’s public debt burden to sustainable levels and enhance 
financial and macroeconomic stability. Finally, in South Africa, the study 
recommends continual improvement in public finance management policies and 
the reduction in public debt levels to within sustainable levels since high public 
debt leads to subdued economic growth rates. 
 
(2) Regarding the impact of disaggregated public debt on economic growth, the 
findings were unique to each country, depending on the type of government debt 
and period of analysis. In Zambia, while foreign public debt has a positive impact 
on economic growth, domestic public debt has a negative effect. In Zimbabwe, the 
relative impact of domestic and foreign public debt on economic growth is 
negative, and the result applies regardless of whether the analysis is in the short 
or long run. In South Africa, domestic public debt is positively related to economic 
growth but only in the short run, while the impact of foreign public debt on 
economic growth is negative but only in the long run. Therefore, in Zambia, the 
study recommends that the government limits its reliance on domestic capital 
markets as this impedes economic growth. The policymakers may also consider 
growing the domestic capital markets by introducing new strategies, for example, 
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the introduction of new government debt securities to diversify the investor base 
by attracting more investors. More so, the government is encouraged to use all 
foreign debt in financing long-term investment projects that should translate into 
economic growth.  
 
In Zimbabwe, both domestic and foreign public debt negatively affect economic 
growth. Hence policymakers should formulate policies to limit the government’s 
borrowing from the domestic financial sector and also institute policies that expand 
the domestic capital markets in the country. More so, borrowed government funds, 
whether from domestic or foreign sources, should be channelled towards long-
term, high returning investments, which can stimulate economic growth.  
 
In the case of South Africa, the study recommends that the country continues 
implementing domestic public debt policies to improve economic growth. 
However, the study cautions the country against growing foreign public debt to 
finance its increasing expenditure as this has adverse effects on economic growth 
in the long run. Policymakers in South Africa, should, therefore, manage foreign 
public debt appropriately to avoid it reaching unsustainable levels. 
 
(3) The study revealed that the impact of public debt service on economic growth is 
distinctly different in each country. In the short run, the impact was negative in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, and positive in Zimbabwe in the long run. In South Africa, 
public debt service has no impact on economic growth whatsoever. Thus, in 
Zambia, policymakers should consider adopting initiatives to improve revenue 
generation, mostly in the short run.  
 
In Zimbabwe, policymakers should consider fiscal and financial policies that 
promote a constant supply of long-term finance, long-term fixed investments, and 
extension of a government securities maturity structure to ensure sustainable 
short- and long-term public debt service expenditure. More so, in Zimbabwe, 
where public service positively relates to economic growth in the long run, the 
study further recommends the consolidation and strengthening of non-




(4) The causality results show that economic growth Granger-causes public debt in 
the short run in the study countries. However, in the long run, the causal 
relationship varied. While economic growth Granger-causes public debt in 
Zambia, in Zimbabwe and South Africa, no causality was confirmed, in the long 
run. Therefore, the study recommends policymakers in Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
South Africa to consider growth-enhancing policies in the short run, since poor 
economic performances may lead to high public debt levels. 
 
(5) With regards to causality between public debt service and economic growth, the 
results show no causality between public debt service and economic growth in 
these countries, irrespective of whether the causality analysis is carried out in the 
short or long run.  
8.5 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further empirical research 
Despite applying due diligence in undertaking this research to ensure that the study 
results are credible, robust and reliable, this study may have specific limitations. 
First, to avoid model misspecification and increase the predictive power of the models, 
the study included six control variables in Models 1, 2 and 3. As a result of these 
control variables incorporated in the specified impact models, Models 1, 2 and 3 
presented an adequate representation of the nature of the impact of public debt 
(domestic and foreign) and public debt service on economic growth. However, other 
important variables could be included, such as, but not limited to, quality of public 
sector institutions and macroeconomic uncertainty. These variables were omitted in 
the study due to the unavailability of reliable time-series data. As the data of these and 
other variables become available, it would be ideal for future studies on the subject to 
establish whether the results would change significantly after incorporating these 
variables.  
Second, this study extends the current debate on the public debt-economic growth 
nexus by empirically testing the impact of public debt on economic growth, and 
simultaneously estimating the relative impact of domestic and foreign public debt on 
economic growth. Some theoretical arguments suggest that the relationship between 
public debt and economic growth could be nonlinear. Hence, it would be interesting 
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for future studies to test the existence (or nonexistence) of nonlinear relationships 
between public debt and economic growth using recently developed econometric 
techniques – and determine the respective threshold points in each study economies. 
Future studies may also consider testing the underlying relationships in this study by 
applying panel data analysis and ascertaining if the results change significantly.  
In summary, although the limitations outlined above could have impacted the empirical 
results and evidence, their effects are assumed to be minimal and not significantly 
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